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PREFACE
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writing the nal words of this thesis. It has included numerous hours working
in the laboratory, a lot of brainstorming sessions and gallons of coee. Working
in several projects, including the EIT Digital ACTIVE, has oered me a great
opportunity to conduct cutting-edge research while simultaneously meeting and
working with inspiring people.
I want to express my deepest gratitude to Prof. Jarmo Harju for his guidance
and collaboration over the years, including several publications. The years
moving from working as a laboratory assistant to a M.Sc degree programme to
further conducting joint research with Prof. Harju on the doctoral programme
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Prof. Billy Bob Brumley is to be thanked for supervising my thesis and help-
ing me nish my doctoral studies. Our cooperation has been straightforward
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uent, so I realize I've been privileged to have worked with Billy.
I am grateful to Prof. Antonio Lioy and Dr. David Arroyo Guardeño for
pre-examination of my thesis and all their sharp-minded comments regarding
the manuscript. Also I'd like to extend a very special thank you to Dr. Diego R.
Lopez, Telefónica, for having such interest in my topic and for his willingness
to act as an opponent.
Special thanks go to my colleague, Joona Kannisto, for his enlightening con-
versations on a broad range of topics, and for his support for my research over
the years. Furthermore, I'd like to thank all the co-authors who have writ-
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I've heard a story that once upon a time, a distinguished researcher started
a conference speech by stating:
If you think I will reveal any secrets here, you're all wrong.
This applies at some level to this thesis as well. The topics covered in this
publication are relatively straightforward and any presented innovations could
have been discovered by other researches working with secure networking.
Regardless, I contentedly publish this thesis addressing presented topics and
their purpose in this eld of technology. Especially the combination of VPN and
SDN is highly ecient to be utilized more in modern networks with high-speed
and low latency requirements. Hopefully, my ndings will accelerate research
in this eld and will eventually lead to ever more sophisticated security designs.
All design involves conicting objectives and hence compromise,
and the best designs will always be those that come up with the best
compromise
Invention by Design, Henry Petroski.
Markku Vajaranta
21.8.2019 Tampere
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ABSTRACT
Securing communication in computer networks has been an essential feature
ever since the Internet, as we know it today, was started. One of the best known
and most common methods for secure communication is to use a Virtual Private
Network (VPN) solution, mainly operating with an IP security (IPsec) protocol
suite originally published in 1995 (RFC1825). It is clear that the Internet, and
networks in general, have changed dramatically since then. In particular, the
onset of the Cloud and the Internet-of-Things (IoT) have placed new demands
on secure networking. Even though the IPsec suite has been updated over the
years, it is starting to reach the limits of its capabilities in its present form.
Recent advances in networking have thrown up Software-Dened Networking
(SDN), which decouples the control and data planes, and thus centralizes the
network control. SDN provides arbitrary network topologies and elastic packet
forwarding that have enabled useful innovations at the network level.
This thesis studies SDN-powered VPN networking and explains the benets
of this combination. Even though the main context is the Cloud, the approaches
described here are also valid for non-Cloud operation and are thus suitable for
a variety of other use cases for both SMEs and large corporations.
In addition to IPsec, open source TLS-based VPN (e.g. OpenVPN) solutions
are often used to establish secure tunnels. Research shows that a full-mesh
VPN network between multiple sites can be provided using OpenVPN and it
can be utilized by SDN to create a seamless, resilient layer-2 overlay for multiple
purposes, including the Cloud. However, such a VPN tunnel suers from re-
siliency problems and cannot meet the increasing availability requirements. The
network setup proposed here is similar to Software-Dened WAN (SD-WAN)
solutions and is extremely useful for applications with strict requirements for
resiliency and security, even if best-eort ISP is used.
IPsec is still preferred over OpenVPN for some use cases, especially by
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smaller enterprises. Therefore, this research also examines the possibilities for
high availability, load balancing, and faster operational speeds for IPsec. We
present a novel approach involving the separation of the Internet Key Exchange
(IKE) and the Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) in SDN fashion to oper-
ate from separate devices. This allows central management for the IKE while
several separate ESP devices can concentrate on the heavy processing.
Initially, our research relied on software solutions for ESP processing. De-
spite the ingenuity of the architectural concept, and although it provided high
availability and good load balancing, there was no anti-replay protection. Since
anti-replay protection is vital for secure communication, another approach was
required. It thus became clear that the ideal solution for such large IPsec tun-
neling would be to have a pool of fast ESP devices, but to conne the IKE
operation to a single centralized device. This would obviate the need for load
balancing but still allow high availability via the device pool.
The focus of this research thus turned to the study of pure hardware so-
lutions on an FPGA, and their feasibility and production readiness for appli-
cation in the Cloud context. Our research shows that FPGA works uently
in an SDN network as a standalone IPsec accelerator for ESP packets. The
proposed architecture has 10 Gbps throughput, yet the latency is less than 10
µs, meaning that this architecture is especially ecient for data center use and
oers increased performance and latency requirements.
The high demands of the network packet processing can be met using several
dierent approaches, so this approach is not just limited to the topics presented
in this thesis. Global network trac is growing all the time, so the development
of more ecient methods and devices is inevitable. The increasing number of
IoT devices will result in a lot of network trac utilising the Cloud infrastruc-
tures in the near future. Based on the latest research, once SDN and hardware
acceleration have become fully integrated into the Cloud, the future for secure
networking looks promising. SDN technology will open up a wide range of
new possibilities for data forwarding, while hardware acceleration will satisfy
the increased performance requirements. Although it still remains to be seen
whether SDN can answer all the requirements for performance, high availability
and resiliency, this thesis shows that it is a very competent technology, even
though we have explored only a minor fraction of its capabilities.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Secure networking is a highly desirable security feature nowadays. Both do-
mestic and commercial users demand technology that can maintain security for
their data as it goes through the Internet. There are several dierent methods
for achieving this, including Virtual Private Networking (VPN), which is often
the choice for many large enterprises. However, probably the most interesting
new networking technology to have appeared in a long time is Software-Dened
Networking (SDN). Vendors and Cloud operators are touting beguiling images
of automated networks that are the answer to all networking problems. In
this context, device manufacturers are presenting SDN as a technology which
can meet all the requirements for these networks. Nevertheless, even the most
ardent of these vendors will concede that there are still some question marks
about the supposed benets of SDN.
Therefore, this thesis aims to study what this new technology, SDN, can do
for secure communication, particularly with regard to its utilization for VPN
networks such as those used to link multiple sites within a single enterprise. Is it
all just sales hype, or can SDN really provide added value for the Internet users
by oering outstanding solutions to the challenges faced by VPN technology?
1.1 The research question, the methodology and
the original contribution of the thesis
When the Forwarding and Control Element Separation (ForCES) Framework
was introduced in 2004 by [178], the whole network paradigm underwent a
wave of innovative change. This led to the inception of the latest SDN concept,
which has opened up yet more new possibilities for ingenious solutions. SDN
can not only be utilized by the largest of corporate organizations, but it can also
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be used to improve and refresh the networks of even small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs).
The importance of secure communication channels over untrusted networks
cannot be emphasized enough. It is a de facto requirement when a company's
operations are spread over several dierent physical locations. Although this
might only appear to be a concern for large multi-site companies, the current
trend for outsourcing servers to Cloud providers is very common. Many small,
kickstart technology companies use servers in the public Cloud, and thus they
have to communicate with them through the Internet.
This thesis answers the following research questions about networking tech-
nology in general, and SDN in particular. The focus is on their ability to
provide secure communication for both SMEs and large businesses:
1. What cost-eective solution can provide SMEs with a secure and resilient
VPN using best-eort ISPs, either with or without SDN?
2. How secure and resilient is an SDN-supported VPN given the additional
rigorous performance requirements of large corporations and the Cloud?
This thesis contributes to the debate by providing fresh thinking and novel
approaches to these questions. The methodology utilized to accomplish this is
the result of practice-driven experiments.
More precisely, the same three-step approach was used for every published
article. The rst step was to conduct research on the web to identify and
evaluate any related work on best practice in the eld. The second step was to
examine the latest research not only in terms of its relation to previous research,
but also to apply novel approaches to the topics. Finally, experiments were
conducted to obtain empirical data which would show up any limitations of the
studies, along with any possible problems with the designs of the networking
solutions under study.
As the research for this thesis progressed, it threw up still more unanswered
questions, so what follows is the story behind each stage of the articles produced
for this thesis, including a brief introduction to each topic.
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1.2 The storyline
The search for answers to the rst question presented in section 1.1 began with
a study of the Small oce/Home oce (SOHO) approach to networking. This
work was actually conducted over a much larger environment than was pre-
sented in the Publication I. The research in Publication I focuses on modeling
power consumption to detect attacks on wireless routers designed for home
use. The results of this research successfully illustrate how a router's power
consumption changes signicantly when it undergoes Wi-based attacks.
The power consumption modeling and attacks may only play a minor part in
the bigger picture of researching SDN-based VPN solutions. The work is based
on a setup that depicts a SOHO network. It includes four wireless routers, one
of which acts as a gateway to the Internet. The network setup used for the
experiments in Publication I was in fact a smaller part of a larger entity, as
explained later in section 3.1. After the experiments on Wi attacks had been
conducted, the setup was extended to include both another SOHO network and
a Cloud connection as well. As this was beyond the scope of Publication I this
work was not included in that publication.
The network presented in Publication I was a fully functional routed VPN
setup for which the routing and IP distribution were done with a Zero-congura-
tion networking (zeroconf) [68] approach. The question then arose, What
would happen with a non-routed setup? Especially one in which the sites
could communicate with each other using a best-eort Internet Service Provider
(ISP)? How resilient and fault-tolerant could it be made to be using open source
tools?
This led to Publication II, for which the research question was immediately
obvious, i.e. What solution fullls the needs for a secure and resilient layer-
2 Wide Area Network (WAN) overlay? Our solution utilized an OpenVPN
carrying Virtual eXtensible Local Area Network (VXLAN) packets which made
forwarding decisions for network packets between virtual Open vSwitch (OVS)
switches. The SDN controller handled all the virtual switches, thus providing
elastic packet-forwarding in the network.
The test network in Publication II had two virtualization platforms and an
oce network with two gateways, each using two ISPs for the Internet connec-
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tion. The experiments conducted on this network showed it to be relatively
resilient and fault-tolerant.
This kind of virtualization platform was a good example of a Cloud infras-
tructure setup where multiple sites host a number of Virtual Machines (VMs),
and this is just what is needed in the head oce of many commercial organi-
zations. Although the current trend for many companies is to outsource their
servers and thus to buy virtualization capacity from a Cloud provider, such
companies still need fast connectivity to their Cloud VMs, especially in terms
of throughput and latency. Furthermore, as commercial enterprises tend to
stick with proprietary solutions instead of open source ones, any connection to
the Cloud is often built using IPsec.
This fact highlighted the need to dig deeper into IPsec, and into methods
for speeding up tunneling. This also entailed research into the high-availability
and fault-tolerance options for IPsec, which resulted in Publication III.
The novel approach taken here was to use an SDN network to separate the
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) and IPsec Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP)
trac from each other, and to terminate them on dierent servers. In this
way, a single device was able to handle a vast number of key negotiations using
IKE. Keys were distributed to a set of servers that were dedicated for ESP
encapsulation.
This work includes a thorough description of the network architecture and
the message exchange description for the SDN and IPsec, all of which were
orchestrated with an Application Programming Interface (API). The results
of the experiments described in Publication III conrmed that the proposed
architecture is functional and ESP encapsulation works uently on the separate
devices in the network. However, the predicted problem with IPsec sequence
numbers was detected and thus it was not feasible to share trac related to a
single Security Association (SA) with other ESP servers. The dierent SAs, on
the other hand, worked well and packets were distributed eciently throughout
the network.
Since it was cumbersome, in fact nearly impossible, to share a single SA
on separate devices, a question arose: How to make IPsec packet encryption
faster? The answer was to accelerate it, e.g. on a Field Programmable Gateway
Array (FPGA) device.
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This topic was thus investigated more carefully in Publication IV and in the
extended journal version of that study published as Publication V. Hereinafter,
Publication V will be the research referred to regarding this topic. The aim of
this study was to evaluate the feasibility of IPsec FPGA acceleration in Cloud
environments with the help of the SDN solution presented in Publication III.
The results were astonishingly good. A single FPGA can host a vast number of
tunnels and provide 10 Gbps packet throughput rate with only 10 µs latency.
The FPGA appears to be an extremely ecient device for this purpose. The
utilization of a separate IKE in a dedicated server relieves the FPGA from a
lot of complex algorithms and processes, leaving it with more room for the
all-important encryption process.
1.3 Scope and restrictions
The eld of internet security could include so many aspects of networking that
is is necessary to dene the scope of any research in the eld. The following
topics have been excluded from this thesis in order to focus on other, more
desired topics.
• Wireless communication
• Digital design
• Cloud (limited scope)
As this thesis focuses heavily on networking, while Publication I is about
wireless networking, it is necessary to state clearly that wireless communica-
tion itself is beyond the scope of this thesis. The methods presented here rely
on wired communication, usually with Ethernet networking. The high-speed
links are mostly wired, and the ISPs oer wired connectivity for their clients.
Although the internal network in some companies might include a wireless net-
work for clients, the backbone of the company network and its server networks
are mostly wired.
This thesis only touches on the topic of digital design described in Publica-
tion V. The FPGA described in that article provides a platform for the desired
functionality. Even though some factors concerning the design of the FPGA
are explained, the digital design itself is beyond the scope of this work.
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The term 'the Cloud' also needs to be dened within the context of this the-
sis. Here, the Cloud is considered to be an Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS)
Cloud, one which oers VMs to its customers. Virtualization platforms provide
the same service, but here the Cloud is regarded as a relatively large environ-
ment hosting a vast number of VMs on several hypervisors. Furthermore, the
IaaS Cloud is often built to be easily expandable and the surrounding infras-
tructure has to be able to adapt to this feature. Such modularity and elasticity
is not covered in more traditional server virtualizations.
1.4 The author’s contribution to the publications
Publication I describes how power measurements can reveal network attacks
on home network routers. The author set up the network for the experiments,
which included a Wi mesh, OpenWRT rmware deployment to routers, a
custom-built Babel routing protocol daemon and an ISP providing IPv6 pre-
xes. The network packets used for the attacks against the Wi network were
also designed by the author. The energy measurements and related data anal-
ysis were covered by the co-authors.
Most of the work described in Publication II on resilient, secure, SDN-based
WAN overlay networks was carried out by the author, who also wrote the
corresponding sections and designed both the network and the experiments
conducted to verify its performance. The topics of redundancy and link watch
script in the architecture were covered by the co-authors.
Publication III describes how SDN is utilized to operate the IKE and ESP
processes from the IPsec on individual devices in a network. Although it was
the coauthor of the article who came up with the original idea for including a
separate ESP processing server in the network, nearly all of the research was
carried out by the author. This included the SDN setup, the ESP crypto en-
gine setp, the IKE service and their orchestration, as well as the verication
experiments. All the relevant sections corresponding to these topics in Publi-
cation III were written up by the author. The orchestration of the IPsec and
the specication of the API specication were done in collaboration with the
co-authors.
Finally, the author's major contribution to Publication V was in providing
20
the overall architectural vision of how the FPGA accelerator can be tted to
the IPsec with SDN paradigm. The author was responsible for several ele-
ments of this article including the system model for the complete design, the
feasibility considerations for using an IPsec on an FPGA, the specication of
the IPsec accelerator logic for the FPGA, and the physical network setup for
the experiments. The corresponding sections in Publication V were written by
the author. However, the author did not contribute to the FPGA internal de-
velopment, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block development, the
FPGA measurement hardware, the packet client or the application logic for the
experiments. Neither did the author contribute to the FPGA resource, or the
performance and latency evaluations.
1.5 Acknowledgments
Supported in part by the European Research Council (ERC) under the Euro-
pean Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agree-
ment No 804476 SCARE).
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2 BACKGROUND
Sending messages has a long history encompassing the ingenious use of a variety
of media including smoke signals, ags, carrier and even carrier pigeons. More
modern inventions include the telegraph, the phone and, nowadays, the packets
of digital data carried by the Internet. Since the 1980s, however, there has been
surprisingly little development in communication networking.
Now, changes are being wrought by the idea of detaching the control and
forwarding planes in the form of an SDN. It is hypothesized that such an
approach would be a perfect match for the Cloud technologies currently being
developed all around the globe.
One of the principal requirements of cloud-related technologies is that the
communication to the Cloud should be secure, and one of the best ways of
ensuring this is through the use of VPNs. This means that current performance
requirements for VPNs are extremely high, so new innovations such as hardware
acceleration are required as soon as possible.
2.1 Conventional networking
For the vast majority of people around the world, computer networks are now
an indispensable part of everyday life. Besides gaming and watching videos,
many people rely on computer networks for their news feeds, for the majority of
their long-distance communication, and of course for their banking and business
aairs. The Internet, that global network which interconnects an incalculably
vast number of electronic devices, is the core communication network for our
world. However, in reality the Internet consists of numerous smaller networks,
each of which may contain any manageable number of devices. Arguably, the
most common type of these smaller networks is the Local Area Network (LAN),
which is usually dedicated to one single network area, such as a company oce,
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or increasingly nowadays, someone's private home.
Any device connecting to the Internet will require an exact addressing scheme
for establishing connectivity with other devices connected to the net and ex-
changing messages. Currently, networking relies on two main types of addresses:
a Media Access Control (MAC) address and an Internet Protocol (IP) address.
The MAC address was standardized by IEEE 802.3 and is the address in the
Ethernet II frame eld of a network packet [93]. Its purpose is to point out the
next recipient for a packet. A MAC address is 48 bits long and is considered to
be globally unique. It is also called the hardware address since it is hard-coded
to the Ethernet chip.
Within networks, the Ethernet packet carries the IP packet in its payload.
The IP address was specied as long ago as 1981 [136]. There are currently two
dierent versions in use: version 4 [136] which species a 32-bit long address
format, and version 6 [33] which has a 128-bit address. The purpose of the IP
address is to specify the actual source and destination devices of each network
packet in any packet transmission.
The Ethernet frame carries the IP frame in its payload. The IP frame
further carries a transport layer protocol, the most common of which are the
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [137] or the User Datagram Protocol
(UDP) [134]. It is the transport layer protocol that usually carries the real
information that is being transmitted in its application data.
The TCP is a stateful protocol ensuring that the communicating devices
can keep track of all the packets sent and received and verify that every single
packet gets transmitted between the two ends of the connection [137]. While
the TCP provides a reliable communication channel for its peers, the UDP,
being a stateless protocol, does not oer the same level of reliability by itself
[134]. For that reason, UDP is often used for packet transmissions which do
not suer from a number of lost packets, such as audio or video transmission.
In networking, there are two types of devices that are mostly concerned with
packet forwarding: switches and routers. The switch is the basic building block
of any network. It may have a relatively large number of ports (e.g. 4-48) and
its purpose is to connect all the devices e.g. in a LAN, for example, together.
The basic function for a switch is to receive a packet in one of its ports and
forward it to one of its other ports for transmission in the LAN. A switch uses
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Figure 2.1 Packet forwarding when PC A sends a packet to PC B.
MAC addresses for this purpose and thus holds a table of seen addresses that
is constantly updated whenever necessary.
The router, on the other hand, connects whole networks together. It usually
has a relatively small number of ports compared to a switch, but of course
there are exceptions. When a router receives a packet, it reads the IP address
to nd out which destination network the packet is going to, and re-sends the
packet either directly to the nal destination or to another router for further
delivery. The router makes the routing decision based on its routing table,
which contains information related to known IP networks. The information in
this table can be gathered using both static and dynamic methods, although
further analysis of these methods is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Figure 2.1 shows a very basic scenario for a network with two PCs, two
routers and three switches (SW). PC A in the gure sends a network packet
to PC B, which is in an entirely dierent network. To reach its destination,
this packet needs to travel through routers A and B. The solid black lines show
the physical connections between devices whereas the green arrows depict the
packet forwarding through the devices holding a MAC or IP address.
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, the router manipulates the Ethernet header by
replacing the source and destination MAC address elds. The switches A, X
and B only read the MAC address and forward the packet to the port where
the destination MAC address is supposed to be. It is notable that in this
conguration the IP address of the packet stays the same from end to end.
However, this is not always the case since sometimes the network utilizes a
technology called Network Address Translation (NAT) [36]. NAT's Purpose is
to translate a public IPv4 address into a private IPv4 address. An even more
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useful technology is Network Address Port Translation (NAPT), which trans-
lates a single public IPv4 address and its TCP/UDP port numbers into multiple
IPv4 private addresses and their corresponding TCP/UDP port numbers. In
this thesis, the term NAT will be used to refer to both NAT and NAPT. This
is an established practice in the literature as, in the end, there is not much
dierence in the two technologies.
The case in Figure 2.1 changes quite dramatically when NAT is deployed on
router A. The packet is sent as before, but the router also replaces the SRC
IP address before sending it on to router B. In this scenario, router B, and
eventually PC B, receives a packet with a source IP of 3.3.3.1.
Commonly, the IP addresses in networks like the one shown in Figure 2.1
are distributed to the clients using a Dynamic Host Conguration Protocol
(DHCP). The DHCP greatly reduces the network management burden and is
thus recommended, especially for IPv6, due to its much larger address space.
In addition, DHCPv6 can also assign complete network blocks from ISP to
customers using DHCPv6 Prex Delegation (DHCPv6-PD) [170].
The objective of the IETF Zeroconf Working Group is to facilitate network
management by making specications for a zeroconf approach using IPv4 and
IPv6 addressing [68]. The Homenet working group has the same ambition
according to [131, 160]. The Homenet [61] project is in turn making imple-
mentations based on these RFCs. These rely on the Home Networking Control
Protocol (HNCP) [160] in order to achieve zeroconf IPv6 (and IPv4) routing,
prex assignment and service discovery for networks with multiple wireless
routers, as stated in [61] . The HNCP uses the prex-assignment algorithm of
[131] with its own message structure, as presented in [160]. Periodic update
messages take place every 20 seconds, verifying the router's continued existence
in the network. The Homenet project relies on the Babel routing protocol [21].
This works by sending periodic HELLO messages to the network every 4 sec-
onds with reciprocal IHU (I-Hear-U) messages. These messages identify neigh-
bouring routers and are followed with the UPDATE messages that update the
routing table information regarding IP networks behind these neighbors.
Networks and devices are often benchmarked in order to ascertain their ac-
tual performance and throughput rate. It is important to understand the eect
that the size of the network packet may have when carrying out such experi-
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ments. For instance, IPFire has benchmarked IPsec in [169] with a wide range
of dierent-size packets. Their results clearly indicate the need for a relatively
large packet size (in the range of 64 B to 1500 B) before line rate operation
can be achieved. Their results [169] started to approach the theoretical maxi-
mum when a packet size of 800 B was used. Operation with small packet sizes
requires a lot of performance just for the packet generation part, let alone the
packet handling itself. Thus, these benchmarks often tend to favor large packet
sizes in their experiments in order to ensure good results and demonstrate a
network's peak performance, rather than its actual performance.
Dening the real throughput of a network is not a simple topic due to the
diculties of accurate benchmarking caused by the large variation in packet
sizes handled by the Internet. The Internet MIX (IMIX) specication explains
the situation in [96] by dening the methods used to nd repeatable test con-
ditions, though the authors are careful to state that one test set might not
work in a dierent conguration. Benson, Akella and Maltz [12] measured the
typical packet size in networks, or IMIX, as varying between 200 B and 1400
B. In this thesis we assume that the Maximum Transfer Unit (MTU) of 1500 B
is used if the packet size for the benchmarks is not dened. These MTU-sized
packets may skew the results slightly, since it shows the maximum throughput
for the easiest-to-handle packet size. Smaller packets are more dicult to han-
dle, and would result in a lower value for maximum throughput. This has been
veried, for instance, Park et al. [128] for IPsec processing.
2.2 SDN networking
2.2.1 A short history of SDN
The earliest reference to SDN is from 1987 by Cummings, Hickey and Kinney
[31] in an AT&T document discussing the evolution of telecommunication at
that time. Their document has only a sketchy reference to SDN, and only
informs the reader that the network is managed using software. The current
SDN concept was rst presented in [178] which described the separation of the
forwarding and control planes. The migration from hardware to software had
already reached networking a while ago, but the really rapid development in
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this research eld has only occurred since 2009 based on Nunes et al. [103].
Since that time, researchers' views on the potential capabilities of SDN have
broadened considerably.
However, this kind of network management via software is denitely not a
new invention. The well-known Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
performed such a task from the time it was developed in 1988 [18]. The idea
behind SNMP is that agent software on an administrator machine sends com-
mands to the network devices. This allows a single machine to manage multiple
network devices.
Going back even further, in-house built custom management script setups
have been used ever since the Telnet protocol was specied in 1983 [138]. These
scripts usually tend to deploy some feature or conguration parameter centrally
to a large set of network devices with relative ease. Telnet has since been
replaced by Secure Shell (SSH) [179], but the main idea of script collection has
stayed the same.
Netconf [39] is an even more sophisticated method compared to custom
script collection. It uses eXtensive Markup Language (XML) [177] to represent
the conguration on network devices and thus is very exible, allowing dierent
conguration schemes for various devices. The only requirement is to have a
Netconf agent running on the device software, which should be connected to a
Netconf manager.
All of the aforementioned methods fulll the SDN paradigm for a software
programmable network [55, 178]. Essentially, it means that devices are cong-
ured centrally with user-friendly software involving minimal eort. The deni-
tion of SDN is still nding its form among the stakeholders.
The SDX Central which is a news and resource site for software-dened
everything has dened SDN as follows [151]: The goal of Software-Dened
Networking (SDN) is to enable cloud computing and network engineers and
administrators to respond quickly to changing business requirements via a cen-
tralized control console.
If Cloud technology is to be closely associated with SDN, then it is also nec-
essary to have a denition for the Cloud. The National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) has specied [91] the Cloud as follows: Cloud comput-
ing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access
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to a shared pool of congurable computing resources . . . that can be rapidly
provisioned and released with minimal management eort or service provider
interaction. Thus the cloud can be considered as a large virtualization platform
providing VM hosting services using several servers (hypervisors). Cloud com-
puting can be supported by edge computing, a technique which moves some of
the data processing from the Cloud core to the edge of the network [156]. This
ooading reduces the network trac and therefore any latency for applications
that utilize the Cloud.
Nunes et al. [103] dened SDN to be a new networking paradigm in which
the forwarding hardware is decoupled from control decision. A similar deni-
tion underlies Raghavan et al. [141] who state that: SDN eectively separates
the control plane from the data plane, much like earlier eorts such as . . . and
provides a programmatic interface so that new control plane functionality re-
quires only writing code for the network controllers.
Perhaps the simplest and best explanation is found from a non-prot con-
sortium, the Open Network Foundation, which is now playing a signicant role
in the standardization of SDN-related technologies. Their explanation [109] for
SDN states that it is: The physical separation of the network control plane
from the forwarding plane, and where a control plane controls several devices.
2.2.2 SDN in a nutshell
To summarize subsection 2.2.1: the SDN is about having separate control and
data planes. This helps administrators to make required network changes e-
ciently even in complex networks such as Clouds. Figure 2.2 depicts a conven-
tional network approach on the left and an SDN approach on the right. Usually,
as in this gure, the SDN is specically designed to utilize switches, but the
SDN concept can be extended to all network equipment. Traditional network
switches make forwarding decisions on their own since every single switch can
be considered to have its own control plane, i.e. its brains. In an SDN net-
work, this control plane is transferred to a server called the SDN controller,
which has connectivity to the switches. This way, the brains of the network
are centralized.
Thus, the SDN controller has a complete understanding of the network struc-
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Figure 2.2 Conventional network with combined control and data plane on the left
and corresponding SDN solution with a separate controller device on the
right [17].
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Figure 2.3 SDN network with four switches, two PCs, single random middlebox and
an SDN controller.
ture and is in an impeccable location for creating ows, which dene network
packet paths in the switch plane. A ow can be regarded as the rule set for
how a packet gets forwarded in the switch plane. Every switch in the packet
path gets an entry in its packet forwarding table. Figure 2.3 depicts an SDN
network with an SDN controller, four switches, two PCs and a single random
middlebox that can be any network device or a server holding an application
of any kind related to network packet handling.
In traditional networking, the network presented in Figure 2.3 is considered
to have a loop. Traditionally, the Spanning Tree Protocol (STP) [167] modies
the network structure by disabling links it nds best to prevent loops [23].
Assume the STP has disabled the link between SW 3 and SW 4, and a packet
transfer from PC A to PC B occurs. The SW 1 uses the path via SW 2 since
that is the only possibility.
SDN changes the situation dramatically as it obviates the need for STP. All
the links between the switches are active. When a packet from PC A to PC B
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Figure 2.4 Different SDN layers and their corresponding API interfaces [152].
enters SW 1, the switch asks the controller for the desired path. The controller
knows the structure of the network precisely, so it creates a ow for the packet
through the network from SW 1, either via SW 2 or SW 3. The topology in SDN
is always completely loop-free, because ows are created centrally on-demand.
Flows can be created either directly, as the SDN controller nds best, or with
rules from third-party software deployed along with the controller. Figure 2.4
shows the dierent layers in the SDN stack and their corresponding APIs [152].
The control layer in the middle holds the SDN controller, which communi-
cates with the applications and switches. Two popular open-source controller
projects are, for instance, OpenDaylight and Floodlight [88]. The Floodlight
SDN controller contains a number of inbuilt applications, or modules, (e.g. net-
work services) like Learning switch [47]. The Learning switch is a basic layer
two-level switch component that makes packet forwarding decisions, unless this
has been done previously by some other Floodlight module. In Floodlight, the
modules are run sequentially as shown in Figure 2.5, where the modules can
decide whether to allow further packet processing or not. For instance, the
Firewall module can decide not to allow the Learning switch to participate in
the nal ow generation.
The SDN controller oers a northbound API that connects the applications
and the control-layer software together. The Representational State Transfer
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Figure 2.5 Example of possible Floodlight module pipeline [49].
(REST) API [142] approach is usually used to provide an easy method for
applications to communicate with the SDN controller [153]. The Application
layer holds third-party applications that the network administrators have de-
ployed alongside the SDN controller. These applications might provide e.g.
precise instructions how some specic packets are forwarded in the network, or
a statistical analysis of network usage. Thus the applications are a method to
automate various task related to network and packet forwarding.
Finally, the infrastructure layer contains the network devices, such as switch-
es. Messaging between the controller and the switches uses a southbound API.
OpenFlow is a communication protocol especially designed for this purpose
[107]. OpenFlow denes a message's structure and how the switches and con-
troller should interact. It oers various options as to how the packet-forwarding
rules in the switches can be congured [154]. At the time of writing, the newest
version of OpenFlow, 1.5.1, oers the richest feature-set yet for packet handling.
For example, usually packets are forwarded based on their source and destina-
tion IP addresses. However, there are yet more advanced forwarding policies.
For instance, OpenFlow version 1.5 includes egress port packet-processing, in
which a packet is processed after determining its outgoing port [107].
Even though the communication from the SDN controller to the switches
tends to use the OpenFlow protocol, it is not essential. Cisco has specied the
Cisco OpFlex protocol [27] as an alternative to OpenFlow, while the OpenDay-
light SDN controller species the use of Netconf instead of OpenFlow.
Thus, there are a range of implementation combinations for SDN. Neverthe-
less, they all utilize the underlying approach of separating the control and data
planes in the network. This all replies on automation, so the next section will
consider the pros and cons of this new networking approach in that context.
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2.2.3 SDN: a worthy endeavor or a waste of effort?
The centralization oered by an SDN controller gives a lot of benets. The
most signicant ones are:
• Ease of management
• Better visibility of the network structure
• Elastic packet forwarding in the network
• Applying applications to network level
There is no doubt that SDN greatly facilitates network management [42,
81]. It provides a central point where administrators can manage the network
as a complete entity, instead of having to deal with single devices. Further
modications such as innovative packet-forwarding policies, or even new ap-
plications, can be easily applied, and automated, from this controller. New
applications can participate in the ow generation so that, e.g., deploying a
rewall application initiates rewalling at the switch level Automated applica-
tions can also provide elastic packet forwarding. This is an extremely useful
and important feature which enables the inclusion of additional devices that
are attached to the network in the network packet path. For instance,in the
case of Figure 2.3, when PC A sends a packet to PC B, an application in the
SDN controller can order the packet to be redirected to Middlebox X, instead
of going straight to PC B. After the packet has been released from Middlebox
X back to the network, it can then be forwarded to its original destination, PC
B. There are a number of dierent parameters that can be utilized to redirect
network packets in SDN. These include the Ethernet address,the IP address,
the TCP/UDP port number and the switch port, to name just a few [50, 106].
In traditional networking without SDN, it is mainly the physical infrastruc-
ture that denes a packet's path through the network. When the network
structure needs an update, the network administrators usually have to physi-
cally modify the network equipment interconnections, or make static changes in
the routing table. If the network restructuring process is particularly thorough,
it might require closing the network for a time (usually in the middle of the
night in order to minimize the impact to the users).
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In SDN, the physical infrastructure of the network does not play such a
signicant role. Once the packet path is dened by SDN, only the necessary
network devices are included in the path. New devices can be added to the
network at any time, and once they are in place they can participate in the
packet processing by changing the way the ows are generated. Added devices
can be tested beforehand with a small set of end devices, and the network
operation can be expanded step by step. This is an especially useful feature in
situations when a problem occurs, as most of the network is still using the old
packet path. So, if a modied network encounters a problem, ow generation
can be reverted back to the old functional path until the problem has been
solved, with as little disruption as possible to the network users. Most of these
tasks can be done during normal working hours, and at worst the network
modication will just cut out the existing TCP connections.
Therefore the infrastructure in SDN can be considered to have a virtual
topology [126]. This, in turn, makes tracing network packets much more chal-
lenging than it is in traditional networks. The physical topology of the network
remains the same. Thus, debugging in operational networks might get very
complex. However, the situation in research and development networks is al-
most the opposite: SDN oers great debugging capabilities for development
purposes since the packets can be freely redirected in the network. This would
be risky in an operational network since the debugging redirections could create
huge problems which could have a devastating impact on vital network trac.
The importance of the virtual topology is even more marked when software
switches are added to the picture. A software switch, for instance OpenvSwitch
[110], is often deployed to a hypervisor in order for the VMs to have network
connectivity. When these switches are added to the SDN architecture, the
visibility of the SDN controller is extended to include the VMs. This is highly
benecial, especially in a Cloud environment. In such an environment, the
networks tend to be highly complex, but since the network is managed centrally
via an SDN controller, individual VMs can be identied from the network.
Furthermore,VMs can provide a number of useful network functions, such as
a rewall, Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) or a Dynamic Host Conguration Pro-
tocol (DHCP) server, to name but a few. This concept is called Network Func-
tion Virtualization (NFV) [40]. Its purpose is to reduce costs by using Com-
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mercial O-the-Shelf (COTS) solutions, instead of using highly-customized,
dedicated devices to run the services in the network, which can be very ex-
pensive [13]. SDN and NFV together are a powerful combination, enabling
the possibility to run a great number of network functions in the servers and
provide such functions to the whole network automatically using SDN ows.
Inevitably, automated network management has its downsides. One of the
greatest drawbacks to SDN is that unless the network is designed and built
carefully, it might end up having a single point of failure: the controller. An in-
accessible controller might cause very severe damage to the network, especially
if the switches have not been carefully congured to tolerate faulty situations.
Packets could easily be directed to the wrong parts of the network, and the
network could become unusable. Once it is accepted that the controller holds
the virtual topology of the network, then it is clear that if the controller goes
wrong, so will the network.
Another important issue with the SDN controller security is the trustworthi-
ness especially in regard to third party applications and in the control plane as
stated by Scott-Hayward, O'Callaghan and Sezer [150]. A compromised SDN
controller will place the network at the mercy of an attacker. Malicious appli-
cations may take over packet forwarding, or impair the network in some other
way. In this context, the control plane is very fragile as it oers a great place
for an attacker to cause harm for instance by modifying network congurations,
by causing denial-of-service (DoS) attack against the controller itself or sni-
ing packets to steal information, to name just a few possibilities. The SDN
controller access control mechanisms are still weak and should receive more
attention from the research community [83, 125].
Missing security in access control is not the only problem SDN faces. In a
2013 workshop, Metzler [94] pointed out some politico-economic problems with
SDN. According to him, because consumers are not really aware of the poten-
tial benets of SDN technology, businesses are not investing heavily enough in
SDN technology. This is reected in the lack of use cases and vendor strategies,
and the immaturity of many of the commercial products on oer, as Metzler
also points out. Another problem is that vendors tend to sell old devices as
new innovation-enablers once the SDN logo has been printed on the packaging.
Metzler calls this SDN-washing and denes it as when: a vendor re-labels
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its legacy products and services with SDN-based vocabulary. Despite these
problems, however, Metzler sees the future of SDN as bright, and thinks that
it oers the possibility to reduce provisioning work by 95 % compared to tra-
ditional networks.
SDN has many attractive features. It is easy to automate, easy to man-
age and it is cloud-ready. However, its greatest vulnerability lies in its greatest
strength. Centralized control means that it will always contain a possible single-
point-of-failure device, one that would also be extremely vulnerable to hostile
attack from an adversary. The security of the SDN controller cannot be em-
phasized enough: whoever controls the controller, controls the network. These
negative points could well be just the initial friction which accompanies the
commercial development of any new product on the market. It seems reason-
able to hope that they will disappear as SDN technology becomes more mature
and nds its own niche in the eld of modern networking.
2.3 VPN technologies
VPN in technology vise is aimed at securing connectivity for two or more net-
works, or computers, through an untrusted network such as the Internet. VPNs
are especially useful in cases where a lot of dierent style network trac takes
place and the protocol used for communication does not, in itself, provide any
condentiality, integrity or authenticity. These are provided by the VPN solu-
tions since VPNs are in fact protocol suites that include for instance encryption
primitives as a part of the provided set of services.
Most common VPN technologies can be categorized into three dierent
classes based on their implementation mechanism [122]:
1. PPTP
2. TLS
3. IPsec
The Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP) [56] is a rather old-fashioned
approach to VPN connection that, as Schneier [148] points out, is vulnerable
to relatively poor levels of security. It still has its uses, especially because of
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its support for legacy devices, but it is not highly-recommended and is thus
omitted from further discussion in this thesis.
IPsec stands for Internet Protocol Security and is a complete suite consisting
of dierent protocols for building secure communication channels. Even though
the RFCs for IPsec can be traced back to 1995, it is still very widely used and
is considered to be an ecient method for building VPN connections [7, 8].
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol can also be used for creating VPN
connections [122]. In practice, TLS VPN is often conated with OpenVPN
[118], which is a very popular open-source VPN solution. Vendors such as
Barracuda [10] and Cisco [29] have their own commercially-available imple-
mentations for TLS-based VPN solutions. Some of these solutions might be
attached with Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) term instead of TLS. The reason
is that the SSL is the old version of the TLS protocol and therefore the SSL
term still exists as a colloquial name even though the SSL should not be used
anymore. Further, for instance in Cisco products, the VPN can even operate
using the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol [22, 143, 144].
The DTLS is based on TLS, but uses the UDP protocol instead of the TCP.
This thesis mainly focuses on OpenVPN due to its wide variety of features and
its open-source implementation.
Although IPsec is very ecient when connecting complete networks together,
the advantages of an OpenVPN are particularly apparent when connecting sin-
gle devices to a corporate internal network. Of course, both systems have their
own advantages, and there are cases where one technology has clear advantages
over the other.
Figure 2.6 depicts the two most common VPN setups: site-to-site [172],
which in this case is built using IPsec, and remote access [171], here built using
OpenVPN. In the diagram, the headquarters (HQ) network has a server, a
PC C, and a rewall to host IPsec and OpenVPN tunnels. The Company oce
network contains two PCs: A and B, and a rewall. The home network consists
of a laptop and a NAT-enabled rewall.
Site-to-site means that there is a connection between the Company oce
and the HQ networks. IPsec would be the typical VPN technology for this
usage. It enables uent communication between the networks. The PCs A,
B and C and the Server do not require any special client software since the
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Figure 2.6 An illustration of Site-to-Site and remote access VPN setups.
Firewalls handle all the required packet-encapsulation procedures.
The Laptop in the Home network is a good example of a remote access
setup. The connection to the HQ network is built through a Firewall with
NAT. The laptop has an OpenVPN client software and negotiates the tunnel
with the Firewall of the HQ network, which is running an OpenVPN server.
Therefore, at least the Server and PC C can communicate securely with the
laptop. The connectivity can be further extended with appropriate routing and
forwarding decisions taken in the Firewall in order to connect to the Company
oce devices as well. These two dierent VPN technologies are explained in
more depth in the following sections.
Secure networking is a broad concept. Even though they are not pure VPN
solutions, it is worth pausing here to include MACsec [145] as it is a very
attractive and much-discussed technology. MACsec is a layer-2 protocol aimed
at providing condentiality and integrity in LAN networks, and as such it is not
directly usable over WAN networks. Nevertheless, it can be used with IPsec
or TLS VPN to achieve end-to-end security [73]. MACsec is mainly used in
point-to-point links between switches or from a switch to a host. It can prevent
both security threats like Man-in-the-Middle (MitM), and playback attacks,
[73] since any trac which fails the integrity check is dropped.
Three indispensable requirements in the VPN networking can be address.
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First is condentiality that is achieved by using encryption. Second and third
are integrity and authenticity which both are provided by message authentica-
tion. Thus, before discussing IPsec and the OpenVPN in more detail, some of
the most common encryption algorithms and their operational modes need to
be explained.
2.3.1 Encryption algorithms and modes for IPsec and
OpenVPN
Trac in VPN can be encrypted using several dierent cipher suites. Even
though other ciphers surely can be used, the following list contains the most
common ones and their equivalent modes for VPN use. The list is gathered
from [161, 162] and from a Linux server running OpenVPN via the command
openvpn --show-ciphers.
• AES-CBC/CTR/CCM/GCM
• Blowsh-CBC
• Camellia-CBC/CTR/CCM
• ChaCha20/Poly1305
The most popular of these is arguably the AES -suite, which was published
in 2001 by the NIST [139]. It uses three dierent key sizes: 128, 192 and 256
bits. Strongswan IPsec [163] can use AES with multiple modes: Cipher Block
Chaining (CBC) [34, 51], Counter (CTR) [62], Counter with CBC-Message
Authentication Code (CCM) [63] and Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [35, 174].
OpenVPN, on the other hand, only supports the AES modes of CBC, Cipher
Feedback (CFB) [34], Output Feedback (OFB) [34] and GCM in version 2.4.5.
Another cipher is Blowsh (1993), which uses variable key lengths between
40-448 bits with IPsec and OpenVPN as specied in RFC2451 [130]. However,
the RFC has reported that weak keys have been detected for Blowsh, raising
doubts about its security. Blowsh does have a successor, Twosh, but this can
be used with IKE version 1 only in the Strongswan suite [161].
Camellia, published in 2000, is regarded as being equivalently safe to the
AES suite, but it is not as popular [90]. It supports 128, 192 and 256 bit key
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sizes and is integrated in OpenSSL 1.1.1c and OpenVPN 2.4.7. Camellia is also
supported for IPsec ESP packet encryption based on [75, 162].
All of the aforementioned suites work on the block cipher principle and uses
Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) for authentication [84]. The
ChaCha20/Poly1305 is a stream cipher suite in which the Chacha20 handles
the encryption and the Poly1305, the authentication. Support for ChaCha20/
Poly1305 in IPsec is from 2015 and is specied in [101]. It uses 256-bit keys
and is limited to IKEv2 in IPsec. The combination of ChaCha20/Poly1305 can
be found in OpenSSL 1.1.0, released in 2016. The OpenVPN also has support
for it from Version 2.5 onwards.
The AES, Blowsh and Camellia suites have dierent block cipher modes
that specify how the blocks are encrypted using the desired cipher method. The
mode aects the security level and performance of the specied cryptographic
algorithm and each have their own pros and cons.
The Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode originated in 1976 and is the oldest
mode still in use [37]. It is known to have a number of vulnerabilities [129].
and is relatively slow in operation because it uses an initialization vector (IV)
value from the previous encrypted block for the next one, i.e its operation is
sequential. Its greatest advantage is its legacy tness as the CBC mode has
been built into virtually every IPsec-supporting device in the past, which makes
it compatible with a lot of old devices.
The Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode is similar to CBC, but the plaintext is
added into an encrypted IV value using the XOR operation. The IV for the
next block is then fetched from this ciphertext. The Output Feedback (OFB)
mode is, in turn, very similar to the CFB mode. The only dierence is that
the IV for the next block is fetched before the XOR operation of the plaintext
value and the encrypted IV [34].
Counter mode (CTR) uses a completely dierent approach in which an IV
and a counter value are concatenated and encrypted. The XOR operation takes
place afterwards with the plaintext to generate the ciphertext. CTR mode is
signicantly faster than CBC because its operations can be parallelized, as
explained in [38].
CCM is a combination of the CTR mode with CBC-MAC (CBC-Message
Authentication Code (MAC)). It uses the output from the AES-CBC-MAC as
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the MAC input for the CTR process as explained in [3]. Crypto++ benchmark
[30] found CCM to be slower than CBC.
GCM combines the CTR mode with Galois eld multiplication. It is no-
table that GCM tends to use its own TAG value instead of HMAC for the
authentication code [35]. The basic operation of GCM relies on IV, which is
combined with a counter that increases along the blocks to be encrypted. An
XOR operation with encrypted value and plain text generates the ciphertext.
The GCM mode is gradually replacing many of the other modes. For instance,
Cisco recommends AES-GCM highly and predicts it will be valid until at least
2035 [26].
2.3.2 IPsec
IPsec is a protocol suite that provides a secure communication channel by
encrypting the desired trac. It is located in layer 3 of the Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) model and thus can easily carry the upper level protocols
such as TCP and UDP through the Internet. As presented in Figure 2.6, it
is an ecient method to securely connect networks together. The IPsec suite
has two major protocols to use: Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [76, 133] and
Encapsulation Secure Payload (ESP) [79].
IKE's purpose is to use public key cryptography to securely create keys for
the ESP protocol. The ESP protocol carries the real payload from the end de-
vices and encrypts the packets using symmetric cryptography. The symmetric
encryption is much faster than with a public key, and therefore it facilitates the
demanding ESP process.
IKE has two versions: IKEv1 [57] and IKEv2 [77]. IKEv2 has many advan-
tages over IKEv1. For example, it uses fewer messages, it simplies negotiation,
it decreases latency and it xes weaknesses to name but a few [77]. So, only
IKEv2 is considered in this thesis.
The message sequence in Figure 2.7 describes how IPsec builds a tunnel. It
denes which processes handle which part of the tunneling when there have not
been any prior packets between the IPsec endpoints [11]. Signaling in Figure 2.7
illustrates the IPsec setup presented in Figure 2.6.
In this example, the PC in Oce 1 needs to communicate with a Server in
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Figure 2.7 IPsec tunnel from zero to up with separate processes for IKE and ESP
packets [11].
Oce 2. This initiates the IPsec tunnel negotiation between the IPsec endpoints
using the IKEv2 module. The IKE in Oce 1 sends an SA initialization (INIT)
request message to the IPsec endpoint in Oce 2. After a successful response,
this is followed by authentication (AUTH). Finally a CHILD SA setup take
place. This CHILD SA holds the information that the ESP process needs, so
it is delivered to the ESP process. Every IPsec endpoint actually holds two
separate Security Associations (SAs): one for the IKE and another for the ESP
(or IPsec as it is often called).
Finally, the ESP process encrypts the plaintext packet received from the PC
and delivers it to the IPsec endpoint in Oce 2, where the packet is decrypted
and delivered to the Server. The Server responds to the PC and sends the
packet to the IPsec endpoint for encryption in the ESP process. This ESP
packet is sent to Oce 1 IPsec endpoint for decryption and delivery to the PC.
In the example shown in Figure 2.7, all the ESP packets were encrypted. It
is also possible to use only authenticated messages by using an Authentication
Header (AH) and not to use encryption at all with the payload [78]. However,
because ESP provides authenticity as well, AH mode is regarded as a legacy
method since encryption is a must for a VPN.
IPsec has two dierent communication modes at the network level: the
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transport, and the tunnel mode [79]. The transport mode is mainly used for
two machines that require data encryption between them, using IPsec. Tunnel
mode, on the other hand, is for much broader use as it connects whole networks
together. Tunnel mode is also a valid method to connect networks that use a
private IP addressing range since the non-routable IP addresses are hidden in
the ESP packets and only the tunnel endpoint IP addresses are visible.
The example in Figure 2.6 uses tunnel mode since there is an external IPsec
endpoint that conducts cryptographic operations for the whole network. In
Transport mode the generated ESP packet retains the original IP addresses
and only the payload of the received IP datagram is encrypted.
Unfortunately, IPsec struggles with the NAT described in section 2.1. Since
the NAT modies the IP address header of the network packets, it breaks the
IPsec tunnels traveling through the NAT in several ways, as described in [2].
This is especially problematic in one specic use case: a remote access setup.
Connections are often made from a home network, or from public networks as
found in hotels, all of which use NAT. So, a connection is thus established
between e.g. an IPsec router with a public IP address and a laptop having
a private IP address. The IPsec tunnels are usually required to have static
endpoint IPs and in this case the client IP is being translated from a private to
a public one in the NAT. Therefore IPsec is not usable as is for this purpose.
The use of NAT Traversal (NAT-T) can help the situation by allowing IKE
operation through the NAT [82]. The ESP packets in tunnel mode should pass
the NAT (and rewall) with small modications including disabled address val-
idation as described in [2]. Still more workarounds like the UDP encapsulation
of IPsec ESP packets presented in [67] have been developed to counter the
problems of NAT.
Thus it is very tricky to build IPsec tunnels through NAT and one solution
described in RFC3715 well illustrates the problem width: It recommends to use
6to4 tunneling and to build IPsec on top of that tunnel, which is to say that it
tunnels the tunneling to achieve the desired tunneling.
These aforementioned problems in IPsec are probably one of the reasons
why the open source community started to work with a VPN solution called
OpenVPN. This technology uses a completely dierent technical approach as
described in subsection 2.3.3.
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2.3.3 OpenVPN
OpenVPN is commercial open source software for virtual private networking.
The initial release is from 2001 and it is heavily community-supported software
[118]. The OpenVPN software works on several platforms including Linux,
Windows and Android, and it has been included in rewall/router distributions
such as pfSense [132], IPFire [71] and OpenWRT [123].
OpenVPN operates in layer 4 of OSI and therefore requires some extra work
to carry the TCP and UDP messages compared to IPsec. The principle is still
the same as in IPsec: a received plaintext network packet gets encrypted and
encapsulated in the carrier protocol, in this case UDP or TCP [140].
The use of UDP or TCP is in fact the key to successful operation through
the NAT, which is where IPsec struggles. From the NAT viewpoint, OpenVPN
trac is like any UDP- or TCP-related trac, such as browser trac. This is
the main reason why OpenVPN is so popular for remote access setups. [122]
OpenVPN is a valid technology for site-to-site setups as well [121]. An
especially handy feature is that it can create secure tunnels between routers
and the tunnel interfaces to have IP addresses. The benet of IPs is that they
can be used in routing decisions. This is not possible in the IPsec case since
IPsec does not have tunnel IPs.
Figure 2.8 shows the message exchange when a PC connects to an OpenVPN
server and sends messages with a Server in the company's internal network
[140]. The client starts by resetting the tunnel parameters to request a new
session from the OpenVPN server, and this is followed by an acknowledgement
(ACK) message. Next, a Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshake take place
with the required exchange of secrets. Finally the CONTROL message is sent
containing key lengths and any other possible options which the OpenVPN
server needs to inform the client about. Finally, the client sends an ACK
message to conrm negotiation completion.
After the PC has negotiated the OpenVPN tunnel with the OpenVPN server,
the PC sends an encrypted packet to the Server in the company network. This
packet gets decrypted in the OpenVPN server and is delivered to the Server.
The response from the Server is sent to the OpenVPN server for encryption
and delivery to the PC, as shown in Figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.8 OpenVPN tunnel from zero to up [140].
As with IPsec, OpenVPN creates two SAs for a connection and uses TLS for
tunnel setup negotiation and, usually, a block cipher like AES for the real pay-
load delivery. OpenVPN supports several ciphers for tunnel negotiation since it
leverages TLS. It is possible to use various Digital Signature Algorithms (DSAs)
[45] including Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [45], RivestShamirAdleman
(RSA) [74] and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [46]. Var-
ious versions of block ciphers like AES-CBC/GCM are also supported. The
newer versions of OpenVPN limit the use of cipher suites to enhance security
[117]. This might cause connection problems in older clients. This mainly con-
cerns platforms which do not receive frequent VPN client software updates,
such as Android.
2.3.4 Speed, security and high availability considerations
for IPsec and OpenVPN
The cipher and its encryption mode strongly aect the performance of a VPN.
A number of groups have measured the throughput in open source IPsec so-
lutions. Libreswan is reported to have reached 5.25 Gbps throughput using
AES-GCM-128 and 1.39 Gbps using AES-128-CBC in [87]. In turn, [169] has
measured Strongswan as reaching 9.6 Gbps using AES-GCM in New Instruc-
tion (AES-NI) mode. The Wireguard project has measured the performance of
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an unspecied IPsec solution as reaching 881 Mbps with the AES-256-GCM-
128 cipher using AES-NI [176]. The choice of hardware has a signicant eect
and thus explains the wide range of dierent results. In order to determine the
maximum throughput, it is even more important to see whether they were all
using GCM mode rather than CBC or some other mode. This clearly indicates
that the use of GCM mode is preferred to gain higher throughput for VPN
solutions.
OpenVPN is not regarded as the fastest VPN tunneling solution based on
benchmarks like [176] and [16]. The Wireguard project [176] has benchmarked
OpenVPN reaching 258 Mbps with their setup using some 256-bit AES cipher.
OpenVPN was also benchmarked by the BSD Router Project (BSDRP) [16].
They achieved 550 Mbps throughput using AES-GCM-128 mode in their test
setup.
OpenVPN has a number of known vulnerabilities as reported in, for instance,
[120] and [116]. Some of these vulnerabilities are not specic to OpenVPN but
aect a wide range of services through a common library like OpenSSL instead.
OpenVPN often utilizes OpenSSL as well, but alternative TLS libraries can be
used. Furthermore, OpenVPN is vulnerable to DoS attacks, as is almost any
public service.
The IPsec suite has been heavily criticized by Ferguson and Schneier [44] be-
cause of its very complex structure, which can even decrease the overall security.
There have been actual attacks against IPsec, as in Felsch et al. [43], for exam-
ple, who found that it is possible to break into the IKE protocol and achieve
authentication bypasses. In addition to these protocol weaknesses, software
projects providing IPsec suites often suer from a number of vulnerabilities.
For instance, Strongswan has been reported as having remote denial of service
up to version 5.6.0 [102].
In addition to targeted attacks, devices running VPNs are also susceptible
to possible hardware or software failures, which can cause the service to be
temporarily unreachable. To mitigate these problems, a High Availability (HA)
[66] feature has been added to the picture. Its purpose is to run another instance
of the service on another device. Although HA does not guarantee 100% uptime,
it does guarantee 99.999% , which means that only minimal service breaks of
a few seconds need occur in an error situation [53]. HA can also be extended
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to include load balancing [66]. The main dierence here is that HA provides
a service to stay up even if some part of the infrastructure running the service
crashes. The load balancing ensures that the workload will be shared among
the available resources.
HA and load balancing are quite cumbersome in IPsec cases, as stated in
[100]. Document scopes the problem of an IPsec cluster oering both fea-
tures. First of all, the SAs of an IPsec should be synchronized between the
cluster nodes to ensure seamless operation. That is still only a minor prob-
lem compared to the diculty of synchronizing the ESP packet SA counters.
These counters are incrementally numbered, making the packets unique and
thus adding an anti-replay feature to the protocol. However, their exact syn-
chronization requires a lot of overhead from the servers, even if it is possible at
all [100].
Instead of counter synchronization after every ESP packet, Nir [100] suggests
synchronizing the outbound SA counters after every 10,000 packets or so, and
learning the counter value from the packets going to the incoming SA counter.
So, the anti-replay feature makes load balancing cumbersome, or even impos-
sible. The other cluster members cannot process the packets uently without
updated SA counter values. It is possible to disable the anti-replay feature as
permitted in [80] but this is very risky due to the security vulnerabilities that
this exposes.
While acknowledging that IPsec ts poorly into an HA setup, the Strongswan
project has nevertheless looked at HA deployment in [164]. Their solution re-
lies on having one virtual IP throughout the cluster servers to run the IPsec.
A customized high-availability plug-in is used to to share state information
and the SA of IKE with the IPsec SAs throughout the cluster. The outgoing
ESP packets are kept on one node to enable sequential numbering. When this
node goes down, the number is lost and in the re-join phase new IPsec SA (or
CHILD_SA) re-keying takes place. The incoming SA counters on the clus-
ter nodes are updated from the incoming packets every now and then, which
provides adequate counter information and therefore the essential anti-replay
security feature [100].
The OpenVPN community edition presents a load balancing and failover
conguration in [119]. The principle is to have multiple remote server ad-
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dresses for the client conguration, and the client picks one from the list to
connect to. However, this kind of approach is not regarded as true load balanc-
ing since the clients randomly pick a server without knowing its load status.
Such a mechanism creates an uneven distribution of clients to the pool of Open-
VPN servers. Furthermore, the server software is unaware of the other possible
servers in the cluster and thus cannot make client hand overs in order to share
the load equally. Although the failover feature is present, if a server goes down
the OpenVPN tunnel must be re-negotiated with some other server.
2.4 Time to make tasks faster: Hardware
acceleration
Hardware (HW) acceleration is a method to speed up the processing of any task
that would require a lot of computation from a typical Central Processing Unit
(CPU) in a workstation or a server. Such tasks can be ooaded to a specic
processing unit, an accelerator, that has been specially developed for the given
task.
Hardware acceleration can take place in either a Graphics Processing Unit
(GPU), a special section in the CPU, a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
or in an Application-Specic Integrated Circuit (ASIC). Usually though, a GPU
or some instruction set in a CPU are used because they are relatively easy to
set up. Although the FPGA and ASIC solutions are very ecient, they often
require a lot of work.
In fact, a GPU is a very good example of a HW accelerator, as its main
purpose is to help the PC's CPU generate an image on the screen. Image-
processing tasks are ooaded from the CPU to the GPU. Additionally, the
GPU may aid the CPU with, for instance, video encoding/decoding tasks [4].
Task acceleration with a General Purpose GPU (GPGPU) [52] means that
the GPU is not just conned to video. For instance Nvidia has developed a
parallel computing platform, which is a Compute Unied Device Architec-
ture (CUDA), that can run a vast number of computationally heavy processes
concurrently in their GPUs [104]. The CUDA can be used with machine learn-
ing, for example with the TensorFlow neural network [166] or with a network
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Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [173].
Even though a CPU is generally regarded as a non-accelerated device, it
might have some special logic section that can be regarded as an accelerator.
The AES-NI presented in 2.3.4 is actually a HW accelerated version of the AES
suite, e.g. in Intel CPUs [69]. AES-NI was used in a case study by Intel and
was proved to have signicant performance gain as compared to traditional
AES usage [70]. The QuickAssist Technology (QAT) HW accelerator block
is another CPU-integrated HW accelerator. It was developed by Intel and
used, for instance, in their Xeon D-1600 series [149]. The QAT oers a set of
accelerators for [97] for cryptographic and data-compression operations. The
use of a CPU-integrated HW accelerator is ingenious since the CPU can ooad
data to it whenever possible. The data stays inside the CPU, which not only
decreases the time spent on data transfer but also reduces the risk of data leaks
compared to an external HW accelerator.
FPGA is an integrated circuits device that holds a number of congurable
blocks and input/output (I/O) ports [159]. With these blocks and ports, it
is possible to congure the FPGA to work on a particular task, such as a
calculation. An FPGA runs on a relatively low clock frequency compared to a
PC, but its eciency stems from the highly parallel hardware operation of the
task [159].
The ASIC is another integrated circuit, although unlike an FPGA, it is
not recongurable. ASIC chips are built to perform their own function, and
nothing else. However, their performance is much better than an FPGA's and
they consume much less power [157]. Probably the best-known standalone
ASIC accelerators are the ones that have been created for Bitcoin mining [175].
A System on a Chip (SoC) is an ASIC design that holds a number of
smaller elements including processors, memory, and also sometimes accelera-
tors. Mathew et al. [89] has presented an AES HW accelerator called nanoAES
that is especially targeted for mobile SoC platforms with only 13 mW total
power consumption. The nanoAES is capable of AES-128 encryption of 432
Mbps. This kind of low-power solution is especially important in relation to
the Internet of Things (IoT), as IoT devices can vary greatly, from large, high-
performance devices to hand-held, ultra-low-power constrained devices.
In summary, there are several choices as to where to run accelerators. The
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FPGA solution outdoes the GPU solution due to its combination of recong-
urability and performance [20]. A GPU suers from its static architecture, such
as the CPU, whereas an FPGA can freely be edited. On the other hand, build-
ing an accelerator for a GPU is a much simpler task than it is for an FPGA. An
FPGA solution requires a lot of extra work from the developer team [20]. The
drawback with ASICs is that they are extremely expensive unless the produc-
tion numbers are huge. For these reasons, the FPGA suits most purposes and
is an almost universal accelerator in that it can be freely congured to perform
almost any desired task. For instance, Salman, Rogawski and Kaps [147] have
used FPGAs for IPsec cryptographic operations and Sjovall et al. [158] for 4K
video encoding.
FPGA accelerators usually use either a Universal Serial Bus (USB), a PCI
express (PCIe) or the Ethernet network to transfer data from, e.g. a PC to
an FPGA. Neil and Liu [99] presented a neural network FPGA accelerator
and implemented it in a USB-attached FPGA development board. In contrast,
Sjovall et al. [158] used a PCIe interface in their video accelerator to insert
the FPGA accelerator into a rack-installable server. A much more ambitious
approach aimed at providing FPGA acceleration for a whole network in one
go was considered by Cauleld et al. [19]. They installed FPGA accelerator
boards between the servers and switches in a Cloud platform. This provided
direct, dedicated, accelerators for every single bare-metal server in the cloud.
It seems that in the long run it is better to run accelerators directly in
the network. The SDN then becomes an ecient method for redirecting the
network packets, as stated earlier in subsection 2.2.3. As an FPGA is a freely
congurable platform, Naous et al. [98] has implemented an OpenFlow switch
on one. Their solution is capable of line-rate switching and the writers found
their solution to be very feasible due to its relatively low area consumption of
34% in a netFPGA platform [98].
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3 ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS:
PUBLICATIONS GET TIED UP
This chapter will establish the links between the publications for this thesis.
Publication I and Publication II discuss the SME business and thus answer the
rst research question, the approach to which is explained in section 3.1.
The second research question is more about enterprise VPN solutions, which
are discussed in section 3.2 and are based on Publication III and Publication V.
3.1 Resilient VPN connections with an IP zero
configuration
Using VPN to provide secure networking between company oces is now fairly
standard practice. Although Publication I might not appear to be directly re-
lated to VPN networking, the network structure for the experiments was part
of a much larger setup. Publication I presented the results of the detection of
network attacks on the home portion of this large network structure. Detection
was based on measuring the power consumption of the Wi router. Two dif-
ferent kinds of attacks were performed against the network. The rst of these
was a Wi de-authentication attack against a Wi based mesh network. The
second was a route injection attack against a Babel routing protocol that was
running on the routers. The results clearly showed that these attacks caused
medium to heavy loads on the wireless router and can be recognized using an
external sensor measuring the power consumption level of the wireless router.
Even though the scope of Publication I was limited to these power con-
sumption measurements, a comprehensive testbed network had to be set up to
obtain the results. After expanding the testbed to its full scale, it was then used
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Figure 3.1 Testbed to examine the IPv6 prefix delegation for a small company with
four wireless routers and a PC.
for experiments aimed at gaining a precise understanding of secure networking
using OpenVPN between dierent sites, zeroconf for the route updates and for
IPv6 deployment, and IPv6 prex delegation.
This testbed was created in Tampere University's Cyberlab premises and
was connected to a network segment dubbed microInternet in the Cyberlab.
The microInternet is a private network entity containing several Autonomous
Systems (ASs) and several networks, just like the global Internet. Thus, the
microInternet has been specially developed for experiments dealing with setups
that are geographically distributed, and sometimes even built through a hostile
network.
The rst version of the testbed is shown in Figure 3.1. The lab site includes
four wireless routers and a PC. The ISP network has a DHCPv6 server with a
router (ISP-1) that acts as an upstream router for the lab site into the microIn-
ternet. The ISP-1 router was a relatively old Cisco 7600 (End-of-Life in 2016)
but was still was capable of IPv6 prex delegation. The ISP-1 router requested
IPv6 addressing from the DHCPv6 server running on a Linux with an Internet
Systems Consortium (ISC) DHCP server. This version of the testbed is exactly
the one that was used for the experiments in Publication I.
As explained in Publication I, the ISP-1 router delivers a /56 IPv6 prex
from the DHCPv6 server to the Lab-GW. All the wireless routers used were
the TP-Link AC1200 model with an OpenWRT Designated Driver router OS
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distribution using Linux kernel 4.1.16.
Publication I required a Wi, ad-hoc, mesh-based, IPv6-enabled routing
network that could be targeted using Wi-based attacks. The project Homenet
which combined HNCP and Babel was chosen as the network. This package
provided a zeroconf approach for the wireless ad-hoc network and IPv4/IPv6
address distribution.
The testbed network operation relies heavily on the Homenet package. On
the WAN side, with the Homenet the upstream ISP connection is automatically
identied as being on the Lab-GW router. DHCPv6-PD request messages are
exchanged with the ISP-1 to obtain the IPv6 prex. The Homenet distributes
the received prex throughout the testbed networks so that they all have an /64
IPv6 network. The Wi routers joining the mesh network triggers the HNCP
protocol to act on the wireless interface of the router and exchange information
regarding addressing space for the newly-joined device. It is important to note
that with the Homenet package, none of the wireless routers in this setup had
static IP addresses assigned. Instead, all the addressing was negotiated by the
HNCP. The Babel routing protocol handled the proper routing information for
the network.
The combination of HNCP and Babel was extremely ecient, only requiring
that the corresponding software packages be installed on the OpenWRT routers
and the interfaces be congured for the hnet protocol. Thus, the network
combination used in Publication I is a perfect solution for a single oce's need
for a wireless multi-router network that supports IPv4 and IPv6.
The next task was to extend this network over multiple sites. This exceeds
the scope of Publication I, so to better elaborate the possibilities, the testbed
was expanded as depicted in Figure 3.2. The Home site is completely identical
to the Lab site in terms of structure and the devices and software that were used.
The Lab-GW no longer receives IPv6 addressing or prexes from the upstream
router. Instead the Lab-GW and Home-GW only have IPv4 addressing in their
microInternet WAN links through ISP-2 and ISP-3. IPv6 ISP is transferred
to the host Master-GW router which becomes a new root router for the whole
site and is located in a Server room. The Master-GW does not have any other
devices in its LAN network. Thus the Server room site represents the case where
a single router device is operating in a Cloud with public IPv6 addressing and
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Figure 3.2 Two geographically separated Wifi mesh networks and a central gateway
that redistributes IPv6 addressing through OpenVPN tunnels to Lab and
Home sites.
IPv6 prex available.
The Lab and Home sites are connected to the Server room site and each
other using OpenVPN tunnels. The OpenVPN was congured to use virtual
routing (tun) interfaces on which the Homenet stack was enabled. The /56
IPv6 prex received by the Master-GW is shared among the networks in all the
sites through the OpenVPN tunnels. Experiments conducted in this network
revealed that the Homenet worked awlessly through the tunneling and to
provide public IPv6 addressing from the Master-GW to both the Lab and Home
sites. The Babel routing protocol was able to manage this complex routing
scenario between the dierent sites.
Naturally, in this scenario the IPv6 packets cannot be directly released from,
e.g. Lab-GW to the microInternet. The packets need to be delivered through an
OpenVPN tunnel to the Master-GW, which is responsible for the IPv6 network
for the all sites. The relatively small overhead and increase in latency for the
IPv6 packets can be recognized since the packets from the Lab and Home sites
must always be routed through the Master-GW.
The complete network described in Publication I is especially targeted at
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constrained devices such as smart consumer devices, sensors or practically any
IoT device that needs global IP addressing. These devices often tend to be new
enough to have IPv6 support in their software. The network presented in Fig-
ure 3.2 is ecient for this purpose but also proved to work during experiments
for regular small oce / home oce trac. No performance measurements
were conducted since the target was not to nd a high performance and low
latency solution, but instead to develop a highly practical setup that requires
minimal eort from an administrative point of view.
Because the rst network did not always answer the need for a tunneling
solution over the WAN, Publication II proposes a completely dierent tunneling
option that utilizes a layer 2 overlay. The publication species three dierent
use cases that might require this kind of L2 connectivity: a LAN-connected
water pump, a traveling salesman and an ambulance. There are many other
cases in which the L2 WAN overlay may be useful, such as for Industrial Control
System (ICS) networks where it is mandatory for some devices to be located
in the same LAN. A uniform LAN for these kind of ICS devices, i.e. those that
are geographically distributed, can be built using the L2 overlay solution. As
the current trend is to push services into a Cloud, many existing critical ICS
devices might suddenly need a seamless connection to the Cloud as well. In such
cases, changes to the network are inevitable. However, changing the structure
of an ICS network might be very cumbersome, costly and even dangerous for
the process the ICS devices are responsible for. The VPN setup presented in
Publication I is not viable for these use cases since it is based on routing, but
the overlay VPN setup presented in Publication II is t for such a purpose.
Publication II denes a layer 2 WAN overlay solution that is resilient and
can cope with several of the problems that may occur in any best-eort ISP
connections, such as link loss, NAT and ISP outage. In essence, the entire solu-
tion consists of the overlay solution itself, securing it, and creating a redundant
loop-free datapath.
Once it was clear that an L2 overlay networking solution was required, the
following technologies, as explained in Publication II, were considered.
• Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links (Trill)
• Virtual eXtensible LAN (VXLAN)
• Generic Network Virtualization Encapsulation (Geneve)
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• Overlay Transport Virtualization (OTV)
• Network Virtualization using Generic Routing Encapsulation (NVGRE)
In the end, the VXLAN was selected due to its maturity and good support
in virtual Open vSwitch. VXLAN works by encapsulating an L2 frame in an
L4 UDP frame. It is perfectly feasible to carry such a frame over a WAN link
and easy to use with secure tunneling mechanism.
In Publication II, OpenVPN, IPsec and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS) were briey discussed as candidates for the secure tunneling mecha-
nism. The DTLS and IPsec are more lightweight solutions than OpenVPN,
but they suer from the NAT incompatibility problem. As the connections
are designed to work through any best-eort ISP, it soon became clear that
OpenVPN was the only feasible choice, and thus it was selected.
In a complex network with an arbitrary topology SDN is a key technology
for enabling comprehensive packet forwarding control. The topology in our
overlay network is expected to have multiple loops caused by the redundant
paths between sites. Therefore, our proposal utilizes OVS for the datapath
because it has good support in both SDN and many other platforms. The
packet forwarding in all OVS switches is controlled by an SDN controller, in
this case, Floodlight. The SDN controller has perfect visibility over the whole
network and thus can eectively forward network packets between dierent
sites.
Figure 3.3 shows the proposed datapath in Publication II between three dif-
ferent locations. Two of those are Cloud platforms, Hypervisor-1 and Hypervi-
sor-2, running VMs. The LAN (192.168.xx.x/24) network depicts the company
network that has two gateways (GW-1, GW-2) to the Internet both using two
separate ISPs: ISP1 and ISP2. The Wireless WAN (WWAN) connections be-
tween the GWs and the ISPs are established using 4G cellular modems. The
gateways are the same TP-Link devices with OpenWRT that were used for the
experiments in Publication I.
Both gateways establish one OpenVPN tunnel to each Cloud using dier-
ent ISPs. The tunnels bind to the correct WWAN interface using a more
specic route and are terminated to tun interfaces which have routable IP ad-
dresses. The VXLAN connections are in turn built between the OVS bridges
(br0,CustBr0) with the tun interface endpoint IPs, as can be seen in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.4 Logical network structure from the SDN controller viewpoint.
The GW-1 and GW-2 have their eth1 interfaces connected to the physical LAN
switches in the oce. The nal logical network structure which the SDN con-
trol recognizes is shown in Figure 3.4. The full-mesh topology is achieved with
several OpenVPN connections and an Oce LAN connection between the br0
switches in GW-1 and GW-2.
The upstream connection on gateways using WWAN interfaces does not
provide any load balancing. The OpenWRT has e.g. mwan3 package [124]
available, which provides a relatively rich feature set to balance the outgoing
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packets over several WAN interfaces simultaneously. However, our proposal did
not use that but instead relied solely on the route metric value. The WWAN2
interface has a higher metric for the default route and thus it is not used actively.
When WWAN1 connectivity drops, the route with the higher metric is taken
into use.
The resiliency of this network was veried by conducting a set of ISP connec-
tion breaks and glitches for the VPN tunnel. The L2 overlay network could not
recover by itself as desired in the rst case. The OVS seemed to lack the link
status information for the VXLAN interfaces, as is described in Publication II.
The problem was especially noticeable because of missing PORT_DOWN mes-
sages in the OVS. The Port Down Reconciliation (PDR) module in Floodlight
should be aware of any network changes but it malfunctioned with the VXLAN
interfaces in the OVS.
The solution was to build a customized watchdog script as described in
Publication II. This script watches the tunnel endpoint IPs every two seconds
using ICMP Echo messages [135]. Once a faulty connection between OVS
switches is recognized, its VXLAN interface gets removed from the OVS and
the related ows are ushed away. After the tunnel has been re-negotiated,
the corresponding VXLAN interfaces are added to the OVS once again. The
Floodlight controller responds rapidly to the interface removal as expected.
With the given script, re-convergence time for the network turned out to be
between 4-6 seconds. The time is not as good as it could be, still we have to
remember that this kind of re-convergence is required only when a large scale
error, such as router or ISP breakdown, occurs. Therefore the error occurrence
probability is relatively low making the 4-6 seconds tolerable re-convergence
time.
During the experiments it was noticed that somehow the network packets
with a near-MTU value did not pass through the tunnel. The reason was that
OpenVPN was incapable of dealing with the 36 B overhead caused by the extra
IP+UDP+VXLAN headers. This was solved by setting the OpenVPN tunnel
MTU to 2000 B. The OpenVPN copes well with the fragmentation of network
packets exceeding the underlying network MTU of 1500 B.
The control plane has several problems in the presented setup. First of all,
stunnel [165] had to be used to achieve secure connectivity between the OVS
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switches and the SDN controller. Incoming connections from the switch to
the controller are caught by the stunnel server and redirected unencrypted to
the SDN controller. The SDN controller, Floodlight, includes TLS support as
stated in [112], but at the time of writing Publication II, the documentation
lacked a clear approach to mutual TLS conguration, which was the reason for
using stunnel.
The second problem lies with the connection between the OVS and the
controller itself through the stunnel since the connection is established between
the OVS and the Floodlight controller using best-eort ISP without any active
redundancy. In the IP level, all the OVS switches use TLS to connect to a
public IP address of a VM running a Floodlight daemon that is hosted in a
Cloud (e.g. Hypervisor-1). Link-loss occurring on an active WAN link causes
the OVS switch to lose connectivity with the controller. The connection is cut
after the TCP timeout and another is established through the active secondary
ISP. A faster control-plane link renegotiation process can be implemented to the
developed watchdog script to speed up the process. Furthermore, the lost WAN
link will be reconnected at some point and then the egress packets will again
choose the WAN link that has the smaller route metric value. If the stunnel
packets are then changed to use the newly repaired WAN link, the OVS loses
connectivity to the Floodlight again since the source IP changes. Therefore,
the developed watchdog script should include a comprehensive and exact route
table update mechanism for stunnel in order to use the existing path to the
Floodlight controller. Added static routing ensures that the stunnel will use a
functional ISP connection and thus prevents unnecessary link changes for the
existing connection.
The third, and nal, problem in the control plane is the single instance of
the SDN controller. This produces a single-point-of-failure that could have dev-
astating results for the whole network being out-of-order when the controller
is lost. Therefore, having a redundant controller pair in a Cloud would greatly
enhance the reliability of the network. As stated in Publication II, the Flood-
light controller did not have high availability support at the time of writing. As
the controller side was not the main goal of the work for that publication, the
SDN controller was not changed, although this missing feature in Floodlight
is reported. Notable is that in some other SDN controllers, like Faucet, high
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availability support is available [41].
The complete protocol structure for this network is quite complex. The
routed OpenVPN solution presented earlier with Publication I is much more
lightweight since only OpenVPN is used. As explained in Publication II, us-
ing IPsec or DTLS instead of OpenVPN would reduce the protocol overhead.
In fact, using technology like MACsec to carry the VXLAN, as was briey
discussed in Publication II, would reduce the overhead even more.
In summary: Publication I presented a routed VPN setup with zeroconf
routing and IP deployment, while Publication II focused on VPN resiliency be-
tween multiple sites. The approaches ranged from a routed scenario to layer 2
overlay technology. Both have their use cases, which can vary from an IoT net-
work to an ICS network, and even to a regular SME company network. The L2
overlay in Publication II benets from the addressing approach of Publication I
. The zeroconf, which enables automatic IPv6 networking, would facilitate a
combination of these two approaches. Whereas the L2 overlay using VXLAN,
SDN and OpenVPN provides the same LAN over multiple sites for devices that
are sensitive to the network structure, the Homenet package provides zeroconf
addressing and routing for the rest of the network, including the L2 overlay
network.
3.2 Tunneling enhancements for large enterprise
VPNs
Publication I and Publication II were largely targeted at examining network so-
lutions for small and medium-sized companies, (SMEs). Large companies tend
to go for more mature and reliable solutions for their VPN connections, such as
IPsec rather than OpenVPN. As the elastic SDN ow creation in Publication II
turned out to be very ecient, even though it only utilized a fraction of the
SDN capabilities, What might be achieved if SDN were to be used with IPsec?
So, the next step was to examine IPsec and SDN together to better under-
stand the possibilities of such a combination. It soon became clear that the IKE
and ESP process separation looked like a promising enhancement for IPsec, as
was explained in Publication III. The IPsec process could be made faster using
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separated IKE and ESP processes on dierent servers in the network while the
SDN ows could manage the connections to the correct devices. This immedi-
ately raised the questions, Does it t with SDN?, Does it scale?, Is there
high availability or load balancing for ESP?, and How fast can we process
ESP packets?.
In fact, IPsec conforms nicely to the SDN paradigm, as stated in Publica-
tion III. There is a clear separation between the signaling and forwarding, and
being more a service in the network layer than, for example TLS, which is more
application specic, this boosted the research. There did not appear to be any
other research into this idea, nor were there any commercial implementations
using the same design with IPsec and SDN.
In traditional networking, IPsec devices require routing and topology changes.
SDN networking changes the picture completely because it allows the IPsec de-
vice to be implemented freely on the network and uses SDN to include the
device in the packet path as shown in Figure 3.5. The gure only includes the
devices needed to illustrate the required network structure. Thus only the SDN
controller, an SDN switch, an IPsec endpoint and a PC are used for a local net-
work. The Branch oce network only contains a Firewall with an inbuilt IPsec
endpoint.
In Figure 3.5, the IPsec tunnel is established through the Internet between
the IPsec endpoint and the Firewall. The SDN controller manages the ow
generation in the SDN switch. A PC in the network operates as the end device
to communicate through the IPsec tunnel. When the PC sends packets to the
Branch oce, the SDN controller creates ows to the SDN switch which for-
wards these packets to the IPsec endpoint for encryption. These encrypted ESP
packets are then sent through the Internet as far as the Firewall (IPsec end-
point) in the Branch oce. The ESP packets from the Branch oce are again
forwarded to the IPsec endpoint and after decryption to their nal destination,
the PC.
The network with separated IPsec functions used for Publication III is de-
picted in Figure 3.6. The IPsec appliance has been replaced by a standalone
device holding the IKE function with an IPsec orchestrator module, and several
ESP function devices that handle the ESP packet encryption and decryption.
The IKE negotiation in this network takes place between the IKE function
61
Internet
SDN Switch
PC
IPsec 
Endpoint
Branch office
SDN 
Controller
Firewall,
IPsec endpoint
ESP Traffic
Unencrypted 
traffic
IKE 
negotiation
Figure 3.5 Traditional placement for IPsec appliance in SDN network.
Internet
SDN Switch
PCs
ESP function
Branch office
SDN Controller
Firewall,
IPsec appliance
ESP function
IKE function and
IPsec orchestrator
ESP Traffic
Unencrypted 
traffic
IKE 
negotiation
Figure 3.6 IPsec with distributed IKE module and two ESP functions for ESP packet
processing in an SDN network.
server and the Branch oce Firewall.
The IPsec orchestrator plays a major role in this setup. First, the orches-
trator orders SDN ow creation for the UDP port 500 trac to reach the IKE
function. Second, the orchestrator needs to deliver the negotiated IKE CHILD
SA values to the ESP device(s). Third, all the ESP trac has to be forwarded
to ESP devices. Fourth, the orchestrator must handle a re-keying process when
required. The CHILD SA value is considered extremely sensitive information
and for this reason the orchestrator is placed on the same server as the one
on which the IKE daemon is running. To be more precise, the orchestrator
only needs to know the lifetime of an IPsec CHILD SA. Therefore all the other
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information, except the lifetime, can be delivered from the IKE daemon up to
the ESP devices in encrypted form. Whether the SA information is encrypted
or not, the packet transmission between the ESP devices and the orchestrator
should take place on a closed network using TLS authentication and encryption
to prevent any possible information leaks.
The network is ready for real packet transmission after the IKE negotiation,
the delivery of the CHILD SA value and the SDN ow generation is complete.
When the PC sends a network packet heading for the Branch oce network,
the SDN controller creates ows to the network based on the IPsec orchestrator
instructions to include one of the ESP devices in the packet path. The encrypted
packet is forwarded to the Internet towards the Branch oce. Returning packets
from the branch oce are redirected to the ESP devices for decryption and then
back to its nal destination.
Given the IPsec SDN network structure presented in Publication III, the
implementation is next discussed based on the original combination of devices
and software listed below that was planned to be used for the experiments in
Publication III.
• HP 5900 series SDN switch
• Floodlight SDN controller [48]
• Strongswan for IKE daemon [163]
• DPDK IPsec-secgw as ESP process [32]
• DPDK process virtualized in NFV style
• Open vSwitch for NFV instances [110]
The HP 5900 switch was used as an SDN switch for the experiments because
of its OpenFlow support. Floodlight turned out to be an extremely unviable
controller for the HP 5900 and HP 3800 switches with which the CyberLab was
equipped. Floodlight was unable to write even simple ows to the switch ow
table. The reason for this was that Floodlight was trying to use wrong ow
table ID. As the main objective in Publication III only required the basic SDN
function of redirecting network packets with ows, the HP VAN SDN controller
that supported HP switches was selected, instead of Floodlight.
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The Strongswan IPsec daemon was used for the IKE negotiations. The
security parameters for the CHILD SA can easily be extracted from the IKE
and delivered for the orchestrators as described in Publication III.
ESP functionality was designed to work on the Intel Data Path Development
Kit (DPDK) IPsec-secgw [32] application in a virtualization platform. This way,
more ESP processes could be launched on-demand in an NFV style. However,
a search of the DPDK documentation revealed that it would not work. The
DPDK relies on ooading the IP header checksum generation from the software
application to the network interface card (NIC). DPDK does not support this
feature for any virtual NIC as specied in [32]. For this reason the IPsec-secgw
was moved to operate on a physical Intel Atom C2000-based platform.
Two of these Atom platforms using IPsec-secgw were attached to the net-
work. The results listed in Publication III are clear: adding more ESP devices
to the network really does speed up the total packet processing. Network trac
that needs to be encrypted can be redirected as wished to the ESP device with
smallest load. If an ESP device crashes, it can be just dropped from the pool of
available devices until it has recovered. The experiments also showed the gen-
erally acknowledged fact that the AES-GCM mode outperforms the AES-CBC
mode. In the experiments, the AES-GCM used the Intel IPsec crypto software
library that optimizes the CPU AES routines [54]. The raw 64-byte packet
transfer rate for this setup with single ESP function and one PC is 600 Mbps,
rising to 1300 using two ESP functions and two PCs. Even though the perfor-
mance numbers were relatively good for such poor hardware, that comes at a
cost: we encountered several obstacles which made the parallel ESP processing
device architecture unsuitable for use in a real network.
The load balancing turned out to be too complicated and cumbersome for
a single IPsec tunnel. As explained in Publication III, the proposed structure
provides HA, but not full load balancing. The load balancing is path-based,
i.e. it relies on IP addresses. Therefore, network packets from one PC cannot
be shared between multiple ESP processes in, for example, a round-robin style.
Another solution such as combining multiple ESP devices using link aggregation
was required.
Path-based load balancing also poses problems for the incoming connections.
A single tunnel is always redirected to the same ESP device since the tunnel
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endpoints are constant. Equal-Cost Multi-Path (ECMP) with SDN can change
this since it uses the least congested available port. Multiple IPsec tunnels, each
with their own source and destination IP addressing can of course be shared
among multiple ESP devices. Free IPsec tunnel distribution from IP addresses
could be done using the Security Parameter Index (SPI) value, but at the time
of writing, the Openow still does not have this feature. Heydari Fami Tafreshi
et al. [60] also pointed out the importance of this feature for Openow SDN.
The load balancing also caused problems for the replay-attack protection.
Every ESP device has its own sequence number counter for network packets.
Thus, the receiving end of a tunnel will receive duplicated sequence numbers
when parallel ESP devices are used. The packets with duplicated numbers will
be regarded as replayed, and therefore are discarded. The sequence numbering
could be xed by synchronizing the packet counters on all the ESP devices that
work in parallel. However, as is also stated in Publication III, this is not a feasi-
ble solution because the ESP operation is often very dense and synchronization
would signicantly slow the process down. The replay-attack protection can
still be disabled, but this is denitely not recommended [80].
So, if this kind of networking architecture with separated IKE and ESP
functions is to be used, some other workaround is needed to balance the load
of the incoming packets.
To be more precise, the problem is not just the load balancing. What is
needed is a platform which can meet the rigorous performance requirements
for the IPsec ESP. Furthermore, high availability is more important than load
balancing. Without active load balancing, the platform could still provide the
necessary replay-attack protection.
The nal conclusion to be drawn from the work in Publication III is that
the network structure and separated IPsec IKE and ESP processes were unique
and novel at the time of writing Publication III. The architecture used does
have a number of benets: the management of the IPsec tunnels is in a single
point, the pool of ESP devices oers passive redundancy, and SDN removes the
need for network layer modications when an IPsec device is attached to the
network.
Regarding the original question presented at the beginning of section 3.2 as
to whether IPsec and SDN can work together, there are a number of positive
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Figure 3.7 Complete network architecture for FPGA accelerated IPsec with FPGA
for ESP processing and Network Director server for IKE.
points. IPsec ts nicely into the SDN paradigm and it can be scaled by adding
more ESP devices. There is some degree of high availability, but this is achieved
without load balancing. However, the performance numbers with the test setup
were not sucient. As a point of comparison, the Libreswan IPsec project
measured 5.25 Gbps ESP packet throughput on AES-GCM [87]. Still, a more
important objective in Publication III was to carefully examine and verify the
SDN network structure and any possible HA and load balancing features rather
than to develop a high-speed implementation.
In the related work section of Publication III, the performance numbers,
especially those with a dedicated IPsec accelerator device, were signicantly
higher than they were for the presented design. In fact, there has been a con-
siderable amount of research into using IPsec on an FPGA. Still, as the related
work section in Publication V indicates, the approaches in these studies vary,
but they often do not consider production readiness and complete system mod-
els. Therefore, Publication V is particularly aimed at nding the answers to
such points. The target, which was successfully achieved, was to replace the
software solution presented in Publication III with an FPGA ESP accelerator
device to host 1000 concurrent tunnels providing 10 Gbps throughput with only
10 µs latency.
So, Publication V utilizes the network structure presented in Publication III.
and investigates the feasibility of an FPGA-based, dedicated IPsec processing
device for ESP packets. The solution relies on a separate software-based IKE
solution as in Publication III, thus saving a valuable FPGA area for ESP pro-
cessing. The main dierence is the use of the FPGA instead of the software
66
IPsec ESP function. The architecture is shown in Figure 3.7. It contains end
devices, such as PCs, whose network connectivity is through SDN switches and
a Router/Firewall to the Internet. The SDN switch is managed by an SDN
controller in the Network Director server which also hosts the IKE service. All
trac between the Network Director server, the FPGA and the SDN switch
takes place on a Control plane network that uses traditional switches. Precisely
the same network packet forwarding occurs in Figure 3.7 as it did for the net-
work presented in Publication III and the end device trac which requires ESP
processing is forwarded to the FPGA using SDN ows.
Figure 3.8 presents the FPGA architecture proposed for Publication V. This
has three main parts: a Control plane, a Data plane and IPsec Accelerator logic.
The purpose of the Control plane is to have a dedicated interface for updating
the Security Association Database (SAD) in the IPsec Accelerator. The Control
plane has an Ethernet interface and a User logic control block containing the
TCP/IP stack with TLS support. It is implemented on a soft core processor.
The ESP trac takes place in the Data plane. The Data plane has a Fiber
optics module that physically connects it to the network. The Packet client is a
protocol parser which processes the Ethernet headers and pushes the Ethernet
payload to the IPsec Manager in the IPsec Accelerator Logic. The IPsec man-
ager chooses which Encryption or Decryption block to use. Every block has
its own AES-GCM + AES block which encrypts or decrypts the given data.
furthermore, the Encryption and Decryption blocks read and write data to the
IPsec Enc & Dec SADs that store all the information needed for an IPsec tun-
nel. Even though Figure 3.8 only shows two Encryption and Decryption blocks,
there can be more parallel blocks as long as they t to the FPGA.
Replacing the software ESP device used in Publication III with the FPGA
presented in Publication V might seem straightforward. Nevertheless, build-
ing such an accelerator needs a lot of attention to detail in order to produce
a properly working solution where all the dierent parts including the FPGA,
SDN controller and the IKE daemon cooperate properly. Therefore, the fea-
sibility for, and details of, an FPGA based IPsec accelerator as presented in
Publication V are explained below.
At the network architecture level, some modications are rst required to
t the FPGA into the network. Publication V describes these modications in
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Figure 3.8 Architecture of the proposed IPsec FPGA implementation.
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 therein. The proposal in Publication V did not contain
an Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) or a MAC address in the FPGA. This
was because the ARP implementation would require more logic and area on
the FPGA and it was desirable to reserve area as much as possible for the ESP
processing. Therefore the FPGA does not modify the original source MAC
address eld, and the SDN switch learns a load of MAC addresses behind the
FPGA switch, even though they are not there. Our suggestion is to disable the
MAC address learning feature in the SDN switch port to which the FPGA is
connected. This way the network packets can freely be forwarded to the FPGA
using SDN ows.
On the other hand, without the ARP implementation the FPGA may en-
counter problems since it cannot identify the destination device's MAC address
once ESP packet decryption has taken place, as described in Publication V.
The solution is to have a Lookup table (LUT) on the FPGA to store the MAC
and IP address pairs so that the correct MAC address can be written for the
leaving packets. Having a LUT for /16 network with approximately 65,000 IP
addresses would require 400 kB of memory, which can be done with the FPGA
on-chip memory. The on-chip memory is crucial since it can be read in every
clock cycle, thus signicantly reducing the latency for any outgoing packets.
Another way to tackle the destination MAC address problem is to rewrite the
false addresses using proper SDN ows in the SDN switch.
Both of the above solutions are more ecient than having an ARP imple-
mentation on the FPGA. The reason is the long and unpredictable ARP request
time, and the consequent need for packet buering while waiting for someone in
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the network to respond to an ARP request. The platform must operate uently
even when it has to deal with data with a line-rate speed and the destination
MAC address is missing. We estimate that e.g. an ARP request which takes 2
seconds will need a buer of 2 Gb if the line-rate is only 1 Gbps. Therefore,
the buering can not be scaled to an FPGA with limited memory.
Publication II described the fragmentation issues at the network level. Frag-
mentation also occurs in this scenario for network packets of 1445 B or more
due to the ESP overhead. Thus, the FPGA-based ESP device needs to han-
dle proper fragmentation for MTU-sized network packets on encryption. Our
suggestion is that when the local network MTU is set to 1500 B, any pack-
ets requiring fragmentation should be split in two. It would be sucient to
have a rst packet containing 1024 B and then another packet with the rest of
the data bytes. On the receiving side, packet reassembly would only require
500 Mb memory for 41k packets with a size of 1500 B. DDR RAM from the
FPGA is to be used because it has a large capacity and its operation is non
time-critical. The ring buer method would be useful since it automatically
overwrites any possible missing fragments. Packets with missing fragments can
be discarded, even though no retransmission is provided by the ESP. The upper
level protocols should be able to x this problem.
The anti-replay feature is a must for IPsec and thus a desirable feature for
an FPGA-based ESP device. An anti-replay algorithm like the one presented
in [180] can be used. Publication V discusses this topic in Section 4.5 and
presents a simple anti-replay mechanism. The FPGA has to store the sequence
numbers for already-seen packets within a sliding window time frame. The
sliding window mechanism reduces the need for memory to store the sequence
numbers. An ecient window size is as low as 1024, which would only require
10 bits of memory. It should be noted that in [174] for instance, a window size
of only 64 is recommended. However, this is too small for high speed operation
so a larger value should be used, as stated in [25].
The sequence number synchronization problem described in [79] is also ad-
dressed in Publication V. When large packet loss occurs, the sequence number
counter can get out of sync with the tunnel endpoints. Building a mechanism
directly onto an FPGA to detect this kind of desynchronization would require
more area and would be quite complicated. Whenever such a large packet loss
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occurs, the ESP process is halted anyway. The time consumed in the IKE
re-negotiation process is a fraction of the total service timeout, so the most
cost-eective solution would be to request re-negotiation from the IKE.
In normal operation, the IKE daemon needs to establish a CHILD SA and
deliver the keys to the FPGA prior to the start of the packet transfer in the data
plane. In a re-negotiation phase the CHILD SA information must be delivered
to the decryption SAD rst, before changing the encryption SAD parameters.
This ensures the receiving end will be ready when new keys are applied to the
encryption SAD and taken into use.
Indeed, the CHILD SA negotiation is non time-critical and thus can be done
using software in a server. Another such process is the initialization vector (IV)
generation. Generating random numbers on an FPGA is quite cumbersome due
to the lack of an entropy source. For these reasons, IV generation is extremely
feasible in the Network Director server using, say, OpenSSL.
The SAD in the FPGA stores all the sensitive information for ESP process.
Our calculations in Publication V show that only 69 kB of memory is required
for the encryption SAD and 109 kB for the decryption SAD in order to host
1000 concurrent IPsec tunnels. The decryption SAD is much larger than the
encryption SAD since it stores duplicate information for every SA. This ensures
that in the re-key phase it is possible to store the newly negotiated key to the
SAD while maintaining the functionality of the old key (and the whole SA).
Thus, when the encryption process updates its keys, the receiving end is ready
for action.
The SAD memory is a problem area, especially with the latency. The re-
quired 178 kB can t in to the on-chip memory, but even though the reading
only takes one clock cycle per line it is still too slow. Even in its simplest form,
with 1000 concurrent entries it could take 1000 clock cycles to read the correct
SA value. Having a 1000-cycle latency in this kind of IPsec accelerator would
be too much. The solution presented in Publication V is to use a Content Ad-
dress Memory (CAM). Although using CAM on an FPGA is quite complicated
and costly, it is still the only feasible solution for SAD. In fact, our proposal
does not cover the CAM implementation as it is a whole research topic in itself,
and thus beyond the scope of this thesis.
Table 3.1 gives a clear illustration of the distribution of the IPsec functions
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Table 3.1 Function distribution between hardware (HW) and software (SW) and any
requirements they need regarding the architecture.
Function Run in Requirements
IKE SW Prior operation
IV generation SW Prior operation
AES HW -
Fragmentation HW Buer size > 500 Mb
SAD HW Response time critical
memory required 178 kB
parallel access needed
Integrity check HW -
Anti-replay HW -
Anti-replay SW Use IKE to re-negotiate
resync
Ethernet stack HW 400 kB of fast response memory
SDN / User HW < 2 MB of instruction
logic control and data memory
between the hardware and the software. Based on Publication V, the ESP
is a feasible and ecient function to be accelerated on an FPGA. Still, as
Table 3.1 shows, there are a number of details that need to be taken care of.
Some of them, such as the anti-replay feature, would just require a few hours
of implementation but the SAD would need careful planning and a good deal
of background work.
The security of the FPGA-based IPsec ESP device itself is essential. Most
potential attacks against the ESP device would occur on the data plane since
that is accessible from the Internet. Therefore it is vital to ensure the data
plane does not leak any sensitive information. The IPsec Accelerator logic
should do this by default due to its design, since SAD is not directly accessible
from the data plane. The CAM SAD can be considered as safe enough in terms
of data leakage. Attacks against it would require physical access and are thus
unlikely. Still attacks against the whole ESP device, such as denial of service,
might cause some damage.
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Figure 3.9 The network director server modules and their corresponding network
interfaces.
The control plane is extremely susceptible to any adversary since it car-
ries the CHILD SA information between the FPGA and the Network Director
server. Indeed, the control plane security is essential for all the setups pre-
sented in Publication II, Publication III and Publication V. Isolation of the
data and control planes must be veried to prevent possible trac injection into
the control plane. In addition, the Network Director server presented in both
Publication III and in Publication V should be secured well. The server must
at least run IKE daemon, an SDN controller and the orchestrator, all of which
have some APIs that accept trac. Exposing these APIs on a public interface
could lead to catastrophic results. The server is an attractive target because it
plays such a big role. The old saying, Divide and conquer might sound like
a solution for this, i.e. the IKE, the orchestrator and the SDN controller could
be distributed to dierent servers. However, this would not work.
Figure 3.9 explains this as it shows the three dierent services in the Network
Director server. The Data plane interface only hosts the IKE negotiator service.
The Network Director orchestrator and the SDN controller services operate on
the Control plane interface. These services need to communicate with each
other a lot, as described in Publication III and Publication V. Dividing these
services between three individual servers would require much more network
trac between them, thus exposing more interfaces to the risk of attack. As the
trac between the three services contains a lot of sensitive material, including
the IPsec keys, it is highly recommended to keep them in a single server and
have a separate network segment for communication with the ESP devices and
switches.
The FPGA turned out to be extremely ecient for IPsec processing as a
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standalone device in the network. As the calculations in the evaluation section
of Publication V show, a single encryption or decryption block on an Intel Arria
10 FPGA reaches 2 Gbps throughput rate on any network packet size. There-
fore the proposed FPGA architecture with parallel encryption or decryption
blocks can reach 10 Gbps throughput rate while keeping the latency below 10
µs. The network packet size signicantly aects throughput, so if MTU sized
packets are used a single block can achieve a throughput rate of 15.6 Gbps.
The SDN is the key function to run IKE separately on a software, and ESP
on an FPGA. Even though load balancing with a single IPsec tunnel between
multiple FPGAs was not feasible, one device can handle a considerable amount
of trac and meet the high speed performance goal.
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4 REFLECTIONS AND LESSONS
LEARNED OF THE CONDUCTED
RESEARCH
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the signicance of the research and
see what can be learned from it. We begin with a discussion of the real world
status of the SDN. Then we assess the implications of being able to have a
single network controller and two separate planes in networking. We move
on to consider hardware acceleration in the Cloud context, and the issues of
orchestration.
4.1 Real world SDN stuff
Even though the virtues of SDN are well publicised, its real power lies in its
applications. Therefore, this chapter nishes with an assessment of some (se-
curity) applications based on the research.
4.1.1 One controller to rule them all
A single controller watching over the whole network and making forwarding
decisions is a signicant benet to be gained through SDN networking. Cen-
tralized packet handling enables accurate packet forwarding in networks with
loops.
The network setup presented in section 3.1 and shown in Figure 3.4 has
a single SDN controller which manages several geographically isolated SDN
switches and the packet ows between them. Although not explicitly dened
as such, the overlay network presented in Publication II also clearly ts the
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Figure 4.1 SD-WAN network architecture with two sites both using SD-WAN router
that is being managed centrally using an SDN controller [168].
description of an SD-WAN, and turned out to be a very ecient method of
connecting several sites together, including a Cloud. The presented architecture
creates a single broadcast domain over several locations, in addition to this,
the network can easily be modied with additional paths between the sites
as desired. It is almost impossible to discuss SDN nowadays without coming
across the term software-dened WAN, or SD-WAN. So, what exactly is an
SD-WAN?
One of the best presentations of an SD-WAN is given in Thompson and
Hollar [168]. In this work, an SD-WAN is dened as a network that provides
high redundancy by securely connecting dierent company sites through mul-
tiple connections. In its simplest form, the SD-WAN router creates an overlay
networking layer between dierent sites and balances the load using software-
managed ows with a central controller.
Figure 4.1 shows such a network scenario with two sites, i.e a Branch oce
and a Headquarters. The Branch oce has an SD-WAN router with Long-
Term Evolution (LTE) and Fiber and Broadband Internet ISP connections.
The Headquarters is equipped with a similar SD-WAN router and also uses
Fiber and Broadband for Internet connectivity. These two sites have also been
connected together using a Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS) network.
The SD-WAN routers in both networks are managed by a central SDN con-
troller. The SDN controller manages the network trac using ows between
the sites in order to select the best available path for the packets. Paths going
through the Internet can be encrypted as explained in [155] using, for example,
IPsec VPN.
One of the greatest benets of SD-WAN networking is that it opens up the
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possibility of adding network-level applications to all the oces simultaneously.
When an application is installed on the SDN controller, it is also enabled on all
the SD-WAN routers. A good example of such an application is policy-based
routing between the sites. All end user applications requiring low-latency op-
eration can be directed to use the path with the lowest latency, not LTE. It
is worth noting that with SD-WAN, and our solution presented in Publica-
tion II, only the trac between sites can be aected; not the trac towards
the Internet.
It has been clearly demonstrated that IPsec tunneling can be used for the
trac between sites. The IPsec acceleration described in section 3.2 can speed
up the packet processing and ease the management for such SD-WAN scenarios.
Instead of pushing the SD-WAN router to its limits with a heavy IPsec encryp-
tion load, another device in the network can do the required ESP processing.
It is almost axiomatic in the computing to make the most common case the
fastest. ESP processing is a very common case for an SD-WAN.
Since the ESP devices in an SD-WAN are managed centrally from a single
SDN controller, there is some dispute about the use of the IKE. It is possible
to build an IKE-less IPsec, as was shown in [58]. The controller generates the
required SA material, such as the SPI and the keys, and delivers them to the
selected ESP devices. This eliminates the need for one of the services of the
network, i.e. the IKE.
The use of SDN in this kind of distributed network environment pushes the
control plane to its limits. Therefore, the whole issue of SDN networking is
discussed in terms of the control plane, based on the lessons learned during this
research.
4.1.2 Future prospects for the control plane and the
controllers
For researchers and developers in the eld, the separate control plane and cen-
tral management is a refreshing wind of change. The use of a control plane and
a centrally managed controller oers a completely new level of visibility to the
network.
The work presented in Publication II, Publication III and Publication V
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used the OpenFlow protocol. However, as explained in subsection 2.2.2, the
control protocol in SDN is not limited to OpenFlow, and SDN does not nec-
essarily mean OpenFlow, (although perhaps it should). The control protocol
will need to be standardized. At present there are numerous groups of network
developers, both open source groups and vendors, who are all working away in
their own little segment of the secure networking eld. Until they can all agree
on the controlling protocol, regardless of whether or not it is OpenFlow, the
whole networking eld will suer.
Interoperability is the key. There is a good example of this in section 3.2.
Our Cyberlab was already equipped with OpenFlow-enabled HP switches. It
was easiest to use some popular open source SDN controller and thus Flood-
light was chosen. Even though the OpenFlow protocol was used, the Floodlight
and the HP switches did not work together as expected. Without proper inter-
operability between the open source projects and the vendors, the companies
who build SDN networks are forced to reinvent some of the basic functions that
should be there by default.
During the experiments conducted in the Cyberlab, OpenFlow performed
the basic operations well. Still, it is less reliable in cases like the one discussed
in section 3.1 where an SDN controller manages switches over WAN links. If
resilient operation cannot be guaranteed, this will hinder the usability of central
management. Although in this work the topic is discussed using OpenFlow as
an example, the same principles apply to all SDN management protocols over
WAN links.
Although SDN was developed especially for LAN networks, its use might
well expand over WANs as well, if it has not done so already. This has changed
the original assumption of having reliable network connectivity between the
controller and the network equipment. The OpenFlow protocol should thus
be tted into these use cases as well. Building a completely new protocol for
SD-WAN makes no sense, as OpenFlow serves it purpose well and its basic
operation is functional over WANs. In fact, separating SDN and SD-WAN at
the protocol level would result in a more fragmented SDN eld.
Possible connectivity problems between the SDN controller and the switches
require some extra features, such as active parallel redundancy as provided by
the Parallel Redundancy Protocol (PRP) [127]. As explained for the data
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plane in Publication II, the PRP can be used to x control plane connectivity
problems for multiple WAN locations. Implementing such a redundancy feature
directly into OpenFlow could solve some of the connectivity problems. The
PRP would create several connections between the SDN controller and the
switches, oering more resilient connectivity. One challenge with this is that
the endpoints should be aware of duplicate packets, and thus a unique identier
for every OpenFlow packet is needed. Therefore, implementing such a feature
in OpenFlow would mean adding it to the core structure of the protocol. The
only solution would be to add this feature to future OpenFlow versions, which
would make all the older versions obsolete for SD-WAN purposes. Although
this would not be ideal, some solution is nonetheless required since, for instance,
when a fault occurs those SD-WAN routers without an active connection to the
controller would not be able to make any new ow modications, and would
have to wait for the connection to be repaired. Cisco has approached the
problem using an Overlay Management Protocol (OMP) [28] in their Viptela
based SD-WAN solutions. Even though the exact technical details of the OMP
resiliency are not available, their use of an OMP here indicates that Cisco
(and Viptela) are also addressing the problem of the SD-WAN routers losing
connectivity with the controller.
The use of TLS for the management protocol is mandatory. As described in
3.1, TLS was used for control plane connectivity with stunnel, which ensured the
condentiality of the connection. As the OpenFlow protocol already supports
TLS, there is, in fact, no need for the stunnel. Still, as long as vendors and
open source projects do not implement TLS support in devices and controllers,
or provide the necessary documentation for them, solutions like stunnel will
continue to be used.
In addition to smoother operation over WAN links, some solution is required
to better t the SA management to the SDN paradigm. The IKE-less opera-
tion of IPsec was briey mentioned in Figure 4.1.1. There is little doubt that
OpenFlow does need better IPsec support. It should be able to carry the re-
quired SA information from the SDN controller to the ESP devices. This would
mean that the SDN controller could use OpenFlow directly to manage the ESP
devices [60].
Our research in Publication III and Publication V, highlighted the need for
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a ow-matching rule for the ESP SPI values. If that were achieved, it would
be possible to direct ESP packets in the network with SPI instead of relying
on the tunnel endpoint IPs. Therefore it would allow the use of several tunnels
(CHILD SAs) between the same public IPs but terminate them on separate ESP
devices. Incoming ESP packets could thus be shared among several ESP devices
which would enhance the ESP packet processing rate with parallel processing.
Meanwhile, the outgoing packets could instead use the least-congested FPGA
for the destination, either with ECMP or with some other method as described
in Publication III.
The future for the control plane looks very promising and it seems certain
that centralized management is a step in the right direction. However, un-
til the industry can reach some mutual agreement on its structure, and the
technologies to use, the control plane will continue to be rather complex and
cumbersome. Nevertheless, networks with central management will save money,
oer new features and be more reliable with SDN.
4.1.3 The future for the data plane
The future for the data plane looks even more promising than for the control
plane. Arbitrary network topology is no longer bound to physical infrastructure
while the ows can be freely created to the network. Flows can include various
network devices in a packet's path, such as rewalls, IDS:s or VPN endpoints, as
long as they are connected to some switch in the network. We have shown that
the use of SDN removes the need for ARP implementation from the FPGA
in Publication V, thus showing how SDN is also very ecient for research
purposes.
Publication II drew attention to the link recovery issue, and the problem
of recreating a ow in the data plane as described in section 3.1. Although
in that case we used a custom script as a x, a parallel redundancy protocol
would be a much better approach, especially in terms of high availability. Fixing
the missing PORT_DOWN information messages in the OVS is not the best
solution from a speed perspective as the SDN controller is required to change
the ows. If the original breakdown occurred on a link where there is an active
connection between the SDN controller and the OVS, it can take quite a long
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time to x a malfunctioning ow. Merling, Braun and Menth [92] presented
a solution for this in which the ows are changed to operational links directly
in the switches, without the need for any SDN controller intervention. This
approach can signicantly improve the quality and reliability of such an OVS-
based L2 overlay without active redundancy ows. Thus stakeholders, e.g. Open
Network Foundation, should carefully consider implementing such features into
the OpenFlow and SD-WAN-related technologies of the future.
Despite the issue of the missing PORT_DOWN status information, the
OVS turned out to be an extremely exible solution and worked well for all
the experiments conducted for Publication II. It not only has a wide range of
dierent features, as listed in [111], but it also oers support for a variety of
virtualization platforms.
A search of the Internet for examples of SDN controllers or SDN applications
for Publication II revealed that Mininet [95] is often regarded as being the main
topic for any rst tutorial. For instance, Mininet is used to create the test
network in the ONOS SDN controller tutorial [105]. The same phenomenon
has been acknowledged by Lantz, Heller and McKeown [85] as well.
As a rst step, this kind of testing with a software-based network is ideal:
the Mininet leans against the OVS and congures the links for it automatically.
This removes the need for any expensive hardware, and thus makes research
into SDN networking much more accessible to the wider networking community.
Still, it is questionable that many projects, including purely scientic research
ones, solely rely on a software data plane utilising Mininet and OVS.
The OVS is very tolerant of dierent SDN controllers, applications and
packet processing features. However, do the currently used physical switches
provide the same features as OVS? Judging by the earlier example section 3.2
where the open source SDN controller could not communicate properly with
the HP switches, the answer has to be no, they do not.
Support for the packet processing features the in physical switches was eval-
uated from the documentation and with a few quick and simple experiments.
Publication V explained the case where the MAC address destination eld can
be overwritten using SDN ows. Based on the documentation [64] at least, this
feature is supported. Interestingly, rewriting the IP address eld for HP/Aruba
switches is not specically explained [6, 64]. In fact, experiments conducted in
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the Cyberlab revealed that the IP address could not be rewritten using REST
API [65], at least not for the devices used for Publication III and Publication V.
And, according to [86], the Lenovo RackSwitch G8272 does not support IP ad-
dress rewriting either. Furthermore, the Juniper Junos OpenFlow feature guide
[72] does not even include the MAC address rewriting ow action feature. On
the other hand, a combination of OVS and the Floodlight SDN controller was
proved to be able to oer the IP rewriting feature. This indicates that the
device vendors do not necessarily provide all the features in their devices that
the OpenFlow protocol allows. So, it is possible that the example networks
built using OVS cannot be directly converted to the physical infrastructure.
Bosshart et al. [15] approach the problem of the missing packet processing
feature by specifying a P4 programming language to describe how switches
should process network packets. This was later taken under the Open Network
Foundation umbrella [108]. One of the main goals in P4 is to make the data
plane programmable and recongurable by the network administrators. This
would allow new feature like rewalls, IDS etc. to be implemented directly onto
the switches. Barefoot Networks has taken up the concept by releasing prod-
ucts that support Protocol Independent Switch Architecture (PISA) and P4 [9],
which are mandatory features for data plane programmability. Versatile hard-
ware blocks in the switches will mean more applications can be implemented
there directly, and this will reduce the need for external, dedicated network
devices.
Even though switches are becoming more programmable, external devices
still have their place in a network. Publication V presented a dedicated FPGA-
based IPsec ESP device for the network. The FPGA was congured to act as
one device in the data plane and our estimates showed that the performance
was sucient for even such a heavy process as ESP. This kind of approach
accords with the idea of having a programmable data plane, even if it is in the
form of an FPGA. While P4 allows the switch hardware to be used directly
instead of an external FPGA, it is important to remember that devices get
faster over increasingly short timespans. As new and more powerful devices
such as switches or FPGAs come to the market, they will be installed into the
network. Changing a single FPGA for a more powerful one is a much easier
operation than using a 48-port switch to achieve faster packet processing for
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an application like IPsec. Basic functions that are not immediately in need of
performance enhancement should be pushed directly to the switch plane. Ad-
vanced applications with rigorous performance requirements will benet from
their own congurable hardware platform in SDN networks. The combination
of two device families is going to be extremely ecient: the switches handle the
core functions while the FPGAs (or similar) can deal with the heavy processing.
Together, they provide the desired level of recongurability.
There might already be performance problems in the OpenFlow switches
in its basic operation. The reason is that the ows generated in the switches
cannot be executed in the switch hardware. Instead, they are provided in the
software mode as explained in [6]. However, using software ows in switches
is relatively slow, as shown in [146]. This study benchmarked the HP 3500yl
switch throughput for hardware ow at 1 Gbps, while the software ow was
measured at 80 Mbps. It is uncertain whether this only applies to HP switches
as neither the Lenovo RackSwitch application guide [86] nor the Junos Open-
Flow feature guide [72] have anything to say about the software/hardware ow
implementation. This kind of performance evaluation needs further clarication
since an SDN network with low throughput is virtually useless.
4.1.4 (Security) applications for the SDN
The value of SDN lies in the breadth and variety of applications that it can oer.
Publication III and Publication V presented an IPsec ESP application. This
kind of approach, combining IKE and ESP, is especially practical for enterprises
hosting a vast number of tunnels due to the central management of tunnels. A
software solution would be relatively easy to set up, while an FPGA solution
would oer higher bandwidth. Whatever the case, IPsec is denitely a good
application to be implemented with SDN.
Hauser et al. [58] were clearly well aware of this as they rst implemented
IPsec directly onto a switch data plane using P4 language, and then onto an
external server similar to the one used in Publication III. The reason they
changed from the switch to an external server was that a bandwidth of only
1.4 Gbps could be implemented directly on a switch. This was due to fact
that the switch lacked any hardware acceleration for the AES processing. The
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concept itself is inspired: IPsec is directly implemented on a switch which
allows immediate encryption for incoming packets from the end devices. High
speed operation can be achieved by attaching an FPGA solution directly to
the switches as in Publication V. Unfortunately, this solution cannot be not
scaled since every switch would require its own external FPGA. Any really
scalable solution would require switches that either have an integrated hardware
accelerator, or full FPGA, such as Arista 7130 [5].
Still the encryption in local networks can be done using other protocols
like MACsec. Hauser et al. [59] implemented MACsec using P4 and centrally
deployed the MACsec to the SDN network using an SDN controller. Their
application ts well into the SDN paradigm. This emphasizes the importance of
having programmable physical SDN switches. In Publication II the L2 overlay
network used OpenVPN for the connections between SDN switches. In that
study, MACsec was briey discussed as being a viable alternative to OpenVPN.
Although the authors of [52] did not cover the use of MACsec over a WAN link,
but instead focused on the implementation for local networks, this kind of SDN-
controlled integrated security mechanism clearly demonstrates the power and
versatility of SDN and points in the right direction for future research.
There are also a number of proprietary SDN applications, such as the one
presented in [14]. In this product, the SDN network forwards all the Domain
Name System (DNS) requests to the company's internal DNS server regardless
of their original destination. This ensures that only company internal DNS
servers are used, even if the users wanted to use some other, global, DNS server.
SDN is thus a good application directly at the network level. As the Bring Your
Own Device (BYOD) ideology continues to spread, the SDN network can repel
some of the possible adversaries that these random devices could bring in.
In summary, SDN networking oers a versatile platform on which to deploy
security applications and should be closely considered for any network requir-
ing a high level of security. Traditionally, the switch plane (or the broadcast
domain) have been the sweet spot for malware to spread because of the free
packet transaction between devices. With SDN, it is possible to add the de-
sired security layer directly onto the broadcast domain. This would allow the
implementation of an application directly on the SDN controller, which would
be able to permit or deny some specied network trac. Thus an SDN network
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can be used to eectively prevent anomalies spreading throughout the whole
network via a single application in the controller.
4.1.5 Does the designed IPsec setup work in the real
world?
While the example networks in Publication III and Publication V present a
basic setup which veries the network structure, a real-world setup might look
dierent due to IPv4 NAT. In subsection 4.1.3 we discuss the possibility of
rewriting the IP addresses directly in the SDN switches, using proper ows.
This allows more customized network setups to be used. Figure 4.2 shows an
advanced example of a network with the ESP and IKE services located outside
the inner rewall. The internal network contains several PCs and a Server
connected to SDN switches and is managed by an internal SDN Controller.
This kind of internal network frequently uses private IPv4 addressing space.
The inner rewall performs a NAT to this network from one public IPv4 address
that is located in a Middle network depicted in Figure 4.2. This middle
network is protected by an outer rewall to reduce trac noise and can operate
either in transparent or routed mode.
The setup presented in Figure 4.2 assumes that the ISP dedicates only one
usable IPv4 address to the company and that this needs to be allocated at the
inner rewall to achieve NAT functionality and Internet connectivity to the
devices in the internal network. The ESP devices can be either DPDK-based
ones as in Publication III or FPGAs as in Publication V. They oer the ESP
encryption and decryption function for the network packets that they receive.
Forwarding trac to the ESP devices is managed from the SDN controller EXT.
The ESP functionality uses the public IPv4 address from the inner rewall in
its processing. This can be done since the SW 4 forwards all the incoming ESP
trac to the ESP devices based on the protocol. Outgoing packets requiring
ESP processing are forwarded based on the destination IP address.
However, this approach slightly violates best practice, as illustrated in the
following example of a packet transaction. PC A (10.3.3.7) is communicating
to branch oce server (192.168.1.2) through the VPN. The network packets
enter the inner rewall with IP SRC: 10.3.3.7 and IP DST: 192.168.1.2. Since
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Figure 4.2 Example network with IKE and ESP services outside the company fire-
wall.
NAT is implemented in the inner rewall, the packets leave with the IP SRC
that is the public IP address of the rewall, say 130.230.112.227 while the IP
destination is still 192.168.1.2. The packets are forwarded to the ESP function
and leave it with the IP address pair of IP SRC: 130.230.112.227 and IP DST:
130.230.113.2, which is the branch oce VPN endpoint IP address. The NAT
gives rise to the unusual situation where the destination IP address is private
while the source is already public for a packet leaving the network. Despite this
scenario, the network is usable since the SDN ows can be created as desired
and the functionality does not suer.
Importantly, it is not necessary to rewrite the IP addresses. However, the
IKE service does need rewriting to ensure uent operation. If the company
has only one public IP address in use (130.230.112.227), some workaround is
needed get the packets going to the IKE as well. This is done using a private
IP address in the IKE Service, say 10.1.100.22. This is not routable, and nor do
any other devices in the Middle network hold IP addresses from the same area.
This is where the rewriting occurs. Any IKE-related packets, as described in
Publication III, enter the SW 4 while the SDN Controller EXT creates ows
in the network that change the 130.230.112.227 to 10.1.100.22 and vice versa.
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This then pushes the packets to the IKE Service or to the outer Firewall.
In this way, a single public IP address can be used concurrently in several
devices. Furthermore, the Public server can host, e.g., SSH service and use the
same public IP address with a similar SDN ow setup. Even without several
public IP addresses, NAT functionality can be achieved at the switch level,
outside the inner rewall, thus enhancing the security in the core network. This
kind of address modication is highly transparent and might cause diculty
in debugging but simultaneously, could complicate possible adversary reverse-
engineering attempts on the network.
There are, of course, alternatives to the network setup depicted in Figure 4.2.
Another option is to use two interfaces from the ESP device and connect them
to the SDN switch planes in the internal network (e.g. SW 1) and in the middle
network. This way the ESP device starts to act as a gateway, but one that only
transfers the IPsec VPN trac. It might be thought that this would require
some complicated routing setup, but that's not the case when the SDN con-
troller makes packet-forwarding decisions in the networks. As for any security
concerns arising from having another gateway device in the internal network,
security is still good since only the trac related to the IPsec is forwarded to
the ESP device. The use of AES-CBC or AES-GCM provides the all-important
condentiality and authenticity [174] for the ESP packets. Therefore only traf-
c which is veried as coming from the VPN peer is processed, decrypted and
sent on to the internal network. Network packets using another protocol should
not even reach the gateway because the SDN ows will push them to the inner
rewall. Some broadcast messages may be the exception, and these must be
terminated in the ESP device via e.g. a white list that only allows ESP packets.
In summary, in a real-world network, any external ESP device would require
careful planning and implementation because of the problems that might be
caused by the addressing limitations. Achieving the desired level of security
also requires careful planning. Some workarounds will certainly be needed, and
there is as yet no best practice available. The best solution is to approach the
implementation with security as a priority, and then to compromise with the
needs of the network design administrators.
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4.2 Hardware backed IaaS Cloud
Publication V presented an FPGA-accelerated ESP device that was ten times
faster than the one in Publication III. Therefore, our research strongly indi-
cates that it would make sense to extend the hardware accelerator in SDN to
include other heavy processes as well. Che et al. [20] researched the benets
of hardware acceleration using three dierent applications: Gaussian Elimina-
tion, Data Encryption Standard (DES), and Needleman-Wunsch. Their results
show that while some applications, like DES, t well to FPGAs, others, such
as Gaussian Elimination, are better handled on a GPU.
The importance of hardware acceleration has been acknowledged by many
groups. Abadi et al. [1] state that the machine learning platform, TensorFlow,
benets greatly from accelerators. The famous cloud operating system Open-
stack [113] has launched a project called Cyborg [114] to address the need for
acceleration. Cyborg provides a management framework for software accelera-
tors like DPDK and hardware accelerators like GPUs and FPGAs [114]. One
FPGA accelerator installation by Cauleld et al. [19] resulted in performance
gains for Bing search rankings and data encryption. These ndings clearly
indicate that Cloud networks, be they public or private, are moving towards
accelerated services.
As described in subsection 4.1.3, accelerators t well with an SDN. Only one
single FPGA was used in Publication V. If it were to be scaled up for the Cloud,
it would incorporate any number of accelerators that could be inserted into the
Cloud SDN network to serve the VMs. There are three dierent options for
such a layout.
The rst of these options is to install a rack full of accelerator devices onto
the network and use SDN ows to utilize these accelerators for all the machines
around the data center requesting HW acceleration. This mean a lot of east-
west trac between racks, which could mean an increase in latency. On the
other hand, the centralized location of the HW accelerators might help with
their management and installation of them to the network.
The second option is to distribute the accelerators through the data center
racks so that any servers in a single rack would try to use their nearest accel-
erator, preferably from their own rack. This, however, requires an orchestrator
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on the SDN network and precise information regarding the nearest accelerator.
The SDN controller and the accelerator orchestrator would then control the
available resources together.
The third option is to implement the accelerators as Cauleld et al. [19] did.
Their approach did not need any intelligence from the network since the FPGA
was just a Bump-in-a-Wire. The authors noted in their conclusions that The
most important problem to solve is the design of scalable accelerators and go
on to mention that the physical location and interface in the infrastructure is
one pressing challenge.
Scalability is indeed an important feature. Using the rst or second of the
above options to distribute the accelerators in the infrastructure seems more
likely to provide the required scalability as more accelerators can be attached
to the network when required. The network interface is one of the best choices
for accelerators to be connected into the Cloud infrastructure. Compared to
local access such as that oered by PCI-E, the network-attached accelerators
can be made usable for all devices in the data center, rather than just to a local
server. Furthermore, if the accelerators are attached to the network, a pipeline
can be built in which data ows from one accelerator to another.
Publication V investigated using the Cloud for the IPsec accelerator. One
use-case for the presented platform is to host tunnels for a vast number of IoT
devices. According to [24] the amount of data that ows between IoT devices
and the Cloud is growing fast. Thus in Cloud environments, a single software
IPsec or even an FPGA cannot handle all the incoming IPsec trac, so a pool
of IPsec tunnel endpoints is needed. The architecture in Publication V allows
central management for numerous IoT devices from a single server (orchestra-
tor) while the ESP trac is processed in other devices. However, some legacy
IoT devices might only support the AES-CBC encryption mode, which would
make the proposed FPGA solution in Publication V unusable. Interestingly,
the DPDK-based approach presented in Publication III could be used since it
supports several dierent encryption modes, including AES-CBC.
A closer look at IoT devices reveals they also might be creating new chal-
lenges for Cloud platforms. Cloud data centers are constantly receiving in-
creasing amounts of trac causing extremely heavy loads to the network, not
to mention the CPUs and storages. Edge (or fog) computing can reduce the
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load from the data centers by moving the processing closer to the edge of the
network and thus closer to the end devices, as described in [156]. Our proposed
FPGA accelerator architecture is suitable to be implemented on the edge as
well. It can provide the necessary connectivity between the edge and the Cloud,
or the edge and the IoT device. Another benet of FPGAs is their relatively
small physical size, and their standalone function without any host server. This
makes their physical installation on the edge site relatively easy. In this location
they are also less likely to increase the heat dissipation or energy consumption
compared to a rack-installable server. Other accelerator applications can pro-
vide data modication functions for desired IoT origin data on-the-y, which is
benecial because, as stated in [156], it reduces the bandwidth and load from
the Cloud platform itself.
A good SDN controller and orchestrator combination can make the use of
accelerators transparent. The orchestrator should be aware of the physical
locations of the accelerators and their capabilities. Furthermore, utilising only
the SDN ows in the network, several parallel or concurrent accelerators could
be used. For enterprises doing heavy data processing this means that their
work can be made faster either in their own data centers, or in public Clouds
via accelerator architecture. Accelerators will not supersede high-performance
CPU servers, but they can support them by providing a platform to run heavy
processes, thereby freeing up more computational power on the servers, all of
which is possible with good orchestration.
4.3 An orchestrator to glue it all together
Even though the original research questions were not specically about orches-
tration, it is an unavoidable topic with this kind of research. The orchestrator
is a management tool, the conductor for a complex computerised entity and its
job is to make sure every part of that entity works together in harmony. All
the network setups presented in Publications II-V relied on orchestration, at
least to a certain extent.
In Publication II, the setup especially beneted from an orchestrator as the
number of sites increased. Multi-tunnel OpenVPN-based setups can use central
management for the OpenVPN tunnels. The number of these tunnels rapidly
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rises (quadratically), as in the setup the full-mesh topology was needed, which
made the management work heavy. The number of required tunnels can be
calculated with Equation 4.1 where n is the number of tunnels.
Ntunnels =
n(n− 1)
2
(4.1)
This means, for example, that while only three tunnels are required for
three sites, 15 tunnels would be required for six sites. Setting up the tunnels
can be time-consuming, while proper orchestration may reduce the time and
conguration errors signicantly. This kind of orchestration could just be a
few scripts. These are used to build the necessary conguration, including
keys between sites, and to deploy the keys to the OpenVPN endpoints, even
for routed scenarios like in Publication I. The Homenet solution presented
in Publication I handles all the necessary IP address assignments, and routes
them between the sites, which greatly reduces the amount of conguration.
The drawback with using Homenet between many sites is that it can lead to
overlapping IP ranges, especially in IPv4 which uses the 10.0.0.0/8 range [61],
since the addresses are managed independently in every site. Thus, central IP
address management through an orchestrator is benecial, even crucial, as the
number of dierent sites increases.
As with the VPN solutions presented in Publication III and in Publica-
tion V, orchestration is often related to the Cloud. In Publication III, an IPsec
orchestrator with its own sub-orchestrators worked as a central information
exchange point for the IPsec process. Its main purpose is to make sure the
process operates as needed: IKE provides CHILD SA, keys that are distributed
to ESP devices and generate ows in the network. Therefore, the orchestrator
can be regarded as having security associations with all the ESP devices in the
network, as well as with the IKE daemon and the SDN controller. All the de-
vices and the orchestrator must trust each other and keep their communication
secure to prevent possible anomalies. For example, sensitive information such
as the IPsec SA keys ows through the orchestrator, although the orchestrator
does not need to know their values.
The IPsec orchestrator in Publication III can be considered as the main
building block which oversees all the sub-level orchestrators. It would have
been desirable in Publication III to launch the ESP processes in NFV fashion.
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Having this additional feature would have required a new sub-orchestrator to
manage the automatic VM launching in the NFV platform. The NFV platform,
or a Cloud, usually has its own orchestrator with one or more APIs already.
Does it manage the virtual network inside the Cloud as well? If yes, it should be
manageable from the orchestrator, which is responsible for IPsec ow generation
in the rest of the network as well. These VMs are in fact ESP devices and need
management from the IPsec orchestrator. As any scenario is developed, the
role of the orchestrator expands heavily and generates highly-complex, nested
orchestration.
If one adds the hardware acceleration from Publication V to the design, the
packet crypto function (or ESP device) orchestrator from Publication III should
also oversee these HW accelerators. The orchestrator also has to understand
the function and location of any HW accelerator in the network in order to give
the best service to the customers.
Furthermore, when technologies like P4-MACsec [59] are implemented to the
network, this places more demands on it. What sort of orchestrator can support
all of these features? It is either a proprietary one from a company who oer
all the desired services in their product portfolio, or it is a nested orchestrator,
where the main orchestrator has several sub-orchestrators. The problem with
the former is that it is very likely only to work with other products from the
same vendor, while the problem with the latter is that because it is highly
complex with several orchestrators the APIs must be carefully standardized to
ensure interoperability between all the dierent parts.
A promising direction for orchestration is to rely on a single open source
platform which allows the use of middleware software to t with dierent en-
tities under the orchestrator. One example of such a platform is ManageIQ,
which has providers e.g. for Clouds, containers, networking and storage, to
name but a few. Openstack has also approached orchestration by having one
central service, Heat, and several sub-services each responsible for one segment,
such as clustering [115].
The complete orchestrator setup would already be complex, even without
IaaS Cloud. Building such uently working orchestration, even for a sim-
ple network-attached accelerator, will almost certainly require a great deal of
knowledge and expertise from the designers, but on the other hand, in the
92
end it would provide all the desired features. However, there can be no doubt
that orchestration at some level will be required when accelerators like the ones
presented in Publication V are attached to the network.
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5 CONCLUSION
VPN technologies oers companies, and individuals, secure communication be-
tween their desktop machines, servers, handheld devices and other devices. If
implemented well, VPN provides condentiality, integrity and authenticity for
network packets over untrusted networks, such as the Internet. The spread of
Cloud computing means that more and more services are pushed to work from
Cloud VMs. This emphasizes the need for secure communication to the Cloud,
and often the most practical way to achieve this is by using a VPN solution.
Much of the time, there are no special requirements for a VPN tunnel and
thus practically any software solution is sucient. Still, at some point the
basic setup is no longer adequate, so a more sophisticated VPN solution is
required providing, perhaps, better resiliency or high speed operation. Recent
advances in networking include SDN, which provides comprehensive visibility
to the network and thus precise packet forwarding capabilities. As our research
indicates, more advanced VPN tunneling solutions can be achieved using SDN
technology.
The work done for Publication I did not cover the use of SDN, but the main
structure of the network setup provided IPv4 and IPv6 networking over multiple
sites using the zeroconf approach. The routed setup presented in section 3.1
has an adequate tunneling setup for the use of SOHO and SME, as these do
not require any higher resiliency than the always-available best-eort.
A more resilient VPN network setup was achieved using L2 overlay technol-
ogy in Publication II. This research was also targeted at the use of SOHO and
SME. This tunneling solution relied on a dedicated SDN controller to build net-
work ows through multiple tunnels between sites. This provided more reliable
packet transfer than the setup in Publication I, even though only best-eort
ISP connections were used. The setup is usable, for instance, in connecting ICS
networks together, and also for connecting to Cloud VMs. However, this solu-
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tion did suer from a fragile control plane and from problems in reallocating
ows when errors occur in the underlying network.
While the former publications relied on OpenVPN tunneling technology,
larger enterprises tend to opt for IPsec because of its maturity, reputation and
higher performance. In Publication III we presented a novel approach to IPsec
where the IKE and ESP functionality is separated and operated from dierent
boxes in the network. This functionality was achieved using proper SDN ow
conguration that redirects trac directly in the switch plane. It even allows
the use of several high-speed ESP devices, albeit under certain conditions and
with some limitations, while the IPsec IKE is managed from a single endpoint.
The distributed IPsec is ecient enough, for instance, for Cloud providers to
run IPsec endpoints to a vast number of customers. The design suers from
a missing anti-replay feature which is the trade-o for parallel operation for a
single IPsec tunnel. By assigning a single tunnel to a dedicated ESP device, the
anti-replay feature would be enabled. The high availability goal could then be
reached through several ESP devices in the network by distributing the IPsec
tunnels between them and moving the ESP processing from any faulty ones
using SDN ows to the operational devices. Thus, the ESP device needs to be
extremely powerful and able to host a great number of concurrent tunnels.
Publication V discusses the IPsec tunnel from this viewpoint. It explains
the feasibility of FPGA-accelerated IPsec on the Cloud. It utilises the same
network design as in Publication III, while the ESP processing is done on an
FPGA platform. That work indicated that an FPGA can provide exactly the
right platform for such a high speed IPsec ESP device. An FPGA such as
the Intel Arria 10 can host roughly 1000 concurrent tunnels and oer 10 Gbps
throughput with any packet size while keeping the latency below 10 µs. This
is achieved using a purely hardware approach on the FPGA and by removing
any function from the FPGA that could possibly operate on commodity server
software. There are a wide variety of use cases for this kind of solution due to
its great design performance: Cloud operators, audio/video transfer, endpoints
for IoT devices and edge computing to name but a few.
SDN still divides opinion as to whether it really is a useful new technology,
or just another marketing trick. Traditional networking solutions like in Pub-
lication I are often sucient, in which case SDN is not needed. However, our
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research shows that SDN comes into its own when elastic packet forwarding is
required. With SDN it is possible to implement highly complex setups and even
transparently obfuscate the network trac from the end devices. Even though
Publication I and Publication II targeted the SME level, larger enterprises
might require more use cases than the presented SDN and IPsec combination
before they will be persuaded to use SDN. These could include, for instance,
avoiding downtime for maintenance by using a virtual topology.
Corporations running a great number of virtual machines, e.g. Cloud op-
erators, benet greatly from SDN since the visibility of the physical network
infrastructure can be extended inside the hypervisors. This provides rich control
for the network packets using SDN ows all the way up to the VMs. Services
can thus be provided in an NFV style as desired in Publication III. Further-
more, a number of hardware accelerators like the ones used in Publication V
can be attached to the network and the network packets from the VMs pushed
to use them via SDN ows.
Besides the research on secure networking with SDN, it turns out that SDN
is in fact an eective shortcut tool for researchers, too. In Publication V the
intention was not to run ARP on the FPGA. Removing the implementation
need from the hardware provided savings for the FPGA area, and simultane-
ously conferred elasticity on the network. Thus it is highly probable that other
research projects dealing with network and non-standard devices will benet
from conducting their experiments using an SDN platform.
It is to be hoped that the future will hold much more research related to
improving secure networking in the SDN eld. Another topic for future research
is hardware acceleration techniques, especially for use at the enterprise level,
but also for smaller companies that run heavy data processing. Innovative
and highly ecient solutions could be achieved with combinations of SDN and
FPGAs, especially if some open source projects look in that direction.
Here is my thesis in a nutshell. SDN-based approach can improve the relia-
bility, resiliency and performance of VPN connections. There are surely other
equally convenient options for VPNs. Research shows that companies can build
complicated, fast, IPsec scenarios or self-managed SD-WANs using open source
tools. The work presented here clearly shows that SDN has its place in net-
working. How quickly that will spread and what the networks will look like in
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the future is up to the vendors. For researchers, SDN will continue to provide
a rich and interesting eld to be harvested for the variety of new, sweet topics
it may yield. This researcher, for one, strongly encourages others to carry on
the good work with SDN.
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Abstract—Future home networks are expected to become
extremely sophisticated, yet only the most technically adept
persons are equipped with skills to secure them. In this paper, we
provide a novel solution to detect and prevent attacks on home
routers based on anomalous power consumption. We developed
a means of measuring power consumption that could be used in
a wide variety of home networks, although our primary focus
on is on profiling Homenet-based residential routers, specifically
to detect attacks against homenet routing infrastructure. Several
experimental results are presented when the infrastructure is
exposed to various types of attacks, which show strong evidence
of the feasibility of our approach.
Index Terms—IETF Homenet, Home Network Security, Power
Consumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Networks in the home today consist of relatively simple
setups. In the majority of homes, a broadband router or cellular
gateway delivers connectivity to devices in the home, either
wirelessly over Wi-Fi, or using an Ethernet cable. In all these
instances, a single subnet is offered, usually behind a NAT
with private IPv4 addresses. Additional gateways are rarely
used, except as repeaters.
In recent years however, the home has rapidly emerged as
a natural convergence point for technological developments
and innovations. It is not only commonplace to have con-
nected homes contain smart consumer devices, sensors, remote
surveillance systems and home automation, but increasingly
having mobile devices and even vehicular networks joining
into a home network when needed. Additionally, better con-
nectivity options and more advanced networking possibilities,
such as support for IPv6 that provides end-to-end communi-
cation without the need for NATs, are now also made possible
from service providers and network operators.
The Home Networking Working Group (Homenet WG)
was subsequently chartered by the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) as a response to the rapidly increasing arrays of
devices, computers, sensors and gateways that are constantly
being added into residential networks, as well as a means to
simplify end-to-end communication, service integration and
network management by the home network owner, network
operators and service providers. Among others, the Homenet
WG proposed that home networks need to adopt an architec-
ture that allows them to scale and evolve organically as the
complexity of the services and devices grow.
One of the most significant recommendations made is
that, with the introduction of IPv6 for home networking, a
Homenet-compliant residential network (simply referred to
from now on as “homenet”), should support multiple networks
and subnets. A homenet can therefore consist of multiple
routers forming a proper routing infrastructure complete with
its own routing protocol. The other is that, as the owners of a
homenet do not normally comprise technically adept persons,
minimal (and ideally zero) configuration of addressing and
networking needs to be performed: Users simply connect their
devices to their home subnet of choice, and the homenet in-
frastructure should automatically handle all the intrinsic details
for addressing, routing, service discovery and reachability.
In terms of home network security, several aspects of
protecting home networks and devices, such as data pri-
vacy, access control and end device protection have been
investigated in current research publications. However, apart
from well-known administrative practices such as ensuring
the use of good passphrases and passwords for wireless
connectivity, employing firewalls and access control lists in
the gateway, little if any security research on home gateway
security actually exists. For example, Geon Woo Kim et
al. [1] discuss the need to protect home networks from a
variety of malware, Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) and
eavesdropping attacks through the introduction of a framework
providing guarantees of authentication, authorisation and a
rule-based security policy engine for undertaking actions when
security infractions occur. Mohamed Abid [2] studies the use
of biometric authentication to enable and personalise user
access into a home network. Also, Shaojun Qu [3] discusses
remote authentication and authorisation to provide secure
access into the home environment.
On the other hand, Lucas Dicioccio et al. [4] reveals that,
while on the whole, even if the number of connected devices
in four out of five home networks amount to less than a
dozen, home gateways in particular are always active at any
given time. This is exacerbated in homenet-based residential
networks, when a proper routing infrastructure having multiple
routers remains active at any given time. Therefore, even if
the idea of an automatically configured routed network in
the home provides convenience and significant advantages to
various kinds of users and smart devices, the homenet routers
themselves can become highly susceptible to malicious activity
unknown to the network owner. This creates new security
challenges, as now home routers and gateways can be exposed
to attacks to intercept and subvert routing and traffic, or inject
malicious router into the home network.
Therefore, the role of security for the protection of a
homenet’s routing infrastructure is important, and can fall
into several considerations. Firstly, access control is needed
to prevent unauthorised eavesdropping, and permitting only
authorised routers to join the core network. This relies on
proper policies and credentials for channel security, such as
symmetric keys, strong passphrases or certificates. Secondly,
authentication and verification of routing messages must be
performed, which allows a router to distinguish and discard
malicious or spoofed packets, particularly when a shared
wireless medium is used. Related to authorisation as well
as authentication is the need to ensure the completeness,
correctness and integrity of routing information. This deters
attackers from being able to insert a malicious router into
the homenet and subsequently inject traffic or cause data
destruction to subvert the routing network.
In conjunction with these considerations, the requirement
of availability needs to also be addressed, particularly so for
routers that could be battery powered. Such routers can exist as
gateways to vehicular networks, or to extend the homenet over
a wider area for a limited period of time. Any sort of availabil-
ity requirements have typically referred to resilience against
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks intended at disabling services
and network infrastructure. When battery-operated routers are
taken into account, availability also refers to resilience against
attacks designed to drain energy, by extensive or prolonged
communication or computational activity [5]. As these can be
launched at virtually any layer of the communication protocol
stack, they can often go unnoticed until power states are
diminished to near critical levels.
While attacks on simple home gateways have been mounted
remotely over the Internet, wireless attacks on homenets can
be realistically compromised by an attacker physically nearby.
Also, residential networks are normally not managed by highly
technical users, who often lack the type of knowledge and
the sophisticated tools to cope with detecting and preventing
attacks on routers.
Hence, we propose a novel approach to protect and detect
malicious activity in a homenet, particularly with regards to
the routing infrastructure. Our approach relies on profiling
the power consumption of homenet routers. By studying the
energy patterns of the routers in various scenarios, such as
during normal activity or when various kinds of attacks are in
progress, unusual behaviour in the routers can be correlated
with spikes or elevated levels of the consumed energy. This
allows network owners to detect attacks in progress to be
detected with a high level of confidence.
Using anomalous power consumption as a means to detect
attacks is a promising area of research that is at the moment
still in its infancy. However, the idea has been applied in
several mobile and wireless domains. For example, research
has been successfully performed on anomalous battery drains
on mobile phone to detect malware as well as unknown
software bugs [6], [7]. Timothy K. Buennemeyer et al. [8]
describes a battery-sensing intrusion protection system which
detects irregular communication activity over IEEE 802.11
Wi-Fi and 802.15.1 Bluetooth. However, to the extent of
our knowledge, applying anomalous power consumption as
a metric for threat detection in routers and routing systems,
has not been performed yet.
Therefore, the aim of our paper is to detail our empirical
power measurements of homenet routers and findings under
different kinds of attack scenarios designed to disrupt network
routing or drain the power from a battery operated network.
In so doing, we attempt to provide evidence of the feasi-
bility of our approach, which can then be used to ensure
further resilience and robustness of homenets. Since password-
cracking brute-force attacks as well as DoS attacks on home
networks have been well documented, our focus is instead
on the securing the routing infrastructure of the homenet.
Therefore, our investigation centers around measuring the
power consumption of homenet routers when the wireless
channel security is being compromised, or when the routing
protocol used by a homenet, called Babel, is targeted.
Section II provides a brief background of the Homenet
architecture, relevant protocols as well as expected deployment
scenarios. Section III details the experimental setup for our
measurements. Section IV provides a detailed explanation of
each experiment and obtained measurements, while Section V
then discusses our findings. Our conclusions are subsequently
given in Section VI.
II. IETF HOMENET
In this section, we describe work of the IETF Homenet WG
to standardise home networks which is relevant to this paper.
An exhaustive discussion of the entire architecture, however,
is out of scope, and the interested reader is encouraged to refer
to the relevant working group documents.
The Homenet WG’s intent is to research and standardise
networking protocols and other mechanisms useful for residen-
tial home networks [9]. Supporting IPv6 natively, providing
automatic networking and service discovery as well as sur-
viving uplink disruptions were perceived as important goals.
The home network is also envisioned to grow large enough
to require multiple network segments and subnets within the
home, therefore a critical requirement of the architecture is to
allow the existence of several routers, which then need to be
orchestrated to perform actual routing in the network, using
one more more well-known interior gateway routing protocols.
For proper operation, ISPs supporting homenet-based resi-
dential networks are required to enable IPv6 and then support
DHCPv6-based prefix delegation, so that a requesting home
router would be supplied an IPv6 address prefix, instead of
a single IPv6 address. This roughly corresponds to an ISP
supplying an IPv6 address block to the home network, and
the router subsequently delegating IPv6 addresses and address
prefixes to other home devices and routers as necessary.
When more than 1 router is present in the homenet, an
interior routing protocol is used within the home. Currently
the routing protocol of choice in Homenet WG is Babel
[10], an ad-hoc multi-hop mesh networking distance vector
protocol. Babel possesses properties such as loop avoidance,
rapid convergence and high performance. A Babel-based mesh
network is resilient to link disruptions, as the protocol adapts
and repairs the mesh topology based on measured link quality,
ensuring a high level of end-to-end reachability. Babel also
has a low memory footprint, and works well over both fixed
Ethernet links as well as wireless 802.11-based radio. These
latter properties make Babel an ideal candidate for homenet,
since a residential gateway and routing infrastructure consists
of inexpensive off-the-shelf consumer-grade hardware which
are not as powerful as enterprise-level network equipment
and generally possess the ability to provide IP connectivity
over Wi-Fi and fixed Ethernet. In some cases, these can also
be resource-constrained or battery-powered routers, allowing
the homenet to encompass vehicular gateways and extend to
peripheral residential areas for limited periods of time.
Finally, homenet routers obtain and distribute information
about the capabilities, routing protocols and services in the
homenet using the Homenet Control Protocol (HNCP) [11] .
While homenet is designed to work with IPv6, the tech-
nology is IP agnostic to end-devices, and IPv4 connectivity
works just as well too. In a homenet deployment consisting
of multiple routers, it is envisioned that typical deployments
would rely on a border router communicating with an ISP
to obtain an IPv6 prefix for the homenet. Other internal
routers would communicate with the border router over fixed
Ethernet, or over Wi-Fi using ad-hoc mode and create a mesh-
based routing network running Babel. Devices in the home
then are supplied connectivity over Wi-Fi using infrastructure
mode over a different radio. Alternatively, depending on the
router hardware, if only one physical Wi-Fi radio interface is
available, it is also possible to advertise 2 different Service
Set Identifiers (SSIDs), and hence virtual wireless interfaces:
the first for joining into the babel routing mesh using ad-hoc
mode, and the second for supplying connectivity to devices
in the home using infrastructure mode. The border router also
periodically transmits router advertisement messages into the
home network, and therefore both end-devices and internal
routers can automatically configure their IPv6 addresses using
Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC), in addition to
obtaining private IPv4 addresses using DHCP.
In default modes, neither Babel, nor the ad-hoc mesh net-
work running over Wi-Fi, require any security extensions for
proper interworking. Any router part of the same mesh is able
to communicate and exchange routing information with any
other existing router, while the entire Wi-Fi mesh network can
be set as an open ad-hoc network which broadcasts a common
SSID specifically for connecting access points. Nevertheless, it
is prudent to employ security measures in both Babel as well as
the wireless mesh network. For Babel, message authentication
can be enabled with a Hashed Message Authentication Code
(HMAC) cryptographic authentication [12]. When HMAC is
used, two compliant hash algorithms must be supported, both
having a 160-bit digest: RIPEMD-160 and SHA-1. Additional
hash algorithms may also be supported as described in RFC
7298. For Wi-Fi, WPA2-PSK authentication, which uses a
human-readable passphrase, can be employed.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Our test environment consisted of several portions. Firstly,
we created an ISP capable of providing Internet connectivity
to various home networks via IPv4 and IPv6. A DHCP server
delivers a single IPv4 address to home border routers (as
most ISPs do today), while IPv6 prefix delegation consisting
of a /56 prefix is provided to supply the home network
with global IPv6 addresses. Secondly, we then deployed a
Homenet-compliant residential network with four wireless
TP-Link AC-1200 routers, which each have a Qualcomm
Atheros QCA9558 CPU, 16MB of flash and 128MB of flash
memory. Routers were positioned several meters apart from
each other approximately equidistant, in order to form a fully
connected mesh. Each router was capable of dual band Wi-Fi
on both 2.4Ghz and 5GHz radio interfaces. The stock firmware
was replaced with the latest OpenWRT ”Designated Driver”
distribution, based on Linux kernel version 4.1.16. The hnetd
(for HNCP) and mdnsd (for multicast service discovery) pack-
ages were installed. Because the babeld (for Babel routing)
provided as a package in OpenWRT does not support HMAC-
based authentication, we cross-compiled a custom babeld for
OpenWRT from the source code provided by the Quagga RE
project, in which HMAC authentication was supported. The
2.4 GHz radio interfaces were dedicated towards creating the
wireless mesh network in which the Babel routing protocol
was utilised. While the 5 GHz radio interfaces can advertise
Wi-Fi connectivity to client devices, for the purpose of our
measurements, we did not enable the interface to eliminate
any measurement bias from communication with end-devices.
Thus, the power consumption figures obtained corresponded
directly to traffic originated and exchanged among the routers
themselves within the Babel-based wireless mesh network.
Fig 1 depicts the test environment. In addition to the routers,
the setup also consisted of a commercial industrial-grade load
generating tool called Ruge [13] that is capable of crafting
forged and flooding packets and simulating DoS attack loads
to intended target networks or hosts. Ruge is a LAN-based tool
and hence used directly for attacks in the homenet in which
physical access to the router is possible. For wireless attacks,
a laptop was used as a relay together with Ruge.
In addition to these components, the setup also consisted of
three Energy Monitoring Modules (EMM), each of which were
connected to a homenet router. The EMMs were built in-house
and monitored the precise power being supplied (both voltage
and current) non-invasively to the routers. The design of the
EMM was adapted from the Energino energy consumption
monitoring toolkit [14], which provides real-time, precise,
energy consumption statistics for any DC appliance. Fig 2
shows the constructed EMM.
HOMENET 
EMM	
EMM	
EMM	
ISP 
Figure 1: Setup for measuring power consumption. Routers are
interconnected in a full mesh topology. Blue arrows indicate
authentic Babel traffic. Red arrows depict forged traffic.
Figure 2: Energy Monitoring Module.
IV. MEASUREMENTS
This section presents our methodology and measurements
per experiment. Various kinds of attacks were targetted at
the homenet. In some cases, power measurements were taken
when Babel was used without HMAC authentication. In the
others, HMAC authentication was enabled, using the SHA1
algorithm. In IETF protocol design, HMAC-SHA-1 is the
preferred keyed-hash algorithm [15].
For each experiment, several sets of measurements were
taken to ensure data correlation. Each run was conducted once
the routers were in steady-state both before and after attacks,
and measurements were taken approximately for an hour.
Additionally, datasets for the three access points were verified
to ensure correct calibration of the EMMs. For each reading
taken from the serial interface of the EMM, the data consisted
of the average voltage, average current, an approximate sample
size of 800 voltage/current samples in the averaging window
of a single reading, each for an approximate time of 200ms
in the averaging window.
For each set, we start by describing the acquisition of our
dataset and then follow with an initial analysis of the results.
A deeper discussion of these results is presented in the next
section V.
A. Baseline Measurements
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Figure 3: Baseline graphs from top-down. a) Power consump-
tion with Babel, HMAC enabled. b) Power consumption with
Babel, no HMAC. c) mDNS traffic triggering peaks in energy
consumption. y-axis shows packet count, x-axis shows elapsed
time in seconds.
In this experiment, we took detailed power measurements
of access points in which no malicious traffic was introduced.
By default, Wi-Fi channel security was achieved by the use of
WPA2-PSK. Two types of power measurements were taken. In
the first instance, the energy was monitored when Babel was
used with HMAC authentication enabled, while in the second
Table I: Babel Protocol Messages and Sizes in a 4-router mesh
Babel Packet No HMAC With HMAC
Hello 74 106
IHU 122 154
Update 157 189
instance, Babel was used without HMAC. The aim of the
experiment was to firstly to study the impact of enabling Babel
message authentication on the overall power consumption,
and secondly, to establish a baseline measurement with which
subsequent experiments and power consumption levels can be
compared against.
Figs 3a and b show the power consumption levels for a
single router with and without HMAC enabled on Babel.
For a 300s duration of the experiment, the average power
consumption for running Babel with HMAC enabled, was
2193mW, while that of the same routing protocol without any
HMAC was 2192mW.
These two values show that there is virtually no difference,
if any, on a homenet router’s power consumption, when
HMAC authentication is enabled for Babel routing during
normal operation. This is so, even when accounted for slightly
larger packet sizes as well as computational time to check
message authenticity. Table I shows Babel packet types (Hello,
I-Heard-U, and Update) and their respective sizes in the mesh
network in which every router has 3 neighbours. For larger
numbers of routers in the mesh network, the size of the Update
packet would correspondingly increase. Consequently, should
Babel be running in a fixed Ethernet configuration, Update
packets would be smaller in size. As can be seen, with HMAC
enabled, the overhead is a constant 32-byte structure to every
Babel packet.
Periodic glitches and spikes can also be consistently ob-
served in both sets of measurements. From network traces
taken during the measurements, the cause was pinpointed to
be large bursts of packets transmitted and received at fixed
intervals over the radio interface, as shown in Figure 3c. A
specific investigation using Wireshark revealed that these were
multicast DNS (mDNS) traffic. mDNS is used in homenets
for automatic service discovery. Table II shows the relative
amount of traffic seen during a 300s interval corresponding
to measurement periods. It can be seen that in total, even if
it is bursty in nature, mDNS traffic is significant, accounting
for more than half of all traffic, having 232 packets with a
total of 84224 bytes. This is compared to 244 Babel packets
having a total of 50089 bytes (or 57897 bytes with HMAC
authentication enabled). By contrast, HNCP traffic is far less
noisy, accounting for a total of 93 packets and 12818 bytes
which accounts for between 8% to 9 % of the total traffic.
B. Wireless Channel Attacks on the Mesh Network
We undertook wireless online channel attacks to show the
power consumption of routers when Wi-Fi de-authentication
attacks are in progress. For Babel routing the homenet routers
used a WPA2-based mesh network protected with a strong
passphrase. Firstly the wireless traffic was passively monitored
Table II: Protocol, number and bytes sent and received in 300s
Protocol
Type
Bytes
Sent
Packets
Sent
Bytes
Received
Packets
Received
mDNS 16628 44 67596 188
Babel 18063 98 32026 146
Babel+HMAC 21199 98 36698 146
HNCP 1922 19 10896 74
using the airodump-ng packet capture tool in order to obtain
the Base Service Set Identifier (BSSID) of an already running
mesh network. During the same period, the BSSID of the
all communicating routers connected to the mesh were also
retrieved.
Subsequently two de-authentication attacks were mounted
simultaneously from a laptop using the aireplay-ng tool to
inject frames, for approximately 6 minutes.
• The first was aimed at disrupting the mesh network oper-
ation and causing the mesh network to become unstable,
with the routers constantly re-authenticating themselves
into the network. This attack was mounted by injecting
de-authentication messages using the BSSID of a specific
router (router 1) as the source and sending it to the BSSID
of the mesh network. The effect of this attack can be seen
in Figure 4.
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Figure 4: Power consumption of Router 1 during WPA2 de-
auth attack.
• In the second attack, in addition to sending the de-
authentication messages to the BSSID of the mesh net-
work, they were also sent to the BSSID of a second router
(router 2) communicating with router 1. This directly tar-
geted the link and connectivity between the two routers,
the aim being to cause an existing connected router to
keep rejecting connection attempts from a targeted victim.
The effects were then observed on router 2 as seen in
Figure 5.
In both cases, routers reflected a higher level of power con-
sumption compared to baseline levels. The average power con-
sumption seen in Router 1 during the Wi-Fi De-authentication
attack, was 2216mW, an increase of about 23 mW for each
300s period of the attack. When Router 2 was additionally
targetted in the second attack, it exhibited a notably higher
increase in consumption of 183mW. This is clearly visible in
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Figure 5: Power consumption of Router 2 during WPA2 de-
auth attack.
Figure 5 which shows the energy profile of the router before,
during and after the attack.
C. Traffic Injection Attack in Babel Network with HMAC
enabled
In this experiment, it is firstly assumed that an attacker
has penetrated the mesh network itself, either via physical
access and tampering with a router, or as an outcome of a
successful offline dictionary attack on a weak WPA2-PSK
passphrase. We look at the impact to the power consumption
of an existing router when an attacker attempts to infiltrate
a network in which the Babel routing has been enabled with
HMAC authentication, with the HMAC-SHA1 key assumed
to be unknown to the attacker. We look at how the response
of existing routers can be exhibited in our measurements,
when either a malicious router is attempted to be introduced
or malformed Babel routing messages are injected into the
network.
In order to facilitate our testing and measurement, we used
Ruge to craft Babel routing messages. Babel employs Type-
Length-Value (TLV) encoding in its packets to exchange rout-
ing information. Babel nodes can also solicit Acknowledge-
ment requests for any transmitted packets. For this scenario,
Babel Hello and I-Heard-U (IHU) messages were used for the
injection attacks. As Ruge is a wireline tool, injecting Babel
routing messages wirelessly into the mesh network required
the assistance of a laptop to capture generated messages from
Ruge over an Ethernet link and save the packet capure traces
into a file. The laptop was subsequently used to joining the
homenet wireless mesh network. The packETH command-
line tool wirelessly replayed these generated Hello and IHU
messages every 4 seconds in an infinite loop. Fig 6 shows 3
power consumption traces of the same router for three kinds
of activity for 300 seconds.
The lowest blue line in this Figure indicates the baseline
power measurement of 2193mW, which corresponds directly
to Fig 3a. The green line is the obtained measurement when
invalid Babel messages without a HMAC have been used in
an injection attack. These packets are received but discarded
immediately by the router. Here the power consumption is
calculated to be 2283mW, an increase of 90mW over non
malicious traffic. The red line obtained in the measurement
indicate the power consumed by a router receiving, processing
and subsequently discarding Babel messages which possess a
forged HMAC. Injected Babel packets appended with a forged
HMAC TLV structure induce recipients to act on the incom-
ing malicious traffic on a per-packet basis before discarding
the forged packets, thereby introducing a packet processing
overload onto the existing routers. Consequently, the power
consumed on average for this duration was calculated to be
2318mW, an increase of 125mW from the baseline reading,
and a slight increase of 35mW caused by the computational
overhead from the green line.
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Figure 6: Differences in power consumption in an HMAC-
enabled Babel network. Blue line indicates baseline power
consumption. Green line indicates malicious Babel traffic with
no HMAC packet structure, Red line indicates malicious Babel
traffic with forged but invalid HMAC.
D. Route Flooding Attack in a Babel Network with no HMAC
In this experiment we explore the worst case scenario of a
homenet which becomes subjected to a flooding attack. This
can occur if both the wireless channel security as well as
the routing infrastructure become compromised. This scenario
is an extension of the previous scenario from subsection
IV-C. This could occur, for example, if the home network
owner did not secure the Babel routing protocol with HMAC
authentication and relied purely on protecting the network
using WPA2-PSK. In this sequence of attack, it is assumed that
the attacker has penetrated the mesh network itself, either via
physical access and tampering with a router, or as an outcome
of a successful offline dictionary attack on a weak WPA2-PSK
passphrase.
In addition to the Babel Hello and I-Heard-U (IHU) mes-
sages from the previous subsection, Update messages were
also generated from Ruge and used in this attack to flood
the network. The messages which were generated in Ruge for
flooding into the mesh were used in the following sequence
of events:
1) When the attack commences, a Babel Hello packet is
sent into the network
2) After a 4 second wait, an IHU packet is sent.
3) After a 1 second wait, steps 1 and 2 are repeated in an
endless loop.
4) After an initial 12 second wait from step 1, Update
messages are constantly flooded into the network every 3
ms. Each message updates current routes for the IPv4 /24
network by increasing the network address by a single
bit for each transmission. Updates start at 10.0.0.0/24.
One network advertisement is done every 3ms.
5) Sending route update messages for the entire /24 IPv4
network takes 15 seconds after which sending Updates
starts anew.
With the above steps, routing tables and information for
the entire homenet mesh was updated constantly, inducing
a heavy stress and CPU load onto the routers.This forces
routers to consider between 200 and 650 routes, depending
on the router load status. As before, a laptop was used as
a wireless relay injecting malicious traffic into the network.
Hello and IHU messages were transmitted using packETH
while Update messages were wirelessly replayed using the
tcpreplay tool. Because the malicious Babel traffic was in-
jected into the homenet where routing was not secured using
HMAC authentication, all the existing homenet routers were
unaware that the traffic was forged. Fig 7 graphically depicts
the resulting router’s energy consumption profile. From its
baseline power consumption of 2192 mW, the router begins
consuming an average of 2802 mW during the attack. The
graph also shows an interval during the sequence of events
where there is a momentary pause before the flooding attack
replay loop resumes, and reaches a similarly consistent state of
high power consumption for a second time during the attack.
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Figure 7: Power consumption during route injection attack, no
HMAC enabled
V. FINDINGS
Based on our measurements and observations, the obtained
results remained consistent across all our experimental runs.
The experiments conducted focused solely on the power con-
sumption profiles of the routers working with Babel in wireless
ad-hoc mode. However, we wanted to ensure that mandatory
features of the Homenet Architecture, and the components
which implemented them were not disabled at any stage of our
experiments. One such component was mDNS, which imple-
ments service discovery. From our findings, mDNS consumed
a significant portion of energy, even when minimal services
existed in the homenet.
Additionally, because all homenet routers participate in
multicast-based packet transmission and reception, it is highly
likely that as more routers are added to a mesh-based homenet,
the increase of multicast traffic could be in the order of O(n).
Implementation optimisations, protocol improvements, tuning
of mDNS advertisements and broadcast intervals may yield
better energy efficiency. However, investigation of such aspects
are out of scope of this paper.
The approach of using power consumption as a metric for
attack detection in homenet appeared promising and feasible. It
can be seen that various kinds of attacks had a definite impact
on the energy consumed by a homenet router. With flooding
attacks, significant differences were seen, compared to the base
level measured. However, even for Wi-Fi based authentication
attacks, while the measured levels of additional power con-
sumed were relatively small, it was noticeable that because
of the nature of the mesh topology, the power consumption
pattern of more than 1 router was normally affected by attacks
targetting even a single homenet router. Consequently, it would
be possible to observe the power consumption patterns and
perform correlation across several routers to detect an attack
in progress, even if individual power consumption levels by
themselves may not give a clear indication. Particularly for
covert attacks, using power consumption anamolies can be
quite effective. On the other hand, our findings note that a
homenet cannot only rely on homenet routers enabling HMAC
authentication for Babel routing, without having a proper
wireless channel security, for example by having a WPA2-PSK
wireless network with a weak passphrase. When energy is an
asset that needs to be conserved, then such a practice would be
counter-productive and exposes an additional attack surface, as
in addition to injecting malicious Babel traffic, an adversary
can append a forged HMAC to each injected packet, forcing a
router to both process the injected message as well as perform
computations on the forged HMAC. An additional point of
input is that homenet-based configurations are also suitable for
deploying ad-hoc mesh and wireless sensor networks where
gateways are more resource constrained in terms of com-
putational ability as well as power. Using energy footprints,
power draining attacks, which force a battery-operated router
into consuming significantly more energy thereby reducing its
viable performance and lifetime, can be similarly detected.
For the EMMs, we saw several advantages in develop-
ing our own implementations based on low-cost but highly
accurate current and voltage sensors. For example, our ap-
proach allowed the ability to non-invasively monitor the power
consumption of the routers without having to install any
special hardware or software on the router itself. Additionally,
EMMs can be colocated in multiple locations without being
physically encumbered in a specific location, as each setup is
portable and can be easily powered using an external battery
supply. However, significant amount of time was necessary
for sensor calibration, and ensuring consistency by double-
checking measurements across the several homenet routers
Table III: Theoretical lifetime values for routers in operation
on batteries
Router Model
Voltage
Battery Capacity
TP-Link AC1200
12V
20000 mAh
TP-Link MR3020
5V
12000 mAh
Babel + WPA2-PSK
(No Attacks) 1389 h 1200 h
Wi-Fi De-authentication 1370 h 822 h
Packet Injection
no HMAC appended 1333 h 800 h
Packet Injection
Forged HMAC appended 1316 h 790 h
Routing Flood Attack 1087 h 652 h
equipped with EMMs in our setup. As an EMM is based on
a Hall-Effect current sensor, it was suspectible to magnetic
influence that had an effect on the output values and as such
could introduce some variation to the measurements. The other
issue effecting the measurement accuracy is the electrical
noise. The RC-filter added to the module lowered the noise
on the ACS712 output/ADC input and stabilised the readings.
Finally, even though the measured power consumption lev-
els were based on a specific hardware model, we performed
quick verifications that these results could be extrapolated and
applied in other router platforms as well. As an example, we
measured the base power consumption of a TP-Link MR-
3020 homenet router. This is based on a resource-constrained
design, having a very small form-factor, 32MB of RAM and
4 MB of flash memory, whose main purpose is to serve as a
personal temporary hotspot or a wireless repeater. The router
was then connected to an external 12000 mAh battery pack,
flashed with OpenWRT and extended for use as a battery
operated homenet router. Using the values derived from our
measurements, we were able to calculate theoretical lifetime
values for both the AC1200 router used throughout this paper,
as well as that of the MR3020, if the entire power was solely
battery-based and all the energy from the external batteries
were used in keeping a similar-sized homenet mesh network
up and connected without any clients connected. This is shown
in Table III. The expected lifetime of these routers when under
attack are also calculated, based on figures obtained from
our power measurements. Real figures however would be far
lower, owing particularly to home network traffic and Internet
usage patterns from end devices and services. Additionally,
our assumption is that commonly used home routers would
lack dedicated hardware support for cryptographic functions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Anomalous power consumption is an emerging research
area, aimed at highlighting unusual ongoing activity which can
escape detection from conventional methods. Our hypothesis
is that by calibrating and profiling the power consumption of a
homenet router during normal operations, a higher than likely
possibility of an intrusion in progress (such as a brute force
attack) can be detected resulting from high radio or CPU
activity, or higher-than-normal gateway activity during quiet
hours. The work done in this paper shows that using power
measurement as a metric for attack detection is feasible for
both novice and professional technical network users.
In future, we intend to continue developing our Energy
Monitoring Modules so that sensors with higher accuracy
could be incorporated and obtained measurements can be-
come more precise. At the same time, sensitivity could be
increased to detect malicious behaviour which do not consume
significant amounts of power. We intend to profile additional
attacks on the homenet infrastructure with a wider variety
of router hardware thereby corroborating theoretical lifetime
values of constrained routers. Future work would consider
other mesh topologies with regards to security in homenets.
User generated traffic in the homenet and its impact on
detecting malicious activity on the routing also remains an
area for future work.
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Abstract— Mobile computing devices, industrial control sys-
tems, and service provider clouds often need to be connected
to each other over wide area networks. However, reliability,
quality of services and confidentiality are challenging in such
setups. Moreover, isolated appliances and physical equipment
face harsh environment conditions. In this paper we explore
designing secure layer 2 overlay networks using Software
Defined Networking (SDN), and challenges in implementing
them with open source tools.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information technology and pervasive computing brings
new waves of innovation [1]. Every object becomes pro-
grammable, data driven, and the physical realm gets weaved
with the digital world. Mobile computing and networking are
huge drivers for this progression, as systems become more
valuable the more connections they have [2].
The proliferation of network connected devices brings
along challenges with security [3]. Many Internet of Things
devices use unsecured connections, protocols and vulnerable
software [3], [4]. The risks materialize when the devices are
installed to networks that do not have strict firewalls. This
is not a threat that concerns only future. Many vulnerable
connected devices are continuously exploited today [4].
Another enabler for pervasive services is the cloud com-
puting. The definition of cloud computing calls for services
that are elastic, independent of location, controllable and
measurable by the operator, and can be accessed by het-
erogeneous devices over standard protocols [5]. The cloud
is further divided to private, community, public and hybrid
clouds, which exhibit different security properties and need
different security services [5].
Cloud paradigm requires new thinking from the network
side. For instance, tenant VM (Virtual Machine) isolation
into their own networks is a must-have requirement for all
shared cloud operators already. To allow efficient resource
distribution, the logical network topology may differ a lot
from the actual physical topology. Cloud computing relies
heavily on virtual networking, which is required as the
traditional traffic patterns no longer apply [6]. Moreover,
the requirements are ever increasing and cloud networks
and VM’s are about to be directly connected to company
networks, home networks, and even to mobile personal
clouds.
Seamless layer 2 clouds are mostly needed for legacy
applications, and such applications which expect to maintain
stable connection. For example, separate ICSs (Industrial
Control Systems) may reside in the same LAN, and it would
be very costly or even impossible to make changes to them.
Yet, connecting networks is not a simple task. Layer 2
WAN overlay network techniques exist and some of them
are secure when speaking about data privacy, e.g. VPN’s
[7]. On the other hand, resilient overlay networks are usually
operating on layer 3 and they are done with BGP (Border
Gateway Protocol) [8]. The combination of these factors
requires new aspects to resilient L2 networking.
When designing such overlay network, the characteristics
must take into account the underlaying network structure and
its properties. The quality of Internet connections is typically
best effort and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) do not wish
to guarantee any latency or maximum packet loss. This
makes Internet connections cheap (even ubiquitous). Further
the cloud providers typically run their operations in multiple
locations which needs interconnection between them. These
interconnects need to scale to many data centers since virtual
machines could even move between the locations. Thus,
redundancy has to be built on top of the upper layers.
The usage of Software Defined Networking (SDN) tech-
nology allows to organize networks freely using also other
criteria besides basic forwarding related decisions. Paths
can be influenced by the need of redundancy or by the
security services in the network [9]. For example, inter-VM
communication can go through a firewall even when the
machines reside logically in the same broadcast domain.
The paper is structured as follows. In the second section
we present use cases and requirements for a WAN SDN
solution. In the third section we review related work and
present potential technologies that could satisfy the require-
ments. In the fourth section we present a network design
inspired by the existing solutions. The fifth section discusses
the experiences and gives ideas for future work. Finally,
conclusions are drawn.
II. USE CASE AND REQUIREMENTS
The security of an overlay network should be carefully
considered. The basic security guideline for the design is
gained from the CIA triad (confidentiality, integrity, avail-
ability) [10].
The resiliency of the designed network is also important,
since the network must be able to operate in distant locations,
but as well in cloud environments. We have selected three
use cases to highlight the importance of the security and
resiliency requirements.
CLOUD
Salesman Ambulance
Water treatment 
plant
Fig. 1. Use cases
Water pump Water supply station resides usually in remote
location which requires an Internet connection for con-
trolling the water pump speed. Without connectivity
the pump operates at a designated constant power.
The water network can tolerate excess or insufficient
pressure/flow, but it operates with less energy when
the pressure is optimal. The controlling system, i.e.
the optimization engine server is running in a cloud,
and thus has real-time measurements from all pumping
stations to achieve the best efficiency for supplying
water.
Traveling salesman While traveling, also globally, the net-
work connections should be terminated to the nearest
datacenter to ensure best quality of service. Security is
of topmost priority. In addition, the operating system
should not reach for local services in unknown LANs
[11].
Ambulance The personnel needs the patient records without
any delay. Hospital equipment, for instance, heart rate
analyzers, EKGs or automatic morphine pumps need to
be in connection with the hospital’s cloud. The vehicle
moves at 180km/h, so mobile connections may break
from time to time.
The L2 connections between locations are built through
untrusted networks. Common for every use case is the
usage of 4G mobile connections. The mobile network is
often implemented with carrier grade IPv4 NAT (Network
Address Translation), which causes end-to-end connectivity
problems. Direct connections can, however, be built using
IPv6 protocol if the mobile network allows it. Unfortunately
often legacy applications do not support IPv6 and thus IPv4
is needed. This leads to the requirement to use a secure IPv4
tunneling method which is immune to NAT. In addition, some
ISPs might have implemented firewalls to restricting certain
traffic. This extends the need for tunnel to be also as firewall
immune as possible.
Sometimes nodes in the public IP network can act as ex-
change points. Based on the needs of the use case, resiliency
will however suffer, if an alternative path (if it exists) would
not be available in a few seconds. This increases the need for
good packet integrity and emphasizes fast convergence time.
Such features are thus required for this implementation.
The use cases define as well the need for good cloud
integration. Provisioning new VMs to these networks should
be effortless and reliable, which is only possible if software-
based switching is available for every location the network
is extended to.
III. RELATED WORK
In order to have security in a untrusted WAN, a secure
tunneling mechanism is needed. One of the most famous
secure tunneling methods is IPsec (Internet Protocol Security
Suite). It works in both transport and tunneling modes
offering the required security features for L3 VPN. The
IPsec, however, often faces problems in NAT connections
[12]. Thus, the reliability does not meet the required level in
changing network conditions, and cheap commodity Internet
connections may not work.
With TLS based VPN (such as OpenVPN) these interop-
erability requirements can be solved. OpenVPN tunnels the
traffic inside encrypted UDP or TCP packets, and thus in
the vast number of scenarios firewalls and NAT appliances
let it through. The L2 tunnel driver for OpenVPN is called
TAP. However, the TAP uses a simple local Ethernet control
plane causing it to be intolerant for topologies with redundant
links, which create loops.
Despite being integral for the development of future ser-
vices, secure seamless cloud WAN networking is not a much
researched problem. Solutions for various sub-problems of
the issue exist, however. Some of them cover simple road
warrior cases that support only a single access concentrator
and are thus not scalable or do not integrate well with
cloud systems. Data center interconnection has gathered
attention, but most solutions are presented for networks that
are controlled fully by the data center operator. Resiliency
of these network environments may not fulfill the needs of
critical cyber physical solutions. A mesh topology is often
used to provide required resiliency but simultaneously it
brings the problem for possible loops. Since the current trend
is to have data centers geographically distributed, secure
tunneling is required between the sites. When it comes down
to ICS, requirements for network stability and reliability play
a big role.
SDN is a key feature when building complex networks.
It allows arbitrary topologies based on different criteria like
security [9], redundancy [13], [14] or efficiency [15]. SDN
is commonly used for cloud networking[15] as it makes
topology changes much faster than traditional networking
approaches. SDN uses separate control plane which offers
centralized controller to have total awareness of the network.
Different industry-driven approaches to L2 virtualization
techniques exist, but some of them are cumbersome or
missing essential features. One technique for DCI (Data Cen-
ter Interconnectivity) is overlay networking, which typically
uses an underlying IP based network, and forms its own
topology over that by using a tunneling protocol (examples
TRILL, MPLS and VXLAN) [6].
TRILL (Transparent Interconnection of Lots of Links)
[16] is a technology to create a L2 cloud which forwards
packets efficiently and can recover from link breaks. TRILL,
like many others is an overlay solution, which means that
it encapsulates the Ethernet frames. MPLS (Multiprotocol
Label Switching) was one of the first popular overlay net-
working solutions. It has labels that are used for identifying
traffic flows. The forwarding decisions are configured either
statically or dynamically [17]. The label switching nodes are
connected over IP, and thus IPsec can be used. Typically, the
technology requires time consuming provisioning from both
ISP and company requesting this feature.
VXLAN is a stand-alone overlay networking protocol
which extends the VLAN identifier space to 16 million
unique different networks. It works by encapsulating the L2
data to L4 UDP frame. VXLAN includes a multicast control
plane, which is used by the distributed switch entities to
distribute unknown unicast packets and broadcast packets
to all switches that form the virtual network. The switches
keep a table of switch identifiers and IP addresses associated
with previously seen MAC addresses, which they utilize in
unicast traffic forwarding. The protocol does not consider
security features and thus should be used only in trusted
environments. The VXLAN however is widely supported, in
physical and in virtual switches as well. VMware platforms
have native VXLAN support since it has been one of the
main developers. [18]
Geneve (Generic Network Virtualization Encapsulation) is
a similar protocol to VXLAN presented in an IETF draft
[19]. Where VXLAN offers its own multicast based control
plane, Geneve aims to be a control plane agnostic tunneling
protocol. The Geneve header includes Virtual Network ID
field to ensure corresponding data transmission through the
tunnel. Unfortunately, the support for Geneve is very poor
and the security features are similar to VXLAN.
OTV (overlay transport virtualization) [20] is a technology
to extend the L2 network directly through the IP network.
Strength of OTV is the ability to stretch the network of a
datacenter to cover several separate data centers together.
OTV by itself does not offer security features, but IPsec
can be added on the links. Neither does VPLS (Virtual
private LAN Service) [21] which uses BGP (Border Gateway
Protocol) or LDP (Label Distribution Protocol) to form full
mesh. Both of these can be operated over IP or MPLS
networks.
Microsoft has introduced the NVGRE [22] (Network Vir-
tualization using Generic Routing Encapsulation) protocol
for network virtualization. The protocol is designed to tunnel
layer 2 packets over layer 3 networks using GRE. This makes
the protocol very simple and lightweight. It does not contain
any security features and thus should not be used over the
Internet.
Traditional method to provide redundancy to Ethernet
networks have been to construct redundant topology and to
use Spanning Tree Protocol (STP). The STP prevents loops
by shutting down ports that do not belong to a tree graph
formed from a chosen root node. The default convergence
time for STP is 30-50 seconds, which is too much for
critical applications [23]. In addition, the STP makes the
network inefficient as the parallel usage of network links is
not possible. For instance, east-west links, which are needed
for inter-VM communication, are typically disabled.
PRP (Parallel Redundancy Protocol) [24] is one option
to create redundant networks with zero recovery time. This
active redundancy protocol offers parallel transmission for a
single packet from source to destination by duplicating the
packet. Delivery paths have no distinction and thus receiving
node discards the duplicates. [25] The challenge for PRP is
to build a topology that can carry the duplicated packets on
distinct paths. Common topology that is used with PRP is
the ring topology. The required topology can be achieved
using SDN [13], [26], [14].
IV. PROPOSED DESIGN TO EVALUATE SECURE WAN
SDN
In order to get implementation experience of a Secure
WAN SDN concept we built a network on virtualized in-
frastructure and OpenWRT based base stations connected
with 4G. The setup is depicted in Figure 2 where GW-1 and
GW-2 are OpenWRT routers. Hypervisor-1 and Hypervisor-
2 in Figure 2 reside in two common rack servers running
a hypervisor to host virtual machines. The used design is a
layered one, which has SDN control plane, encrypted links,
and virtual switching provided with Open vSwitch.
A. Link Layer Encryption
Link layer encryption method had several possibilities.
The method must however answer the given requirements
and consider the VXLAN usage as well. Different considered
protocol stacks are shown in the Figure 3.
VXLAN over OpenVPN was chosen because it works
through firewalls and is tolerant of NAT. OpenVPN also
supports larger MTU than its underlay network. OpenVPN
is a tunneling solution, and creates a network, which allows
bidirectional communication inside single connection.
VXLAN over DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security)
would be more light-weight, but as VXLAN needs two
separate connections, it cannot function with NAT that does
not allow incoming connections. Even without NAT firewall
permissions may as well restrict the traffic making the DTLS
unusable for this matter.
IPsec-VXLAN would have been another alternative. How-
ever, it suffers from the same problems with NAT as DTLS-
VXLAN. IPsec host policy is independent from routing, and
packets going to IPsec protected destinations do not travel
in clear text if they are handed to a wrong interface.
B. SDN Control Plane
Open-source module-based controller [27] written in Java
called Floodlight operates as the SDN controller. It uses
OpenFlow protocol for communication between the switches
and the controller. OpenFlow works on top of TCP and many
OpenFlow implementations also support TLS with or without
mutual authentication.
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Tunneling solutions like stunnel can be utilized to ensure
secure connectivity, when the TLS support is insufficient or
non-existing. Floodlight does not have very good documen-
tation for mutual TLS configuration in the release v1.1 or
below [28]. Therefore, the stunnel proxy server was used for
the switch connections.
All the functionality in the Floodlight is implemented as
modules over the core. Custom modules can be written, but
they are not essential for this work. A forwarding application
is in charge of installing the flows for the connections in
the network. It uses underlying topology module, which
uses SPF algorithm (Shortest Path First [29]) to build paths
between the source and the correct destination ports.
When a packet without matching flow entry enters a switch
it is forwarded to the controller through stunnel. In the
controller the forwarding application searches for the shortest
path and informs the switch plane using FlowMod messages.
New flows are created based on this information giving loop
free topology which is simultaneously cost-efficient.
C. Datapath
Open vSwitch (OVS) is probably the most popular virtual
switch in the open source world. Good integration with
Xenserver, Openstack and many other platforms have given
it almost de facto status. The OVS has support for VXLAN
tunneling and it can be controlled with an SDN controller,
and thus it is used in this work.
Datapath can be seen in the figure 2. Hypervisors 1 and
2 both contain a VM (Virtual Machine) for a tenant. Both
VMs are connected to the corresponding OVS bridges that
communicate using VXLAN inside OpenVPN. The network
is further extended behind the tenant gateways using the same
methods.
VXLAN seems problematic over a WAN, as the control
plane for VXLAN utilizes multicast, and multicast may not
be available in the WAN underlay. Yet, in practice it is not
necessary to use multicast with VXLAN. For instance, Open
vSwitch can utilize an external SDN controller for its control
plane. The SDN controller is then able to build paths for the
flows over the network using the whole physical topology.
As seen in the figure 2, every device including hypervisor
and the gateway contains at least one Open vSwitch bridge.
Hypervisors have bridge named as CustBr0 and the gateways
br0. The VXLAN tunnels are terminated to an IP address
called Virtual Tunnel End-Point (VTEP). This could be a
routed loop-back address or any other IP address on the
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machine. The important point is that the sending VTEPs can
reach the other VTEP interface over the Layer-3 network.
VXLAN is designed so that the L3 network provides the
resiliency through routing. However, as we are unable to
influence the routing of the actual IP underlay, we can make
redundant paths using VXLAN and let the controller handle
the redundancy. This is guaranteed because the VPN tunnel
IP addresses are used as VXLAN VTEP termination points.
The figure 2 presents as well how the VXLAN tunnels
are built via OpenVPN tunnel interfaces. Tagged traffic is
forwarded to the corresponding TUN interface and pushed
to the destination where e.g. virtual machines are directly
connected to the OVS bridge. Through the Internet a single
packet is thus encapsulated inside VXLAN protocol which
is further encrypted using OpenVPN tunnel.
D. Active Redundancy
Active redundancy environment can be created using a
protocol called PRP (Parallell redundancy protocol). Prac-
tical implementation requires adding two virtual Ethernet
interfaces to Open vSwitch and connecting them to a PRP
tap which removes duplicate packets [24].
PRP operation in the implemented network is explained
in the figure 4. It works by making the Ethernet address
translation rule for the second PRP interface, so that the
network can make independent forwarding decisions for the
packets. For instance, if the paths share some links the
subsequent links can still be on different paths. Another flow
rule in the chain duplicates the packet and the vendor part
of the Ethernet MAC address is changed to a special PRP
prefix. The end destination is PRP aware, so it can rewrite
the packets coming with the special MAC address to the
correct one.
If the controller, or the script that is making the flows, is
not PRP aware, the end switch needs to also send some of
the packets with the PRP source address. Also IP addresses
may need to be rewritten if the controller does not permit that
the same address is used in multiple ports and with different
MAC addresses. Furthermore, when the active redundancy is
made using an external script to control the SDN controller
northbound interface, the configuring software needs to know
the network topology at least partially. For example, if there
are two independent links leaving from the edge node, the
packet can be copied to both of them, and the controller can
make the rest of the path for the flows. However, the paths are
not guaranteed to be different from each other. If the paths
share links, the redundancy is not increased accordingly and
some resources are wasted for carrying duplicated packets.
In contrast, PRP implementation as an SDN controller
application is much simpler. The only thing that the SDN
controller needs to be aware of is that the destination for
the packet is a PRP destination. Then, it can choose paths
optimally using either Loop Free Alternatives [30] or some
other mechanism. MAC address rewriting or adding some
other flow identifier can be used if the redundant paths need
to share links.
Cases where the secondary PRP transit MAC addresses
use a known prefix, forwarding application can find alter-
native path in stateless manner. Thus the application selects
among possible paths the one that shares the least amount of
links with the most optimal one. The same rule can further
be applied if some other flow identifier is used.
E. Control Layer Redundancy
As our topology has multiple paths between the source
and the destination, the controller can change the forwarding
rules in the case of reachability issues. However, due to
the way Open vSwitch tunnel interfaces are exposed to the
controller, it was needed to develop a custom watchdog
application [31].
Open vSwitch lacks the link status information for
VXLAN links. VXLAN is built on the assumption that the
L3 network underneath is resilient. It does not natively have
the concept of multihop forwarding either, which can fix the
L3 reachability issues. For end to end reachability detection
BFD (Bidirectional Forwarding Detection) protocol is avail-
able in OVS, but it does not generate a PORT DOWN status.
The controller should know if a VXLAN link is unable
to communicate. These communication problems cover all
tunnels and physical problems. OVS should inform the SDN
controller about broken VXLAN links, but it does not. Based
on the information, the PDR (Port Down Reconciliation)
module in Floodlight should change the path for the existing
flows based on the network changes [27]. This does not
occur, and even the new flows are built to non-working
interfaces.
To fix the issue we developed a watchdog script [31]
to notice dead links and flows. The used watchdog script
checks reachability for tunnel endpoint every two seconds
with ICMP echo (ping). Changing the current jammed flows
to backup link is done by removing the interface and clearing
the associated flows. Floodlight controller then rebuilds nec-
essary flow tables to switches using other interfaces, which
hopefully will be up. The script configures the interface
back up once the endpoint is reachable again. Using the
custom watchdog application the convergence time will be
4-6 seconds.
V. DISCUSSION
As the security of the proposed setup relies heavily on
the OpenVPN tunnel, it can be vulnerable to the tunnel
disappearing, and packets may get routed through wrong
interface in clear text. For example, if the tunnel interface
goes down, without proper firewall settings the VXLAN
packets are transmitted to the ISP’s network unencrypted
based on the default route information.
Moreover, the security is not end to end when there are
multiple links. Therefore, a secure variant of VXLAN type
of tunneling protocol would be useful. In SDN environment
the controller should take care of the security associations.
The usage of VXLAN requires the underlay technique to
accept MTU value above 1500 bytes. This was faced with
several experiments where ping and other smaller packages
go well through the network, but any larger messages did
not. VXLAN encapsulated packet consists of IPv4 and UDP
headers which make 28 bytes and in addition the VXLAN
header is 8 bytes more, total 36 bytes. The underlay net-
work’s MTU should thus be adjusted to consider this extra
overhead.
For instance, the OpenVPN tunnel MTU must be raised if
some parts of the bridged network do not support MTU less
than 1500. The tunnel interface can be set to much higher
MTU, e.g. 2000 bytes since the OpenVPN takes care of
the fragmentation. This creates an overhead, which could
be a problem for scalability. Yet, any tunneling solution will
experience MTU issues.
Practical option would be MACsec [32] under VXLAN
or any other tunnel, provisioned using an extension to
OpenFlow or with MACsec key exchange protocols. MAC-
sec is supported in some traditional switches. An SDN
controller could implement the necessary key exchanges to
be compatible with them, so the security domain could be
extended outside of SDN domain as well. Overall encryption
at the network edge would be desirable. In addition, MACsec
actually implements PRP-like duplicate packet filtering as
a side effect of avoiding replay attacks. OpenFlow key
management for MACsec would be one issue. This could
be solved by storing the public keys on the controller for all
the switches. The receiving switch gets flow rules that use
key wrapping.
Switches are unable to exchange keys between each other,
as the sending switch is unaware for the final destination
switch of the packet. This knowledge is at the controller.
Key derivation could create problems which are not as severe
with key wrapping or key distribution. For instance, when a
switch for a destination VM changes all the flow rules need
to be reinstalled.
Control layer based redundancy is combined with active
redundancy to have the best sides of each. Active redundancy
has potentially zero convergence time. Yet, active redun-
dancy loses capacity, potentially increasing latency as well
as packet loss due to congestion. Thus capacity problems
might occur if the packets would be copied to any possible
alternative path. In addition, PRP does not handle more than
two interfaces [33]. Quality of Service (QoS) is partially
improved by the PRP. At any given moment, PRP uses the
interface that can provide the packets faster.
Control layer based redundancy is too slow for some
of the applications. On the other hand, faster convergence
time could cause continuous topology changes in mobile
conditions. However, topology change is necessary eventu-
ally since the backup paths could be constructed very sub-
optimally.
The SDN controller is the centralized brain for the overlay
network. Therefore, redundant controller design is required
for increased reliability. Currently if the controller is not
reachable the old flows continue to operate, but no new
connections can be made. OVS supports using multiple
controllers, but high-availability features are missing in the
Floodlight controller v1.1 [28]. Floodlight though has plans
to support synchronization but the support is not ready fully
integrated nor tested [34], [35].
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper describes a method for building a secure
overlay network over WAN connections. The used protocols
and technologies offer a resilient and secure communication
method for ICS, DCI and other use cases. Presented example
system has been built using commodity hardware and best-
effort 4G mobile wireless WAN connections. The use of
these components further increase the need for reliable
communication protocol stack.
The security in this context is not pervasive security which
prevents everything and creates an isolated network. The
main aspect is to have a safe mechanism to move data
between two locations without a possibility to be seen by
a 3rd party. It answers the need for confidentiality, integrity
and availability. Still the security features in this network do
not totally prevent DDoS attacks, MitM attacks and many
others.
As presented, VXLAN and OpenVPN transporting meth-
ods combined with SDN offer a powerful tool for secure
seamless WAN. SDN is the key function that allows pre-
sented network to operate seamlessly.
The used SDN components, Open vSwitch, and the
Floodlight controller presented minor issues, and some re-
quired components were still missing. For instance, the OVS
VXLAN implementation does not inform the SDN controller
about broken links, which had to be compensated using
custom watchdog script. Also, control plane redundancy is
missing since the Floodlight does not support it yet. This
creates a single point of failure and hopefully problem
is fixed within the incoming versions of the Floodlight
controller.
Data plane redundancy is provided by PRP protocol. It
ensures the data transmission between endpoints using two
different paths through the overlay network. Yet, it cannot
function in complex networks without an SDN component
that can build logical ring topologies for it.
The built stack causes quite large overhead, which is
not ideal, although much of this is due to interoperability.
This overhead issue could be answered with e.g. VXLAN
over DTLS, but the resiliency and availability would suffer
greatly. Also, resiliency can always be improved, and even
provided as a service.
Data center and industrial control system networks will
need to consider overlay network security eventually. This
paper offers one solution to cover some use cases using
open-source tools. Set requirements were answered and the
necessary resiliency and security level was reached. SDN
technology proofed its power and elasticity in this rather
complex network setup.
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Abstract. Currently IPsec performance in high-speed networks is prob-
lematic. Traditionally the connections are established between some mul-
tifunction network devices which are typically inefficient already in 10
Gbps packet delivery and do not have high-availability nor scalabil-
ity features. In the Software-Defined Networking, packets only travel
through the desired dedicated networking devices. However, few high-
speed stand-alone IPsec solutions exists that can be hooked up with the
SDN. In this paper we propose a design which will utilize the IPsec in
SDN fashion by separating IKE and packet encryption. Experimental
results show that high-availability and scalability goals are reached and
per-client throughput is increased. The IPsec protocol suite can thus face
the on-going need for faster packet processing rate.
Keywords: SDN, IPsec, Network security
1 Introduction
The aim of SDN, and particularly Openflow [1], is to enable innovation in net-
working by separating the control and the data planes [2]. Even though most
commercial networking hardware had been built with the control and data plane
separation for a very long time already, the separation was not always rigorous,
and the control plane was local. This forced the traditional network appliances to
be managed as separate units and use static routing or routing protocols to man-
age the logical topology. Deploying new features would therefore require routing
changes and even some specific protocol support from the network appliances.
For SDN, the controlling software runs on a separate controller. The con-
troller instructs the SDN forwarding appliances and switches, which are respon-
sible for forwarding the traffic on the data plane. This reduces the amount of
duplicate information, and speeds up innovation by centralizing the network
logic. Only the network controller has the information about the whole network
topology, such as connected nodes and the links between them. The switches
need to know only their own forwarding rules. Also, as the topology is a virtual
one, new features can be brought in without infrastructural upgrade.
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) concept enables different network
functions, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), VPN devices,
just to name few, to run virtualized. This allows service aggregation to a single
server and simultaneously offers possibility to add functions as on-demand to
the network. The NFV and SDN together is a powerful combination to provide
elastic services and use them without major network reconfigurations. [3]
IPsec is an example of a protocol that has a clear signaling and forwarding
separation [4, 5]. The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol [5] is used to ne-
gotiate the security associations (SAs), which are then used for the actual data
plane of the IPsec. This makes IPsec conform nicely to the SDN paradigm. IPsec
is also a service of the network layer, unlike, for example, TLS, which is more
tied to the actual application.
Some common IPsec clustering problems have been discussed in [6]. The RFC
however ignores the IPsec function distribution, which this paper describes. IPsec
can be distributed into multiple SDN enabled functions, that can be effectively
parallelized and freely organized based on the available resources. Furthermore,
we concentrate on presenting the communication between the modules, and hope
that our contribution would incite discussion on open APIs to provision security
functions to SDN networks, such as the IPsec and IKE functions presented here.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains the related work.
Section 3 describes the proposed solution of IPsec functionality distribution and
SDN paradigm. Section 4 evaluates the performance of the proposed solution
while Section 5 contains future work and discussion. Finally Section 6 draws the
conclusions.
2 Related work
Inserting security appliances into SDN networks has already been discussed in
[7–11] showing that the security needs guide the networking topology. One of
the conclusions being that SDN allows to forget the physical topology altogether
[12].
Yet, freedom from the physical constraints may require advanced flow bal-
ancing. Scott-Hayward et al. added that traffic redirection may cause link con-
gestions which results to performance problems [12].
Tafreshi et al. [13] argue that Openflow needs to support IPsec, in order to be
aware of the flows and to route the traffic more efficiently. The usage of Security
Parameter Index (SPI) parameter in flow identification would enhance network
operation in High Availability (HA) enabled IPsec setups.
Recently, Li et. al. have proposed having IPsec concentrator as an integral
part of the SDN network [14]. Their work, however, differs from ours, as they
do not implement a modular design of independent services orchestrated by the
SDN controller.
SDN network is enhanceable by NFV services. While SDN controller changes
flows to insert some middle-box functions, the NFV concept introduces services
providing these functions using virtualization. [15, 16]
The presented solution is tailored to use IPsec, but it is not limited to it.
The same methodology applies whether MACsec or OpenVPN is used in the
middlebox [17, 18]. Dedicated IPsec processing appliances are required to provide
fast IPsec functionality to the network. Solutions such as DPDK [19], PIPSEA
[20] or Cavium Octeon based devices [21] have been proposed. Meng et al. also
included measurements for the throughput on different packet size [21]. Their
solution struggled with large amount of small packets which is a commonly
known problem in VPN tunneling.
3 Scalable IPsec architecture description
From this point we use the following terminology:
IPsec appliance handles the whole IKE and IPsec functionality autonomously.
IKE function handles only the IKE negotiation.
Packet crypto function (PCF) handles only IPsec for network packets.
3.1 Traditional IPsec Appliance in an SDN Network
Figure 1 presents how a stand-alone IPsec appliance can be applied to an SDN
network. The appliance maintains the tunnel connection and performs data en-
cryption/decryption operations between the headquarter and the branch office
network. The SDN controller in the network does not have visibility to the IPsec
appliance status. The controller is only for modifying the flows and forwarding
the packets to the IPsec appliance when necessary.
The traditional design does not achieve scalability nor availability needs with-
out vendor specific redundancy protocols and ad-hoc management of resources.
More IPsec appliances can be added to the network, but they suffer from being
separate devices in that they cannot take over each other’s flows.
3.2 Distributed IPsec functionality
Network design where the IPsec functionality is distributed to an IKE function
and two PCFs is described in Figure 2. This design meets the high availability
Internet
SDN Switch
PC
IPsec 
Appliance
Branch office
SDN 
Controller
Firewall,
IPsec appliance
ESP Traffic
Unencrypted 
traffic
IKE 
negotiation
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network
and scalability needs for IPsec because every function can have several multipli-
cations. IKE function is required to negotiate SA values with the branch office
IPsec appliance. These SA values need to be transferred from IKE function to
all PCFs.
The IPsec orchestrator module acts between the PCFs and the IKE function
to store and deliver necessary information such as SPI and key values. Delivery
can occur in a separate network from the main SDN control network, if so
desired. The IPsec orchestrator also selects the PCF for one specific network
flow. The PCF operates on the data plane and is responsible for encryption and
decryption operations. The SDN network allow to use virtually any number of
these functions to reach the required IPsec packet processing rate.
3.3 Message exchange
Figure 3 describes message exchange between the different actuators in the net-
work. It reflects a situation where a PC in the local network is the first to send
a packet going to the branch office. The SDN controller checks its table for ex-
isting IPsec SAs, and consults the network policy on whether the packet should
be protected, dropped or forwarded as is. This matching is done by a controller
module responsible for security associations. If the packet needs a new SA, the
IPsec orchestrator needs to be informed and a new IKE negotiation is initiated.
The IKE negotiation requires the SDN controller to redirect all packets with
UDP port 500 to the IKE function (there can also be a static flow rule). This
allows the IKE negotiation to occur between the IKE function and the branch
office IPsec VPN appliance. The resulting SA with the traffic policies, are added
to the IPsec SA table in the IPsec orchestrator. SPI, KEY, lifetime and IP
information are distributed to the PCFs.
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Fig. 3. Signaling and message transfer between different actuators when PC A sends
a packet (P) to Branch office.
3.4 Technical details of IPsec orchestration
The IPsec orchestrator is the central information exchange point for the IKE
orchestrator and the packet crypto function orchestrator as shown in Figure 4.
The communication is done using API layers. When a packet related to new IPsec
communication is received, it is forwarded to IPsec orchestrator for verification
and decision making. If the packet is valid, second level orchestrators are called.
The IKE orchestrator is responsible for verifying incoming new IKE connec-
tions. If connection is valid, the IKE function establishes new IKE SAs. The IKE
orchestrator also orders the SDN controller to create flows for capturing the IKE
initiation traffic to the device responsible for IKE function.
The Packet crypto function orchestrator is responsible for monitoring the
load of PCFs and sharing traffic equally between them. Orchestrator makes the
decision which PCF is used for which flow in the network and thus it gives flow
instructions directly to the SDN controller.
The IPsec, IKE and packet crypto function orchestrators share a lot of sen-
sitive information. They need to know the SPI, key and the lifetime informa-
tion that the IKE function negotiates. All the communication between different
orchestrators and functions is done over a separate control network. The com-
munication can use TLS, physical separation or preferably both. None of the
IPsec orchestrators needs the keys themselves, so the keys could be transmitted
in encrypted form.
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Fig. 4. IPsec orchestrator and its sub-orchestrators: IKE and packet crypto function
orchestrator, different functions and SDN controller communication.
3.5 IPsec orchestration API
The IPsec orchestrator needs to get the keys from the IKE orchestrator to be
delivered to the PCFs. The simplest way is to use API. In our example, the IKE
orchestrator launches the IKE function which negotiates IKE parameters. The
IKE function returns the child SA keys to the IKE orchestrator which sends the
keys to IPsec orchestrator. It makes a POST request to initiate a dataplane PCF.
The function returns a resource identifier that can be later queried for statistics
and removed. The response also includes a description of the ports provisioned
for the operation. The packet crypto function’s API is a JSON REST API with
the syntax described in the following listing:
{"mode": [" tunnel","transport "],
"spi": "0 x512256",
"operation ": [" encrypt","decrypt"],
"details ": {
"enc -mode" : "aes -cbc",
"mac" : "sha -1",
"ck": "deadbeef",
"ik": "caffeebaba",
[" tunnel"," transport "]: {
"out_dst ": "10.0.0.1" ,
"out_src ": "192.168.0.1" ,
"in_block ": "10.33.7.0/24" ,
"out_block ": "192.168.13.0/24"
}}}
At minimum, the PCF device needs the integrity (ik) and cryptography (ck)
keys, and SPI (defaults to transport mode, and AES-CBC with SHA-1 HMAC).
For the tunnel mode, the outer IP addresses, as well as allowed inner addresses
are required.
4 Performance results and evaluation
Experiments were conducted to ensure proper functionality and determine packet
processing rate. The network structure matches Figure 2 where HP 5900 SDN
switch was connected to HP VAN SDN controller. The SDN network operated
internally in 1Gbps speed and had 10Gbps upstream link to the Internet.
Experiments used Intel Atom C2000 based platforms as the PCFs with IPsec-
secgw DPDK sample application. Strongswan provided the necessary IKE func-
tion on the SDN network side of the VPN tunnel. On the other end of the tunnel
another Strongswan was operating as the IPsec appliance. IPsec was configured
to use tunnel mode.
SSH connections through IPsec tunnel ensured functionality. The packet pro-
cessing rate was determined when two PCs sent traffic through the tunnel. Small
packet size is the most difficult and resource consuming one. Thus the measure-
ments included experiments with 64 and 128 byte ICMP Echo request packets.
Four different algorithm scenarios for ESP packets were tested. The Null
algorithm used no encryption at all. Both, AES-128-CBC and AES-128-GCM
were evaluated with OpenSSL based crypto library. Finally, AES-128-GCM was
re-evaluated with Intel’s IPsec crypto library.
The first experiment had one PCF in the network. Throughput results are
show in Figure 5. The TX value is the total value of traffic to be encrypted that
is sent by the PCs.
The null encryption method is the simplest mode and thus can be kept as
the baseline for throughput measurements. The GCM with Intel-IPsec provides
approximately 600-700 Mbps throughput while CBC cannot reach 200 Mbps. Re-
gardless of the selected crypto algorithm, single PCF cannot handle the amount
of traffic sent by the PCs.
The second experiment had two identical PCFs. Figure 6 shows the total
throughput. The traffic from the source PCs is shared between these functions
with SDN as equally as possible.
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Fig. 5. Combined transmission rate of local PCs (TX) and receiving rates of remote
VPN endpoint in Megabits per second (Mbps) when different encryption algorithms
and single packet crypto function is used.
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Fig. 6. Combined transmission rate of local PCs (TX) and receiving rates of remote
VPN endpoint in Megabits per second (Mbps) when different encryption algorithms
and two packet crypto functions are used.
The results show that 1.5 Gbps throughput is reached in 128 byte packet size.
The TX Mbps value is smaller than the Mbps value of the received encrypted
data, since every null encrypted packet enlarges the original packet with 32 bytes
and GCM with 56 bytes. Thus the GCM line should be higher than the null line,
but with 64 byte packet size the PCFs still choked.
All the experiments used DPDK based IPsec-secgw as the PCF. Through-
put using one PCF with 64 byte packet size was best with GCM (Intel-IPsec),
approximately 600Mbps. In comparison, the authors in [20] were able to use
Intel Quick Assist Tool (QAT) with DPDK and achieved 1Gbps throughput.
Their own embedded APU environment, PIPSEA, reached 3Gbps. Even faster
packet processing rate, 4Gbps, have been achieved in [21] using Cavium Octeon
platform.
5 Future work and discussion
The described model proves that SDN and distributed IPsec operate well to-
gether. Multiple PCFs serve in the network to provide the required HA feature,
but they only guarantee partial load balancing. In this concept the load balanc-
ing is path based meaning that a client uses one PCF at a time. Simultaneous
use is doable, but would require a proper link aggregation mechanism leading to
multiple PCFs being presented to the SDN network as one. This method needs
multipath labeling to identify individual packets, which is a future research topic.
Outgoing packets are well load balanced, but incoming packets are redirected
always to a certain PCF for decryption in the tunnel mode. This is caused by
the source and destination IPs being the same for each packet in the tunnel
mode, meaning that the transport mode is unaffected. A solution for better
load balancing in the tunnel mode is to use Equal-Cost Multi-Path (ECMP) in
Openflow SDN which chooses the least congested ports if possible.
The presented design of this paper is vulnerable to replay attacks because
the sequence number verification in the tunnel mode needs to be disabled as
permitted in [4]. This is because each PCF allocates sequence numbers to their
packets independently, and in the receiving end the packets from different PCFs
(but belonging to the same SA) may appear as duplicates. The problem could be
eliminated by synchronizing the packet counters between all PCFs, which would
require shared state table between the functions. This is virtually impossible in
high speed operation.
A replay attack may occur even when the sequence number verification is
enabled. If an attacker has two packet injection points to the data plane, the
controller can construct flows through different PCFs, causing the duplicate
packet to reach the destination. An answer is to use deterministic link selection,
which in turn makes ECMP unsuitable. A platform-independent solution would
be to run multiple flows through the network and balance these flows by using
encrypted payload bits with a bitmask.
The original model can be extended to include automatic PCF launching
in NFV fashion. The used DPDK ipsec-secgw sample application relies on IP
header TX checksum offloading while the virtual interfaces do not support this
feature. For this reason experiments were not conducted in virtual environment.
An existing IKE negotiator was used for experiments. Our approach required
complicated dataplane arrangements for the IKE messages and could likely have
been avoided with a pure IKE component as an SDN application. Although
in these pilots the IPsec orchestrator has access to all the secrets, we can also
support key wrapping in the orchestrator mediated messaging to the data plane
PCFs. In most environments this would have only minor security benefit for a
lot of added complexity.
6 Conclusions
We present a modern approach utilizing SDN to enhance the IPsec availability
and performance on commodity hardware. The model distributes IPsec main
operations to individual functional modules. The IKE module provides necessary
information to the data plane devices for ESP operation.
The results of our performance tests show that IPsec throughput increases
from 750Mbps to 1.5Gbps when the number of packet crypto functions is dou-
bled. While this performance increase was to be expected, it also emphasizes the
benefit of distributed design of SDN networks.
This kind of an SDN network which includes the presented IPsec model works
for both small and enterprise networks. However, great benefit can be achieved
when a lot of clients use IPsec.The work presented in this article illustrates the
possibilities that SDN brings to the legacy techniques which have difficulties to
meet the current scalability needs.
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Abstract— Line-rate speed requirements for performance
hungry network applications like IPsec are getting problematic
due to the virtualization trend. A single virtual network appli-
cation hardly can provide 40 Gbps operation. This research
considers the IPsec packet processing without IKE to be
offloaded on an FPGA in a network. We propose an IPsec
accelerator in an FPGA and explain the details that need to
be considered for a production ready design. Based on our
evaluation, Intel Arria 10 FPGA can provide 10 Gbps line-rate
operation for the IPsec accelerator and to be responsible for
1000 IPsec tunnels. The research points out that for future data
centers it is beneficial to rely on HW acceleration in terms of
speed and energy efficiency for applications like IPsec.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we consider the feasibility of IPsec offloaded
from Software (SW) to FPGAs in a large-scale environment
such as a cloud. We elaborate which IPsec functionalities
are feasible for FPGA and what effects are there for area,
memory and processing requirements. We explain the limits
that production ready IPsec accelerator would face. With this
setup we show how packet forwarding, sensitive material
handling and security weaknesses stated in the previous
work [1] can be addressed. We also include the FPGA con-
trol/data plane separation description and possible drawbacks
in network features that no longer rule in Software-Defined
Networking (SDN) and FPGA environments.
The article is structured as follows. Section II covers
the related work regarding the IPsec on FPGA. System
model for the design is explained in III. The section IV
contains discussion and observations of the design. Section
V evaluates the the design and addresses future work. Finally
conclusions are drawn in section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
IPsec on an FPGA has been researched widely and table
I shows the summary of IPsec features in related work. To
the best of our knowledge, no FPGA implementations are
done for IPsec as an Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP)
middle-box in SDN fashion where the Internet Key Exchange
(IKE) is removed to work on a completely isolated device
in a SW solution. Further, the feasibility of an IPsec FPGA
implementation and its difficulties in implementation are not
being considered for large production environments such as
cloud usage.
The IPsec implementations in related work usually rely
on Advanced Encryption Standard Cipher Block Chaining
Research AES mode SAD ICV Replay attack IKE
[4] CBC + + - SW
[5] CBC + + + SW
[6] ECB,CBC + - - -
[7] ? + - + -
[8] CBC,CTR SPD - - *
[9] ** - + - ***
[10] ECB,CBC - - - -
This work GCM + + + SW
(-) feature not covered ; (+) is mentioned
[8] SPD, Security Policy Database
* HW and SW components used
** Examined lightweight IPsec ESP cores
*** Authors used ECC core for IKE
TABLE I
IPSEC FUNCTIONALITIES PRESENTED IN RELATED WORK.
  Internet  
Network 
Director 
serverFPGA
Data plane
Control plane
End
devices
SDN Switch
Switch
Fig. 1. The network design for the designed FPGA middlebox system.
(AES-CBC) encryption mode. Some included Security As-
sociation Database (SAD) module or an equivalent on the
FPGA which is a necessary storage for IPsec. The Integrity
Check Value (ICV) and IKE module are mentioned in a few
articles, whereas the anti-replay is considered additionally in
documents like [2], [3].
III. ARCHITECTURE
This section explains the network and FPGA concept
architecture design.
A. Network architecture
The network architecture, depicted in Figure 1, extends our
previous work in[1]. The network consists of separated data
and control planes. The data plane contains end devices, an
SDN switch and the router/firewall which acts as a gateway
to the Internet. All communication between the network
director server, SDN switch and the FPGA occurs in the
control plane.
Network Director server
IKE 
negotiator
SDN 
controller
Network 
Director 
orchestrator
Data plane 
interface
Control plane 
interface
Fig. 2. The network director server modules and their corresponding
network interfaces.
IKE 
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controller
Orchestrator SDN Switch FPGA
Flows: IKE forwardings
OK
OK
Establish SA
OK
SA information
Flows: Packet forwarding for
encryption/decryption
OK
Fig. 3. The initial message sequence required in startup phase.
The network director server depicted in Figure 2 imple-
ments three software modules: an IKE negotiator, a network
director orchestrator and an SDN controller. The IKE ne-
gotiator SW establishes the necessary Security Association
(SA) with the other endpoint of the IPsec tunnel through
the data plane. The SDN controller SW uses the control
plane interface for pushing flow rules to the SDN switch. The
network director orchestrator SW is the binding component
between the IKE negotiator, the SDN controller, and also the
FPGA(s). Thus the network director orchestrator controls the
whole process by giving instructions to other SW modules
and the FPGA.
The messages sent between different modules in IPsec
tunnel setup phase are shown in Figure 3. The orchestrator
instructs the SDN controller to push flows into the SDN
switch which forwards the IKE messages coming from
the Internet to the network director. When finished, the
orchestrator instructs the IKE negotiator to start establishing
the SA. Once the SA phase is done, the orchestrator pushes
IKE SA information to the FPGA using the control plane.
Finally more flows are pushed to the SDN switch that contain
information which packets need to be sent to FPGA for
encryption or decryption.
B. FPGA architecture
Figure 4 shows an example block diagram for an IPsec
accelerator in an FPGA in figure 1. The HW architecture
contains three different logical components: the IPsec ac-
celerator logic, SDN fashion data, and control planes. Even
though the data and the control planes both communicate
with the accelerator logic, any traffic entering the FPGA is
unable to jump from one plane to another.
The control plane subsystem is only for updating the SAD
Data plane
Control plane
Ethernet
40G 
QSFP+
SDN / User 
logic control 
Ethernet 
Packet client
IPsec Accelerator logic
Encrypt 
#1
IPsec 
Manager
AES-GCM 
+ AES
IPsec 
Enc & 
Dec 
SADs
Decrypt 
#1
AES-GCM 
+ AES
AES-GCM 
+ AES
AES-GCM 
+ AES
Encrypt 
#2
Decrypt 
#2
Fig. 4. Internal block diagram of an IPsec FPGA implementation where
IPsec accelerator operates as user logic with a separate data and control
plane networks.
table whereas the accelerator subsystem holds the desired
functionality for the FPGA, in this case the IPsec. The IPsec
manager receives data from the packet client and selects
between the encrypt and decrypt modules. All modules
are dependent on their corresponding SAD registries that
contain the tunnel information. Both modules are required
to do checks on the traffic to verify the integrity of data. If
everything matches, the AES-GCM + AES block is being
queried with given data.
IV. FEASIBILITY OF AN FPGA ACCELERATION
Below we consider the following issues affecting the feasi-
bility of FPGA acceleration: the network director, modifica-
tions required to the network, information in IPsec operation
and security considerations of the design.
A. Network Director orchestrator responsibilities
The orchestrator SW is responsible for setting up and
removing the IPsec tunnel operation in the network. It
initiates new connections using IKE an negotiator, pushes
flows using SDN controller and updates the SAD entries on
the FPGAs. The orchestrator needs to set up all of these
before the actual packet transmission starts. This ensures the
minimal latency in the network level.
The high-speed requirement makes it impossible for the
FPGA to request the orchestrator to do IKE negotiation when
a packet with non-existing SA information enters the FPGA.
The negotiation is virtually too late in that case. The SW
modules will not create latency if beforehand all tunnels
are negotiated, keys are stored in the FPGA SADs, and
the necessary flow rules exist in the SDN switch. Similarly,
latency can be avoided by doing the re-key and key delivery
operations prior to key timeout.
B. Network layer considerations
A standalone FPGA in a network does not require a Media
Access Control (MAC) address at all since the forwarding
decisions in the switch plane are made by the SDN. The
packets may enter and leave the FPGA with any MAC
address pair. This is adverse since the switch learns falsely
some MAC addresses to be behind the FPGAs switch port
even though they are not there. For this reason the MAC
address learning feature should be off at the switch port
where the FPGA is connected to.
Quite many different kinds of broadcast/multicast mes-
sages are seen in the network. Thus it’s a good practice to
have a white list in the Ethernet packet client module to
allow only desired traffic to bypass it and to be delivered to
the IPsec accelerator logic.
One major issue faced by the design is the incoming
packet forwarding after the packets are decrypted in the
FPGA. These decrypted packets contain wrong destination
MAC address which need to be updated to match the real
destination specified in the Internet Protocol (IP) header.
This can be easily achieved by keeping track of the seen IP
and MAC address pairs and rewriting the false destination
MAC address in the Ethernet packet client. Another approach
would be to use flow rule in the SDN switch which rewrites
the MAC addresses in the switch level. Both approaches have
their benefits and should be chosen on occasion.
C. SPI, Sequence number and IV
The Security Parameter Index (SPI) value that is negoti-
ated by IKE must be unique for the IPsec tunneling deploy-
ment. SW IKE solutions running in e.g. Linux consider this
property by default and thus the uniqueness can be trusted.
The Sequence Number (SN) identifies a single packet
and works as an anti-replay mechanism which should be
implemented as described in [11], [12]. The usage of Ex-
tended Sequence Number (ESN) is mandatory in IKEv2
making the ESN 64 bits long. When considering the 40 Gbps
link, the maximum amount of packets per second (pps) is
59,523,808. A practical viewpoint is that even though the
packets with consecutive SNs should be close to each other,
they will arrive in mixed order. For this reason, effective
sliding window mechanism is required to have a working
anti-replay mechanism. The design for such a mechanism is
however out of the scope in this paper.
The Initialization Vector (IV) for encryption is a value
that must never repeat [11]. Usually after the depletion of
IV numbers, the key is renegotiated. The value however is
64 bits long. If every single value is used, the 64-bit IV will
last for approximately 9827 years making the IV to be unique
for the key lifetime even if used carelessly. Thus the FPGA
does not need to worry about IV depletion and its signaling
to the network director.
D. IPsec SAD
The SAD contains the items described in table II. The
destination network information is not required because it is
used only for identification when choosing correct SA for
outgoing packets. Similarly not required is the IV since it is
read from the incoming packet.
This results in 552 bits of data per connection in encryp-
tion SAD. The decryption SAD is required to store double
the amount of information specified in the table to ensure
seamless operation in the re-key phase. Thus the decryption
SAD size is 1008 bits per connection.
We can approximate that in a larger environment with
1000 IPsec tunnels the amount for on-chip memory on an
FPGA is 68 kB for the encryption SAD and 124 kB for the
TABLE II
SAD REGISTRY ENTITIES ON THE FPGA
Item Size (bits) Enc. SAD Dec. SAD
Destination network 32+32 yes no
SPI 32 yes yes
key 256 yes yes
key size 8 yes yes
IV 64 yes no
SEQ # 64 yes yes
Tunnel SRC IP 32 yes yes
Tunnel DST IP 32 yes yes
decryption SAD. Thus the SADs fit to the on-chip memory
easily which speeds up operation. The advantage is that the
on-chip memory can be read every cycle compared to the
external memory which requires multiple cycles.
E. Packet processing inside an IPsec accelerator
The presented IPsec accelerator design in the Figure 4
is functional as is. The IPsec manager is responsible for
sharing incoming packets to the right function (decryp-
tion/encryption), and the desired module (encryption #1,
encryption #2...). The selection between encryption and
decryption function can be based on the Protocol field in
the IP header. All ESP packets are sent to decrypt function
and all plain text packets to the encryption.
Contrary to Figure 4, the number of function modules is
not limited to two. Having more parallel modules speeds up
the packet processing since consecutive packets belonging to
the same SA can use same module. This action saves time
since AES does not need to be reconfigured. The mechanism
is however complicated since functionality should be able
in some cases to utilize all modules for a single SA and
sometimes every module for a different SA. To guarantee
fair and correct module selection, the utilization level of a
single module is needed. This algorithm can be built using
sliding window approach, but is not covered in this article.
F. Concept security and possible attack vectors
The most vulnerable spot is the control plane where the
messages for the FPGA and the SDN switch configurations
take place. It is vital to ensure the physical security of the
control plane network in addition to securing the devices
which have access to it. As long as data goes in plain text,
they can be easily obtained from the control plane. Thus
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol suite should be
implemented to it for security. The Openflow protocol that
is often used for communication between switches and the
SDN controller supports TLS as well. If used, it can provide
the necessary confidentiality, integrity and authentication for
that specific traffic as well.
The on-chip memory on an FPGA for SAD ensures that
private material cannot be leaked from the external memory
of the FPGA by bus snooping. However, side-channel attack
can still be executed on the system-on-a-chip (SoC) itself
which would be successful even though the process is
complicated and time consuming one.
TABLE III
CYCLES PER TASK OF THE IPSEC ACCELERATOR LOGIC
Task Encryption Decryption
Manager 2-4 2-4
AES config 2-3 2-3
AES receive 0-14 0-14
Data to AES 8 7
TAG gen/check 2-3 2-3
When the SA is being removed, the related flows from the
network should also be removed. Without flows, all packets
that were originally getting pushed through the IPsec tunnel
are now sent to the router for getting routed even though it is
very likely not possible. Unfortunately this is very dangerous
behavior since clear text packets that might contain sensitive
user data will be pushed to the Internet. Thus the router
should include firewall to drop the packets. This operation
can be automated to the orchestrator if the firewall has some
configuration Application Programming Interface (API) or it
supports SDN.
V. CONCEPT DESIGN AND FUTURE WORK
The design including the control logic, Ethernet packet
client, and the IPsec accelerator logic is still at concept
level. We can evaluate the accelerator logic to operate on the
lowest clock rate, but at least in 175 MHz. The logic requires
approximately 300 Adaptive Logic Modules (ALMs) for the
IPsec manager, 18.5k for decrypt module with AES and 20k
for encryption with AES. Further we can evaluate the control
plane blocks to require 20k ALMs and the data plane blocks
24k ALMs. Thus we can approximate that entire IPsec FPGA
implementation with 9-10 encrypt and decrypt pairs in IPsec
accelerator can fit to e.g. Arria 10 GX1150 that has 427.2k
ALMs.
The Arria 10 has 53 Mbit of internal memory. We can
evaluate that 13 Mbit of those must be reserved for the
control logic and the SAD. Packet buffering that is between
the Ethernet packet client and the IPsec accelerator can safely
use 40 Mbit. With 64-byte packet size, we can estimate
in full speed operation (59,523,808pps) the buffers to store
maximum 81920 packets which equals 1.3 millisecond time
frame.
Table III shows cycle values for the IPsec accelerator de-
sign. It is notable that AES does not need to be reconfigured
every round with a new key which virtually removes the 14
cycle wait. After AES configurations the IPsec accelerator
can provide new data through modules every 14-15 cycles.
With 64 byte packet size the encryption and decryption
module can therefore reach 1.4 Gbps packet processing rate
in all circumstances.
A future work is to build a proof-of-concept implemen-
tation based on this concept design. The Goal is to reach
10Gbps packet transfer rate with pipelining. Further the
research targets on finding a fast SAD search method and
a reliable packet fragmentation mechanism for FPGA.
VI. CONCLUSION
This research introduced an SDN fashion IPsec accelerator
concept and what must be considered in big networks such
as a cloud. Indeed, the IPsec network packet handling can be
offloaded from a software module to an FPGA accelerator.
The presented method is feasible for cloud environments and
can provide a very cost-effective solution.
The presented concept is much simpler compared with the
related work ones because we consider only the heavy IPsec
packet processing in the FPGA and let the IKE operate from
a completely different device in the network. This saves the
valuable area on the FPGA to focus on packet encryption and
decryption functions. An individual function should easily
reach 1.4 Gbps operation speed without pipelining which
will speed up the processing up to 10Gbps.
The HW offloading functionality can be a significant
feature for the cloud operators to make savings and to speed
up their services. The IPsec is a good proof-of-concept to be
offloaded due to its modular structure and future will likely
reveal much more important functions that can be offloaded
to HW accelerator.
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Hardware acceleration for famous VPN solution, IPsec, has been widely researched already. Still it is not 
fully covered and the increasing latency, throughput, and feature requirements need further evaluation. 
We propose an IPsec accelerator architecture in an FPGA and explain the details that need to be consid- 
ered for a production ready design. This research considers the IPsec packet processing without IKE to 
be offloaded on an FPGA in an SDN network. Related work performance rates in 64 byte packet size for 
throughput is 1–2 Gbps with 0.2 ms latency in software, and 1–4 Gbps with unknown latencies for hard- 
ware solutions. Our proposed architecture is capable to host 10 0 0 concurrent tunnels and have 10 Gbps 
throughput with only 10 μs latency in our test network. Therefore the proposed design is efficient even 
with voice or video encryption. The architecture is especially designed for data centers and locations with 
vast number of concurrent IPsec tunnels. The research confirms that FPGA based hardware acceleration 
increases performance and is feasible to integrate with the other server infrastructure. 
© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
The IPsec Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnel is a commonly 
used protocol suite to build secure end to end connections through 
the Internet. It provides confidentiality, integrity and authentic- 
ity, but also introduces performance overhead affecting the latency 
and throughput of the transmission. IPsec requires both packet 
protocol processing and cryptographic computations, and a net- 
work must support a massive number of IPsec tunnels simultane- 
ously. At the same time, the network functions, including IPsec, are 
being virtualized. Thus we need to find both high-performance and 
flexible solutions. 
The IPsec leans to Internet Key Exchange (IKE) to ensure se- 
cure key exchange between endpoints and uses Encapsulated Se- 
cure Payload (ESP) to encrypt network packets. Our previous work 
in [1] presented a design where the IKE and ESP processes are dis- 
tributed in a local network using Software-defined Network (SDN) 
to improve performance. In this paper, we consider hardware ac- 
celeration on FPGA for ESP processing and extend the context to a 
very large-scale cloud environment. 
∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail addresses: markku.vajaranta@tuni.fi (M. Vajaranta), 
arto.oinonen@tuni.fi (A. Oinonen), timo.hamalainen@tuni.fi (T.D. Hämäläinen), 
jouni.markunmaki@nokia.com (J. Markunmäki), ari.kulmala@nokia.com (A. Kul- 
mala). 
The work in [1] tried to speed up IPsec processing by run- 
ning ESP processes parallel in multiple SW servers. This approach 
was not feasible due to problems with incoming packet forward- 
ing and cumbersome anti-replay protection. The research however 
described SDN to precisely control the IPsec flows, and separation 
of IKE and ESP execution in different devices in the network. 
In [1] the IPsec packet processing throughput was 100 Mbps us- 
ing AES-128-CBC cipher and 600 Mbps on AES-GCM with 64 byte 
packet size. It showed the packet processing to be relatively slow 
operation on SW depending on used crypto algorithm. The Li- 
breswan open source IPsec project has measured with unspeci- 
fied packet size 5.25 Gbps throughput on SW using AES-GCM and 
1.39 Gbps using AES128-SHA1 crypto ciphers [2] . The benchmarked 
system performed 9.78 Gbps link throughput without crypto. In Li- 
breswans’ results it is possible that the network packet size was 
set to relatively large resulting higher total throughput in every 
test. Even though these aforementioned numbers were decent, our 
goal is 10 Gbps throughput and 10 μs packet latency which is hard 
to achieve without using HW acceleration. These numbers clearly 
indicated that SW solution in long run is not performant enough. 
This justifies the usage of fast IPsec middle-box in SDN fashion for 
IPsec packet processing. 
In [3] we shortly explained the architecture where an FPGA 
would consider the ESP processing when used in such network ar- 
chitecture presented in [1] . The work indicated that much larger 
research is needed just for the architecture to be elaborated and 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.micpro.2019.102861 
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Fig. 1. Simplified system model with separate IPsec devices for ESP on FPGA and 
IKE on SW server. 
all the limits and constraints the FPGA will face with a production 
ready solution that can host vast number of concurrent tunnels. 
Some number of studies concerning FPGA IPsec solutions exist as 
the related work section will reveal, but they do not consider the 
production readiness and features the IPsec endpoint requires. This 
was a strong motivation for our research. 
When considering the IPsec FPGA accelerator architecture, the 
challenge is how to partition the IPsec functions on HW, in which 
we need to trade-off between memory consumption, computing 
power and area. A major contribution is to draw a clear picture of 
the requirements and limits for the IPsec HW accelerator besides 
the proposed architecture. We elaborate the whole architecture to 
find non-time-critical parts and move them to run on software to 
achieve more area on an FPGA for performance hungry functions. 
Our proposed system model is depicted in Fig. 1 . End devices 
can be considered as user PCs connected to the Internet via a Fire- 
wall. IPsec processing take place collaboratively in IPsec FPGA and 
in IPsec SW server. The SDN Switch connects these different de- 
vices together. The IPsec tunnel is negotiated by IKE using IPsec 
SW on a server with another IPsec endpoint somewhere in the In- 
ternet. These negotiated Security Association (SA) values are trans- 
ferred to the IPsec FPGA which covers the ESP packet processing. 
When the End devices communicate through the IPsec tunnel, the 
SDN switch forwards the traffic to the IPsec FPGA for packet re- 
packaging. This approach uses the FPGA to accelerate only the traf- 
fic related to End devices and do not consider key negotiations at 
all. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the re- 
lated work regarding the IPsec on FPGA. Our proposed system ar- 
chitecture is explained in Section 3 . Section 4 points out critical 
issues of IPsec functionality and their consequences to FPGA im- 
plementation. Our proposal for the HW accelerator architecture is 
presented in Section 5 . Section 6 evaluates the design. The conclu- 
sions are given in Section 7 . 
2. Related work 
Several FPGA based implementations have been presented for 
IPsec acceleration. For instance, Heliontech already provides a com- 
mercial IPsec ESP core [4] which can reach 3.7 Gbps throughput 
rate, and there are several research proposals listed in Table 1 . 
Most of the works propose encryption acceleration on FPGA. 
Most use Advanced Encryption Standard Cipher Block Chaining 
(AES-CBC) or Electronic Code Book (ECB) instead of Galois Counter 
Mode (AES-GCM), despite that AES-GCM is described in RFC4106 
already in 2005 [5] . In addition, the Security Association Database 
(SAD) module or an equivalent is often considered on the FPGA 
which is the necessary storage for IPsec. The Integrity Check Value 
(ICV) and anti-replay are mentioned in few works and the purpose 
is well explained. The anti-replay feature for FPGA is a research 
topic itself and considered additionally e.g. in [6,7] . Quite many 
works left IKE out of scope and discussed the efficiency and cost- 
effectiveness of their solution instead. Our architecture uses IKE as 
described in [1] where it is working in its own SW solution. 
Table 1 
IPsec functionalities presented in related work. Throughput rate for 64 byte 
packet length in CBC mode if not otherwise specified. 
Research AES SAD ICV Replay IKE Throughput 
mode attack rate 
[8] CBC + + − SW 2.1 Gbps 
[9] CBC + + + SW 1.2 Gbps ! 
[10] ECB,CBC + − − − 1.5 Gbps ! 
[11] ? + − + − 11.28 Gbps 
with 512 B 
[12] CBC,CTR SPD − − ∗ 600 Mbps ! 
[13] ∗∗ − + − ∗∗∗ Unknown 
[14] ECB,CBC − − − − 742 Mbps 
with 1500 B 
[15] CBC + − − − 3.08 Gbps 
[16] CBC SPD + + - − 4 Gbps 
[17] only SHA − + − − −
[18] CBC − − − − 577 Mbps ! 
This work GCM + + + SW 2x5 Gbps 
( −) feature not covered; ( + ) is mentioned + − Covered, but implementation 
unknown SPD: Security Policy Database instead of SAD ∗ HW and SW com- 
ponents used ∗∗ Examined lightweight IPsec ESP cores ∗∗∗ Authors used ECC 
core for IKE ! Throughput rate not specified with network packet length This 
work uses 5 parallel 2 Gbps blocks for both decryption and encryption 
Korona et al. [8] proposed to use encryption modules in parallel 
for a single task using round-robin style. Parallel access to SAD in 
this solution was done using an arbiter system in its own clock do- 
main for the best performance. They reached 2.1 Gbps throughput 
for 64 B, and 5.5 Gbps for 1500 B packet length. 
Lu et al. built their solution on top of Xilinx Virtex-II Pro-FPGA. 
They separated the data and control paths to move the data pro- 
cessing on top of HW and leave the SW to maintain only control 
traffic. The work includes the SAD, ICV and anti-replay features and 
the design was built using reconfigurable and extensible network 
service platform with IBM PowerPC processor for SW operations. 
Synthesis shows maximum of 1197 Mbps throughput rate in AES- 
128 mode [9] . 
Virtex 5 family device was used by Niu et al. for IPsec ac- 
celerators in [10,11] . The design used key engine instead of IKE. 
The research addresses that crypto processing is the most time 
consuming operation and thus the design is utilizing several AES 
cores simultaneously through a crossbar bus. The SAD is placed 
in the SRAM and specified to hold 256 security associations. The 
proposal in [10] reached 1.5 Gbps processing rate with unknown 
packet length. However, they reached 11.89 Gbps throughput rate 
for 512 B packets in [11] . 
Partial reconfiguration is playing the key role in [12] . Their con- 
tribution includes mixing HW and SW solution in FPGA to gain 
flexibility in its operation. The design utilizes external memory to 
load either AES, SHA256 or MODEXP to IPsec co-processor using 
partial reconfiguration. The design reached slightly over 600 Mbps 
throughput with undocumented network packet length. 
The research in [13] focused as well on the crypto core instead 
of IPsec features. Driessen et al. presented a core called IPSecco 
that is designed for reconfigurable and lightweight HW. They used 
PRESENT instead of AES, GROSTL and PHOTON instead of Secure 
Hash Algorithm (SHA) and the ECC core instead of IKE which made 
the core very energy and cost-efficient. 
Wang et al. [14] used Network Security Processor system to ac- 
celerate the IPsec and SSL operations on FPGA. The research fo- 
cused on cryptographic processing and its optimization. The de- 
sign is planned to work with a PC through PCI-X interface instead 
of standalone device in a network. The implementation reached 
0.742 Gbps AES-256-CBC with HMAC-SHA-1-96 when tested with 
1500 B network data packet. This particular research addresses the 
problem of data packets exceeding the MTU of 1500 B. Their solu- 
tion uses packet size of 576 B for the network fragments generated. 
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In addition to IPsec on an FPGA, Park et al. discovered in 
[15] that Accelerated Processing Units (APUs) can be used for IPsec 
processing. Their design, PIPSEA , was able to reach a throughput 
of 3.08 Gbps for 64 byte packets and 11.09 Gbps for 1280 byte net- 
work packets using AES-CBC + HMAC-SHA1. The design was utiliz- 
ing three CPU cores and one GPU in the APU. 
Meng et al. designed and implemented IPsec on Cavium Octeon 
in [16] . The throughput rate for 64 B packet size was approxi- 
mately 4 Gpbs and with 1024 B packets 20 Gbps. Work described 
the need for integrity checks for ESP messages, replay attack pro- 
tection mechanism, and network packet fragmentation. 
An IPsec FPGA accelerator working through PCI interface was 
developed in [18] . Even though the results are quite old (2001), 
they achieved 577 Mbps throughput rate for AES-CBC with 128 bit 
keys with unspecified network packet size. 
In [17] the authors focused exclusively to SHA-1 implementa- 
tion. The SHA is important for IPsec because it provides necessary 
integrity protection and authentication for e.g. AES in CBC mode. 
They were able to reach 2.5 Gbps throughput for SHA-1 algorithm. 
Other characteristics of full IPsec implementation were not consid- 
ered. 
In [19] the authors proposed high speed AES implementations 
for AES-ECB and Counter Mode (AES-CTR). The results shows that 
still convenient CTR mode on Xilinx Virtex-6 reached 260.15 Gbps 
data throughput. 
Project Wireguard [20] has measured that famous IPsec soft- 
ware suite, Strongswan [21] , reaches 881 Mbps transfer rate with 
0.508 ms ping response time on an Intel i7 CPU on AES-GCM 
mode. Other benchmarks like Tremer [22] shows Strongswan can 
reach 1.3 Gbps throughput (AES-GCM) with 64 byte packet size. 
These values can be considered as a reference when measuring the 
hardware implementations. 
Related work clearly indicates that the approach, features and 
throughput varies a lot between the proposals. Our approach is to 
consider a full solution to be deployed in a production cloud envi- 
ronment. Therefore we also address the feasibility, difficulties, and 
constraints for the IPsec FPGA implementation. Our research con- 
tributions can be summarized as follows. 
• Elaborate requirements and options for production ready accel- 
erator design 
• Explain factors affecting the total performance of the design 
• Propose an IPsec HW accelerator architecture with SDN 
Our current prototyping platform consists of a lab network with 
servers hosting IKE services and several Intel Arria 10 FPGAs for 
ESP processing with 40 Gbps fiber links to SDN switches that we 
consider the upper bandwidth limit for our design constraints. Our 
proposal uses IKE from Strongswan [21] IPsec suite, but is not lim- 
ited to a specific IKE daemon nor FPGA device since we focus on 
the feasibility of the overall architecture. 
3. Architecture 
The overall network architecture is depicted in Fig. 2 . It is based 
on our previous work in [1] , in which the data and control planes 
are separated and the main division of IKE and ESP processing was 
made. In this paper we propose FPGA implementation for ESP, but 
we still need to consider the whole system for the requirements 
and constraints. 
The physical setup consists of end devices (e.g. IoT, mobile, 
computers), servers (router, director) and one or more FPGAs. An 
SDN switch is used in the data plane and a normal one in the con- 
trol plane. No traffic can cross the planes. 
The data plane contains the end devices, the SDN switch and 
the Router/firewall which acts as a gateway to the Internet. All 
Internet   
Network
Director
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FPGA
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Control plane
End
devices
SDN Switch
Switch
Router / 
Firewall
Fig. 2. The complete network architecture. 
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Fig. 3. The network director server modules and their corresponding network in- 
terfaces. 
communication between the network director server, SDN switch 
and the FPGA occurs in the separate control plane. 
Communication through the IPsec tunnel is transparent to the 
end devices. Packets are forwarded to the FPGA for encryption (or 
decryption) whenever needed based on the SDN flow rules in the 
SDN switch. These rules are created by the SDN controller which 
recognizes all IPsec related packets and makes necessary modifi- 
cations to the network. From the end devices viewpoint, they are 
sending packets to the router as usual. Packets get forwarded based 
on the destination IP address to the FPGA in the SDN switch. This 
behavior can be achieved only in SDN networks. 
The network director server depicted in Fig. 3 implements three 
software modules: an IKE negotiator , a network director orchestra- 
tor and an SDN controller . The IKE negotiator establishes the neces- 
sary Security Association (SA) with the other endpoint of the IPsec 
tunnel through the data plane. The SDN controller uses the control 
plane interface for pushing flow rules to the SDN switch. The net- 
work director orchestrator SW is the binding component between 
the IKE negotiator , the SDN controller , and also the FPGA . Thus the 
network director orchestrator controls the whole process by giving 
instructions to other software modules and the FPGA. 
The network director server is only intended to use IKE from the 
IPsec suite while the FPGA takes care of the IPsec packet process- 
ing. This is achieved in SDN by redirecting the IKE messages to 
the network director server as described in [1] and forwarding other 
IPsec related packets to the FPGA. 
The messages sent between different modules in IPsec tunnel 
setup phase are shown in Fig. 4 . The orchestrator instructs the SDN 
controller to push flows into the SDN switch to forward the IKE 
messages coming from the Internet to the network director . When 
finished, the orchestrator instructs the IKE negotiator to start estab- 
lishing an SA. Once the SA phase is done, the orchestrator pushes 
IKE SA information to the FPGA using the control plane. Finally 
more flows are pushed to the SDN switch that contain information 
which packets need to be sent to FPGA for encryption or decryp- 
tion. 
4. Feasibility for FPGA implementations 
In the following we consider issues affecting the intended FPGA 
implementation: the network director role, modifications required 
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Fig. 4. The initial message sequence required in startup phase. 
to the network, packet fragmentation problem, IPsec related vari- 
ables, anti-replay feature and security considerations. All of these 
contribute to the HW/SW partitioning decisions. 
4.1. Network director orchestrator responsibilities 
The orchestrator is responsible for setting up and removing the 
IPsec tunnels in the network. It initiates new connections using IKE 
as the negotiator, pushes flows using SDN controller and updates 
the SAD entries on the FPGAs. 
The orchestrator needs to set all of these up before the actual 
packet transmission starts. If a packet with non-existing SA infor- 
mation enters the FPGA, it must pause its operation and request 
the orchestrator to perform the IKE negotiation. Since the FPGA 
does not have much packet buffer space, such a delay may cause 
even loss of data. Thus, all IPsec tunnels should be negotiated be- 
forehand, keys stored in the FPGA SADs, and the necessary flow 
rules set in the SDN switch. Similarly, latency can be minimized 
by doing the re-key and key delivery operations from IKE to the 
FPGA prior to key timeout. This motivates our decision to run non 
time-critical tasks like IKE in SW and the rest in FPGA. 
4.2. Network layer memory requirements 
As desired and explained in (3) , the IPsec packet processing in 
FPGA is transparent to the end devices. We assume that all FPGAs 
are directly connected to the SDN switch so that all data forward- 
ing to the FPGA is based in IP addresses instead of typical Me- 
dia Access Control (MAC) address. Thus the packets may enter and 
leave the FPGA with any MAC address pair, or no MAC at all. De- 
spite easy control, there are some drawbacks. 
The first is that the switch learns falsely some MAC addresses 
in the FPGAs’ switch port even though the FPGAs have none. For 
this reason the MAC address learning feature should be off at the 
switch port where the FPGA is physically connected. 
The second is the incoming packet forwarding after the pack- 
ets are decrypted in FPGA. These decrypted packets contain wrong 
destination MAC address, which needs to be updated to match the 
real destination specified in the Internet Protocol (IP) header. There 
are practically four different solutions for this: 
1. ARP protocol on FPGA data plane 
2. Store learned IP & MAC address pairs on FPGA 
3. Use router’s MAC address as destination 
4. Let SDN switch to rewrite destination MAC field 
The most efficient and easiest is to use a look-up-table (LUT) to 
keep track of the seen IP and MAC address pairs in the FPGA and 
rewrite the false destination MAC address in the FPGA. The down- 
side is that unseen addresses are not yet present in the LUT and 
on the other hand, the size of the LUT would exceed the FPGA ca- 
pacity if all the possible IP addresses should be tracked. In simple 
networks with under hundred clients the size of the LUT will not 
cause problems. Still in larger networks some Address Resolution 
Cache (ARP) cache mechanism like one in [23] should be consid- 
ered. A sufficient method is to bind IP address to LUT addresses as 
presented in the following. 
1. IP address 192.168.0.24 = LUT address 0.24 
2. IP address 192.168.1.24 = LUT address 1.24 
3. IP address 192.168.112.87 = LUT address 112.87 
The LUT memory address thus is calculated from the lowest 
8 + 8 bits. Single LUT will then contain /24 network where each ad- 
dress holds the a MAC address for the IP address. Addresses for /16 
network in such LUT would consume 400 kB of memory, which in 
turn should fit to the on-chip memory. The usage of on-chip mem- 
ory is crucial since it can be read every clock cycle. 
Another feasible approach would be to use flow rule in the SDN 
switch to rewrite the MAC addresses in the switch level. In long 
run this however causes overhead to the SDN controller since it 
will receive every now and then requests to do also MAC address 
rewrite. Using a combination of second and fourth solution would 
be the best where the FPGA takes care of packet process in long 
run and the SDN network backs up when necessary. 
Another issue is that many different broadcast/multicast mes- 
sages in the network might reach the FPGA. Thus it is necessary 
to have white lists to allow only desired traffic to enter the FPGA. 
Without such white list all e.g. ARP and Dynamic Host Configura- 
tion Protocol (DHCP) packets, just to name few, will be delivered to 
the IPsec encryption process and pushed through tunnel. Allowing 
only IP protocol traffic that has no multicast address in the IP des- 
tination field or broadcast addresses in the MAC destination field 
will solve this problem. The white list can be implemented in a 
register file to be configured when needed at runtime. 
4.3. Network packet fragmentation 
Network packets close to the Maximum Transmission Unit 
(MTU) size of 1500 B cause a lot of problems in IPsec implemen- 
tation. The main reason is the overhead of 54–57 B in the IPsec 
AES-GCM mode. The header includes tunneling IP header (TNL IP) 
(20 B), SPI (4 B), Sequence number (4 B), IV (8 B), Padding (max 
3 B), pad length (1 B), Next header (1 B) and authentication tag 
(max 16 B). 
When a network packet with a size of 1445 B or larger gets 
encrypted in IPsec, it exceeds the MTU limit and requires fragmen- 
tation. The fragmentation can occur on IPsec device or on a router 
[24] in which case the packets must be reassembled prior to ESP 
packet processing. Thus packet fragmentation must be considered 
in the FPGA as well. 
To simplify the FPGA design, the fragmentation issue may be 
handled by limiting the MTU on the local network to 1400 B. This 
guarantees that no fragmentation is needed. However, this is not 
very robust and permanent solution. 
Usually the local networks have MTU of 1500 B and in these 
cases the fragmentation can be done by splitting the incoming 
packet in two: e.g. first 1024 bytes and the rest of the packet. 
This is an efficient and lightweight method which uses always the 
constant packet size. It is irrelevant in this case whether the first 
packet is full but not the second, because the two fragments will 
be generated in any case. 
Slightly more intelligent algorithm is required since the net- 
work MTU in local networks can be fixed to 90 0 0 B when the 
jumbo frame support is enabled. That will create seven 1500 B 
fragments because of the header overhead. The algorithm needs to 
take as many 14 4 4 B data chunks as possible, resulting to packets 
of n times 14 4 4 B and a packet containing the rest of the data. For 
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Fig. 5. Block diagram for simple anti-replay mechanism. SN(P) represents the Sequence number for received packet whereas X presents the SN counter current value. 
instance a packet of 2890 B will be fragmented to two where each 
contains 14 4 4 B of data and a packet of 2 B of data. 
Even though the splitting can be done efficiently, RFC4459 
[25] addresses the next three problems: 
1. Overhead of headers caused by fragmentation 
2. Computation required by the fragmentation 
3. Difficulties in packet reassembly in the receiving end 
The first one will occur in any case, and the computation prob- 
lem can be solved with FPGA. The last, however, is the most severe 
for the FPGA. As we know, the network packets rarely arrive in or- 
der and thus some buffering method is required. 
A recommendation is to use external DDR memory as a buffer 
to store all incoming network packet fragments. The FPGA needs 
to wait for all pieces to arrive, reassemble the whole packet and 
then push to the IPsec decryption module. Surely this is problem- 
atic when some fragment is lost or long latencies faced during 
the transmission. Thus the FPGA fragmentation buffer needs to be 
ready to clear out the oldest fragment pieces in order to receive 
new ones. The solution is a ring buffer that works well accord- 
ing to our experience. The ring buffer size does not have any strict 
minimum requirement. We can calculate that 500 Mb buffer will 
hold slightly over 41,0 0 0 packets of 1500 B which can be consid- 
ered sufficient for this application. 
4.4. SPI and IV 
The Security Parameter Index (SPI) value identifies the IPsec 
connection and thus must be unique for the IPsec tunneling de- 
ployment. The SPI negotiated by IKE protocol in a SW solution like 
Strongswan should verify the SA uniqueness for the best of the au- 
thors knowledge. The SPI value is 32 bits that minimizes the colli- 
sion possibility. 
The Initialization Vector (IV) is a random number used in cryp- 
tography and an essential part of AES-GCM process. The generation 
of a true random number in FPGA is complicated due to missing 
entropy source, but a pseudo-random number [26] is often suf- 
ficient. Our proposal is to benefit from the separate orchestrator 
server and create the random numbers there with a desired crypto 
library in advance and deliver the IV to the SAD for the usage. 
The IV value also must never repeat as stated in [5] . If the IV 
numbers deplete during the key lifetime, re-key operation should 
follow. The IV value must be 64 bits long in the IPsec using AES- 
GCM, that is quite a large set of unique numbers. Thus the IV can 
be considered unique for the key lifetime of few hours. Our con- 
clusion is that the FPGA does not need to carry out IV depletion 
case and its signaling to the network director. 
4.5. Anti-replay feature, integrity check value and sequence number 
The Integrity Check Value (ICV) and Sequence Number (SN) are 
both included in the anti-replay feature described in RFCs [5,24] . 
The SN verifies that a packet has not yet been received and is 
adequate new. The ICV, in our case the AES-GCM TAG, verifies 
the integrity and therefore trustworthiness of packet and its SN. 
Fig. 5 shows a simple anti-replay mechanism proposal for FPGA ar- 
chitecture. 
In optimal case, incoming packets come in order making the 
verification simple: next packet SN(t + 1) would be the previous 
packet SN(t) + 1. Unfortunately this is not the case since packets 
will likely arrive in mixed order within certain timespan if they 
ever arrive due to packet loss. Unseen packets will go through the 
integrity check for verification and when passing, the process will 
continue to update the necessary anti-replay information prior the 
next packet handling. 
The SN counter update occurs only when the received packet 
SN exceeds the current SN value. When so, the counter is updated 
with the SN value from the received packet. The next step is to up- 
date the information regarding the seen packets. The SN is 64 bits 
long due to the usage of Extended Sequence Number (ESN) manda- 
tory in IKEv2. Therefore it is virtually impossible to store informa- 
tion whether every single packet is already received or not. Luckily 
this is not necessary and a sliding window method such as one 
presented in [7] can be used. Still a register with a size of win- 
dow size is required to store received packet numbers. This does 
not cause any great memory requirements since e.g. register of 10 
bits is needed with anti-replay window of 1024 packets. 
Packets falling out of the anti-replay window can be silently 
discarded. In these cases the upper level protocol probably fixes 
the situation by requesting re-send from the original source when 
necessary. Discarding packets also occurs when they have already 
been received. Notable is that some implementations increase the 
SN counter when such discard occurs [27] . 
The [5] specifies anti-replay window size of 64, but for exam- 
ple Cisco presents windows size of 512 in the enhancement re- 
quests CSCva65805 and CSCva65836 512 [27] . When considering 
a high speed link, the window size of 64 is relatively small and 
some greater number in power of two like 512/1024/2048 should 
be considered. 
The anti-replay feature still might drift to problems when a 
significant packet loss of more than 2 32 packets is encountered 
[24] . The high bits of the ESN loses synchronization resulting to 
state where the anti-replay will fail all the time. This requires trig- 
ger and re-synchronization mechanisms as stated and described in 
[24] . The probability of such packet loss increases with higher link 
speeds. With 1 Gbit throughput rate we can estimate that packet 
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loss needs to last approximately for 2880 s. In 10 Gbps it is only 
tenth resulting 288 s. Therefore with faster links already in few 
Gbps it is a necessity to have this mechanism. 
A replay attack might occur when an attacker delays a network 
packet or resends it to the IPsec endpoint that it has already re- 
ceived. This kind of an attack is very severe because it can affect 
any device communicating through a VPN tunnel. Consequences 
vary from slowing down and cutting connections to having server 
software to receive duplicate entries or even possible denial-of- 
service (DoS) attacks. Thus the anti-replay feature is vital for an 
IPsec gateway even though the RFC 4303 [24] permits disabling it. 
4.6. Security association database 
The SAD contains the items described in Table 2 . The destination 
network information is not required in decryption SAD because it is 
used only for identification when choosing correct SA for outgoing 
packets. The IV on the other hand is missing since it is read from 
the incoming packet. The decryption SAD instead needs space to 
store sequence numbers (SNs) that have already been received. 
This results in 552 bits of data per connection in encryption 
SAD. The decryption SAD size is at least 868 bits per connection 
because it is required to store double the amount of information 
specified in the table to ensure seamless operation in the re-key 
phase. 
Thus we can approximate that in a larger environment with 
10 0 0 IPsec tunnels the amount of memory on an FPGA is 69 kB for 
the encryption SAD and 109 kB for the decryption SAD. The size of 
SAD does not seem to be a problem, but the response time is. Any 
external memory is slow compared to the on-chip one, which can 
be read every cycle. Still in the worst case finding a correct SA in- 
formation from the database takes 10 0 0 clock cycles which is way 
too long. The response must come from the SAD within few clock 
cycles, say 1–5, otherwise the whole accelerator speed is signifi- 
cantly reduced. 
There are two practical approaches: some small cache in the 
on-chip memory to store few previous (e.g. less than 20) SA in- 
formation, or the usage of Content Addressable Memory (CAM) or 
Ternary CAM (TCAM). The cache is fast to implement and offers a 
reasonably good response time. The downside is that it works well 
only when the FPGA processes a lot of packets with a very minimal 
set of SAs. When the number of SAs rise, the only feasible solution 
is CAM/TCAM, which returns the queried information in one clock 
cycle. 
For example Jiang and co-workers [28,29] presents good 
CAM/TCAM implementations, and a white paper from eSilicon pro- 
vides a good overview and arguments for TCAMs in Cloud [30] . 
In addition to CAM, we need to consider how to manage mul- 
tiple encryption and decryption modules accessing the SAD (CAM 
or equivalent) in parallel [8] . This occurs when workload is shared 
amongst more than one encryption or decryption modules. Luckily 
only the IV, SN and Seen SN values are affected. Thus a semaphore 
is required to ensure that only one process handles the variable at 
Table 2 
SAD registry entities on the FPGA. 
Item Size (bits) Enc. SAD Dec. SAD 
Destination network 32 + 32 yes no 
SPI 32 yes yes 
key 256 yes yes 
key size 8 yes yes 
IV 64 yes no 
SN 64 yes yes 
Seen SNs x no yes 
Tunnel SRC IP 32 yes yes 
Tunnel DST IP 32 yes yes 
a time. Extra latency of 3–5 clock cycles is expected, but can be 
reduced out via proper pipelining. 
As a conclusion, a memory solution that can return correct val- 
ues from a large table in few clock cycles is required. We cannot 
give any estimates of the required area before implementation and 
thus such CAM might even slow down the overall performance 
by limiting the number of maximum parallel modules. Unfortu- 
nately the CAM implementations are very expensive on FGPA leav- 
ing room for research on lightweight and fast memory solution. 
4.7. Security and attack vectors 
The most vulnerable spot is the control plane where the mes- 
sages for the FPGA and the SDN switch configurations take place. 
It is vital to ensure the physical security in addition to securing 
the devices’ software. Thus Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol 
suite should be implemented to control plane, including the FPGA. 
The most straightforward solution is to use soft core processor for 
its implementation on FPGA. The Openflow [31] protocol we use 
for communication between switches and the SDN controller sup- 
ports TLS as well. 
The on-chip memory on an FPGA for SAD ensures that private 
material cannot be leaked from the external memory of the FPGA 
by bus snooping. However, side-channel attack can still be exe- 
cuted on the chip itself, but this is out of scope of this paper. We 
require that any control traffic to FPGA is never plain text. 
When an SA is being removed, the related flows from the net- 
work should also be removed. Without flows, all packets that were 
originally getting pushed through the IPsec tunnel are now sent to 
the router for routing to the destination network even though it 
is unreachable. Unfortunately this is very dangerous behavior since 
clear text packets that might contain sensitive user data will be 
pushed to the Internet. Thus the router or another network device 
should drop these packets. 
This operation can be automated from the orchestrator if Ap- 
plication Programming Interface (API) or SDN is present in devices 
participating the packet delivery in data plane. Our solution relies 
on an SDN flows which create STOP rules for removed SAs. This 
might however cause a small overhead to the SDN controller and 
the orchestrator but is non-significant when everything is working 
properly. 
4.8. Summary of requirements 
Based on above considerations we conclude the requirements 
for the FPGA implementation in Table 3 . The IKE and IV genera- 
tion must be done prior to operation and necessary information 
delivered to the SAD in the HW. The fragmentation buffer size may 
vary, our architecture uses 500 Mb to reach sufficient buffering. 
Table 3 
Function distribution between hardware (HW) and software (SW) and any 
requirements they need regarding the architecture. 
Function Run in Requirements 
IKE SW Prior operation 
IV generation SW Prior operation 
AES HW –
Fragmentation HW Buffer size > 500 Mb 
SAD HW Response time critical, memory 
required 178 kB, parallel access needed 
Integrity check HW –
Anti-replay HW –
Anti-replay HW –
resync 
Ethernet stack HW 400 kB of fast response memory 
AES control HW < 2 MB of instruction and data memory 
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Fig. 6. Architecture of the proposed IPsec FPGA implementation. 
SAD has the strictest requirements with a response time of 1–5 
clock cycles, 178 kB of memory even though it might need to be 
on-chip memory, and also parallel access from the different mod- 
ules. The Ethernet protocol stack requires 400 kB memory which 
can return information rapidly, preferably on-chip. 
In the following we present the FPGA architecture that fulfills 
the above requirements. 
5. Proposed FPGA architecture 
Fig. 6 depicts the proposed IPsec accelerator architecture on 
FPGA. The main subsystems are the IPsec accelerator logic, control 
and data planes. Any traffic entering the FPGA is unable to cross 
the planes. 
The control subsystem contains a copper Ethernet interface and 
controller logic that terminates the incoming connections from the 
network director to this interface. The logic is implemented on a 
soft core processor with a lightweight TCP/IP stack and TLS im- 
plementation. The main task of the control plane is to update the 
SAD table in the IPsec accelerator. It has also register access to the 
other subsystems like packet client for configuring and monitoring 
the system. 
The data plane consists of Fiber optics block and a Packet client 
block, shown on the left in Fig. 6 . The Fiber optics block provides 
Physical Transport (PHY) and MAC functions. The packet client is 
a configurable protocol parser that is configured only to process 
Ethernet headers because the IP and ESP headers are processed in 
the IPsec accelerator logic. The packet client also includes the ARP 
cache and fragmentation handling. 
When the Fiber optics module receives data from network, it 
forwards Ethernet frames to the packet client which removes Eth- 
ernet header information and writes the payload data to the IPsec 
accelerator logic. When sending accelerator data to the network, 
packet client packs the data in an Ethernet frame and writes it for- 
ward to the Fiber optics module, which transmits the frame to the 
network. 
The IPsec accelerator logic consists of IPsec manager , a number 
of modules implementing the Encrypt/Decrypt functions and AES- 
GCM + AES blocks, one for each function module. The AES-GCM + 
AES blocks perform the actual AES algorithm. 
IPsec manager receives data from the packet client and delivers it 
to the desired module (Encrypt #1, Encrypt #2, Decrypt #1...). The 
IPsec manager only makes decision where a received packet will 
be pushed next and thus all modules are required to inform the 
IPsec manager whenever they are ready to receive new packet. This 
function is only concerning forwarding decision inside the IPsec 
accelerator logic and thus kept as lightweight as possible leaving 
the anti-replay and integrity check verification to take place in the 
modules. 
The modules directly communicate with the SAD to find and 
update corresponding SA entries whenever needed. They work on 
their own either to encrypt or decrypt the given packet. Each of 
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latency measurement locations marked as testpoints TP1-TP5. 
these modules have dedicated AES-GCM + AES blocks to ensure fast 
cryptographic processing. 
The number of functional modules is not limited to two as in 
Fig. 6 . Having more modules in parallel speeds up the packet pro- 
cessing since consecutive packets belonging to the same SA can use 
the same module. This action saves time since AES does not need 
to be reconfigured. However, in some cases all modules should be 
used for a single SA and sometimes every module for a different 
SA. To guarantee fair and correct module selection, probing the 
loading of a single module is needed. This algorithm can be built 
using the sliding window approach, but this is out of scope of this 
paper. 
6. Evaluation 
We will evaluate the FPGA logic area and speed as well as 
bandwidth and latency of the IPsec acceleration in the following. 
Our target platform is Arria 10 connected via 1 Gbps link to the 
control plane and 40 Gbps fiber link to the data plane. Laboratory 
setup for the evaluation is shown in Fig. 7 . It includes of six SDN 
switches, separate control plane switch, three Intel Arria 10 FPGAs, 
four servers and 20 PCs. 
Latency of the overall lab setup and SW solution was experi- 
mented. The proposed FPGA architecture was modified for mea- 
surements so that the IPsec accelerator logic is replaced with mea- 
surement logic shown in Fig. 8 . The measurement logic includes a 
loop that connects RX input directly to TX output, and an Ethernet 
frame generator that is capable of producing raw Ethernet frames of 
different sizes at stable 40 G bandwidth. The Control block selects 
the source of TX path between the two options and configures the 
frame generator. The control block can also inject packets to the 
Packet client TX output, when raw Ethernet frames are not suffi- 
cient for testing. Test points TP1-TP5 are probes that are used for 
latency calculations. Counters in Application logic and Fiber optics 
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blocks keep track of frames and bytes sent, and the values are used 
for bandwidth calculations. 
6.1. Software IPsec performance 
Experiments of latency and throughput on Strongswan IPsec in 
tunnel mode between Server 3 and Server 4 was conducted. Both 
had a virtual machine (VM) as a client for the VPN tunnel. Servers 
included Intel E5-2680 v4 CPU with Centos 6.9 and Strongswan 
5.7.1 in aes256gcm16 mode. In the experiment, FPGA 3 operated 
as an additional client for a network behind Server 4 sending ping 
packets to the VM in Server 3. To reach the VM, the packet re- 
quired IPsec encryption on Server 4 and decryption on Server 3. 
The packet, however, was hijacked right after encryption using an 
SDN flow back to the FPGA 3. The time difference measured on 
FPGA between sent and received packets in test points TP5 and TP1 
was the latency of Strongswan for encryption plus latency caused 
by the switch. 
Strongswan packet encryption for a single IPsec tunnel was 
measured to require 172 μs on average. Having 200 concurrent 
IPsec tunnels up without traffic did not cause any more latency. 
Increment in latency to 192 μs was noticed when 64 B ping traf- 
fic of approximately 10,0 0 0 packets per second (pps) in total was 
pushed through the tunnels. 
The raw packet throughput was measured with sending file 
with netcat directly between Server 3 and Server 4. Results showed 
4.7 Gbps transfer speed without IPsec encryption and 630 Mbps 
with it. Our expectation is that after offloading the IPsec process to 
HW acceleration on FPGAs 2 and 3, the same 4.7 Gbps is reachable 
with only 10 μs latency increment. There might be several reasons 
why the test setup did not reach 10 Gbps throughput already with- 
out IPsec, but this is irrelevant. Instead, significant is the decelera- 
tion in transfer speed when IPsec is used. 
6.2. FPGA resource and performance evaluation 
We can evaluate the accelerator logic to operate on at least 
175 MHz clock rate. The fiber optics module uses two separate 
312,5 MHz clocks for the RX and TX data paths. To allow the ac- 
celerator to run on a lower clock frequency, dual-clock FIFOS are 
used for crossing the clock domains between packet client and ac- 
celerator logic in each direction. The fiber optics module on FPGA 
transfers data every two cycles on a 256-bit Avalon-ST bus. As the 
accelerator reads from the FIFO every clock cycle, its frequency has 
to be at least 156,25 MHz for 40 Gbps bandwidth. 
The accelerator logic requires approximately 300 Adaptive Logic 
Modules (ALMs) for the IPsec manager, 18.5k for decrypt module 
with AES and 20k for encryption with AES. Further we can eval- 
uate the control plane blocks to require 20k ALMs and the data 
plane blocks 24k ALMs. Thus we can summarize that the entire 
IPsec FPGA implementation with 9–10 encrypt and decrypt pairs 
in IPsec accelerator fits to Arria 10 GX1150 that has 427.2k ALMs. 
The Arria 10 has 53 Mbit of internal M20K memory. We can 
evaluate that 10 Mbit of those must be reserved for the control 
logic and the SAD. 3 Mbit is reserved for the ARP cache. Packet 
buffering that is between the packet client and the IPsec accelera- 
tor can safely use the remaining 40 Mbit. With 64 byte packets en- 
tering the FPGA in 40 Gbps (59,523,808 pps), the buffers will store 
the maximum of 81,920 packets, which equals 1.3 ms time frame. 
Fig. 9 shows the process of encrypting one 64 B packet on 
FPGA. The IPsec manager reads the incoming packet and forwards 
it to Encrypt block 1. The Encrypt block configures the AES-GCM 
block using the information stored in the SAD and delivers the 
packet to be encrypted. After the AES-GCM encryption, the encrypt 
block finishes the packet to output. During the finishing task, the 
Table 4 
Impact to maximum allowed process- 
ing time in the implementation with 
different packet sizes when theoretical 
maximun packets per second rate for 
40 Gbps link is reached. 
Packet Packets per Maximum 
size (B) second time (ns) 
64 59,523,808 16.8 
128 33,783,783 29.6 
256 18,115,942 55.2 
512 9,398,496 106.4 
1024 4,789,272 208.8 
1500 3,289,473 304 
Table 5 
FPGA packet client buffering latency with 
different packet sizes. 
Packet RX path TX path 
size (B) latency (ns) latency (ns) 
64 50 62 
128 50 78 
256 50 100 
512 50 154 
1024 50 263 
1500 50 353 
9000 50 1854 
block generates the ESP trailer, updates the SAD and finishes the IP 
header. Decryption follows a similar procedure. 
In Fig. 9 , a new SA configuration is needed for the AES-GCM 
block. The new configuration causes a 14 clock cycle delay, before 
the AES-GCM block can start encrypting the data. When the AES- 
GCM block is reused for the same SA and already configured, the 
14 cycle wait is removed, because only IV and SN values have to 
be updated in the AES configuration phase. 
When encrypting a larger packet than 64 bytes, every 16 byte 
transfer cycle in the packet increases the processing time by 1 
clock cycle. Therefore, a 14 4 4 B packet can be encrypted in 131 
cycles. 
The processing rate of the implementation is critical in high- 
speed networks, because packets have to be handled in a cer- 
tain time to prevent buffer overflow. The Table 4 illustrates how 
packet size affects the maximum number of packets per second 
and therefore the processing rate requirement. Single decryption 
or encryption process can reach 2 Gbps packet processing rate at 
64 B packet size and 15.6 Gbps with MTU size. With pipelining and 
parallel processes, the throughput in 64 B reaches easily 10 Gbps. 
6.3. FPGA latency evaluation 
The total latency of the HW acceleration consists of packet pro- 
cessing and data plane latencies on the FPGA, and port latencies 
produced by the network switches. The data plane latency on the 
FPGA is the sum of fiber optics module, packet client and buffering 
latencies. Various test setups were used for measuring the band- 
width and latency in the network and inside the FPGA. FPGA data 
plane latencies were measured with an SDN flow that routed all 
IP traffic between Server 1 and Server 2 through FPGA 1, that was 
configured as loop. When Server 1 sent ICMP packets to Server 2, 
the RX path latency was measured on FPGA 1 between test points 
TP1 and TP3, and TX path latency between TP3 and TP5. 
Table 5 shows the combined latency of the packet client and 
FIFO buffers. The latency of RX path was constant 50 nanoseconds, 
but the TX path latency depended on the packet size. The reason 
for the difference is, that the TX FIFO is configured in store-and- 
forward manner to wait for a complete frame to be stored before 
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sending it to the network. A store-and-forward FIFO relaxes the 
clock speed requirements for the application logic, as the Ethernet 
standard does not allow the transaction of a started frame to be 
paused if the application is not able to produce data fast enough. 
For the FPGA transceiver and switch port latency measure- 
ments, FPGA 3 was configured as frame generator. The roundtrip 
latency of the transceivers was measured from test points TP5 to 
TP1, when a loop adapter was connected to the data plane inter- 
face. When FPGA 3 was connected through the switch to FPGA 
2, which looped packets back to FPGA 3, the switch port latency 
could be calculated by subtracting the previously measured laten- 
cies from the total latency between TP5 and TP1. Frame and byte 
counters in the Fiber optics block on FPGA 3 were used in the test 
for bandwidth calculation. 
The measured switch port and FPGA transceiver latencies were 
1 μs and 250 ns per direction, respectively. Measurements also re- 
vealed that the full 40 Gbps link could be utilized on all packet 
sizes between 60–1500 B. Therefore, one 14 4 4 B MTU-sized packet 
can be encrypted or decrypted by the FPGA with an approximated 
total latency of 10 μs, including the port latency in the network 
switch. 
6.4. Summary of evaluation 
A single FPGA can reach 10 Gbps operating speed in any packet 
size. When put to Cloud Data Center (DC) context the real world 
efficiency is depicted in the following. The network traffic in DC 
varies a lot depending the DC purpose and traffic measuring point. 
According to our experiences, common traffic in the DC back- 
bone is around 100 Gbps whereas closer to edge 10 Gbps. Common 
packet size according to Benson et al. [32] is between 200 Bytes 
and 1400 Bytes. Supposed DC in this case with 100 Gbps traffic us- 
ing e.g. 400 B IMIX [33] packets handle more than 25 Mpps. There- 
fore the Cloud DC requires approximately 10 IPsec FPGA accelerator 
devices that each have their own tunnels to handle. 
We have listed two different open source IPsec projects that 
we can easily compare to our IPsec FPGA based proposal. First 
is the Libreswan with throughput of 5.25 Gbps using AES-GCM 
with unspecified packet size [2] . Second SW solution is the 
Strongswan measured in Section 6.1 reaching 630 Mbps throughput 
even though in [22] reported to reach 1.3 Gbps packet rate with 64 
B packets. Thus our proposed IPsec FPGA architecture has speed up 
of 1.9 to Libreswan and 7.7–15.9 to Strongswan. The HW solutions 
presented in related work are mainly slower compared to our solu- 
tion. Still in [11,15,16] the throughput outperformed our presented 
architecture when large network packet size was used. 
Latency measurements in turn shows 172–192 μs latency for 
the Strongswan. The most difficult network packet in terms of la- 
tency for our architecture is 14 4 4 B since it produces MTU-sized 
ESP packet. Evaluation indicates the proposed solution to han- 
dle these MTU-sized packets in approximately 10 μs resulting to 
speed-up of 17 in latency to SW solution. 
The throughput of the presented architecture is limited by the 
data processing rate in the accelerator logic. The most expensive 
operations on FPGA are AES-GCM encryption/decryption and AES 
configuration. Multiple AES-GCM blocks can operate in parallel for 
increased throughput. If the AES-GCM block is already configured 
for the correct SA, reconfiguration is not needed. Therefore, the ac- 
celerator logic should prefer forwarding packets of one tunnel to 
the same AES-GCM block to avoid unnecessary reconfigurations. 
7. Conclusion 
This research introduced an SDN fashion IPsec accelerator ar- 
chitecture and what must be considered in a production ready de- 
sign. The IPsec is a good proof-of-concept to be offloaded due to 
its modular structure. 
Presented concept considers only the heavy IPsec packet pro- 
cessing in the FPGA and leaves the IKE to operate on a completely 
different device in the network. This saves the valuable area on 
the FPGA to focus on packet encryption and decryption functions. 
An individual function reaches 2 Gbps operation speed at 64 B, and 
15.6 Gbps with MTU sized network packets without pipelining. The 
presented architecture meets the target and is capable of hosting 
10 0 0 tunnels, and with parallel processing 10 Gbps packet through- 
put is expected in all packet sizes while the latency stays below 
10 μs. 
The presented IPsec HW accelerator meets our goal and pro- 
vides all the necessary features for production ready design. The 
IPsec HW solutions are widely researched as shown in the related 
work, but the overall architecture and production readiness is often 
quite vague. Even though it is easy to discuss the throughput and 
latency, more important is to include all necessary features and 
functions since they affect the performance. Designed architecture 
covers the necessary anti-replay and fragmentation features which 
are mandatory. This accelerator is feasible for voice and audio ap- 
plications due to its low latency, and simultaneously it also serves 
the IoT world that needs vast amount of concurrent tunnels. 
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